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1 
l':'li v· . S ::.~ \... <; e \'i) . ~to E.D. Pa . Timely ~, 4 
~nn [Circuit Judge], .d~~ ~~ · I 
v. Lord & Cahn [District ~
Judges ]-) --
GOLDBERG Federal/Civil 
1. SUMMARY: Does the Military Selective Service Act, 50 
u.s.c. A.pp. § 451, et s eg., unconstit•Jtionally disc riminate 
against wome n by excluding them from registering f o r the draft? 
2. FACTS: The Military Selective Service Ac t (MSSA) 
provides separately f o r registr a tion and for conscription. Under 
§ 452, the President is empowered to issue a procl amation 
requiring nll male citizens and Jllale resident alie ns between the 
ag e s of e ighteen and twenty-six to regi s ter. Regi s tration was 
,.._ r~;>!r 
di s continue d by Pr es i dent Fo r d in 1975. Partly in response 
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Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, President Carter on July 2 
reinstituted the registration procedures by requiring 19- and 20-
year-old males to register. The President also recommended to 
Congress that the MSSA be amended to permit the registration and 
possible conscription of women. Congress agreed that 
registration was necessary and appropriated funds for that 
purpose. H.R.J. Res. 521. Congress did not, however, amend the 
MSSA to include women. 
The present suit was filed in 1971 by male citizens arguing 
that the Selective Service Act violated, inter alia, their right 
to equal protection of the laws. In 1974, a three-judge court 
was convened pursuant to 28 u.s.c. (1970 ed.) § 2282, to consider 
whether the MSSA Act impermissibly discriminated on the basis of 
sex by excluding females from the registration requirements. 
After years of inaction, the suit was scheduled for trial in 
1980. On July 18, 1980, the three-judge district court issued 
its opinion. 
3. DECISION BELOW: In a unanimous opinion, the three-judge 
~
district court found the registration requirements of the MSSA 
u~ The court first found that it had jurisdiction 
over the case in that plaintiffs had standing and the case was 
ripe for determination. The court next addressed the essential 
question of the appropriate standard of review. It noted that a 
middle level standard of review is normally applied in sex 
discrimination cases requiring the government to demonstrate an 
"important government interest" in support of the classification. 
~' ~.s_., Personnel Administration of Massachl.!setts v. Feeney, 
' . 
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442 u.s. 256, 273 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
This heightened standard of review is justified because the Equal 
Protection Clause is intended to guard against "seemingly well-
intended classifications that in fact relegate women to an 
V"" 
inferior status." The Government's citation of Schlesinger v. 
Ballard, 419 u.s. 498 (1975), for the proposition that a less 
stringent test is appropriate given the important governmental 
interest in matt e rs involving the armed forces is not persuasive. 
Schlesinger did not explicitly state that a rational relations hip 
test was being applied, and the fact that the Court stated that 
mere administrative convenience was insufficient to justify the 
classification indicates that it was not the test being applied. 
The fact that Congress' war powers are invoked is not cause to 
( 
change the standard of review. Korematsu v. United States, 323 
u.s. 214 (1944). 
The court, applying the middle level of review, found the 
Government's showing to be inadequate. Essentially, the 
Government argued that since women could not fill combat 
positions in the armed services it would serve no purpose to 
register women since, if conscription were required, the primary 
need would be for draftees to fill combat-related positions. The 
court, citing Department of Defense studies, rejected the 
argument since it was clear that the armed services could use 
certain number of women to fill noncombat positions and thus free 
men from those positions. The availability of women registrants 
would materially increase the armed services' flexibility, as 
-4-
opposed to hampering it. Moreover, Congress has in the past 
encouraged female participation in the armed services. 
"It is incongruous that Congress b~lieves on 
the one hand that it substantially enhances our 
national defense to constantly expand the 
utilization of women in the military, and on the 
other hand endorses legislation excluding women 
from the pool of registrants available for 
induction. Congre s s allocates funds so that the 
milit a ry can us e and active ly see k mor e fem a le 
recruits but noneth e le s s asser t s that the re is 
justification for excluding females from 
selective s e rvice, de spite the shortfall in the 
recruitment of women. Congress rejects the 
current opinion of each of the military service s 
and asserts that women can contribute to the 
military effectively only as volunteers and not 
as inductees." (Footnot e s omitte d.) 
The court concluded, therefore, that the MSSA was 
unconstitutional and enjoined the Selective Service Department 
( from requiring any registration under the Act. 
On July 19, Mr. Justice Brennan stayed the execution and 
enforcement of the district court's judgment. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The Government argues that the district 
rather than the rational relationship test employed in 
Schlesin~. In Schlesinger, the Court recognized that Congress 
has broad constitutional power to raise armies under Art. 1, § 8, 
and emphasized that the responsibility for determining how the 
military should fight or prepare to fight wars rests with 
Congress. The result of the heightened standard of review is to 
place the court in the position of considering policy arguments 
beyond its technical competence. First Amendment. cases have 
shown that the full panoply of constitutional safeguards are not 
i~herently afforded when the military is involved. ~.g., Greer 
' I 
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v. ~oc~, 424 u.s. 838 (1976). Moreover, deference ~ ngress 
the is appropriate because the question of registration 
subject of continuing and vigorous congressional debat . In such 
the~ instances, the legislature is the proper forum for resolving 
lv 
issues. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464, 479 (1977). ~
The Government, in the alternative, argues that even under 
the heightened standard of review the Act is constitutional. The 
system of conscription, of which registration is a necessary 
part, is combat-oriented. Registration and subscription must be 
structured to satisfy Congress• perception of military needs. 
Congress has recently concluded that in times of national 
emergency the draft will be required to fill critical manpower 
shortages in combat positions that are foreclosed to women. 
Congress also found that noncombat positions can presently be 
satisfactorily filled by women volunteers. Congress was of the 
view that all potential draftees should be comba t-capable to 
provide maximum flexibility in the event of national emergency. 
All draftees, regardless of their assigned position, are 
potential combat troops if the need arises. Thus, the Act is 
constitutional because it bears a substantial relationship to the 
Act's central purpose of creating an effective system to mobilize 
the Country's human resources during a national crisis. 
5. DISCUSSION: As Mr. Justice Brennan stated in his in-
chambers opinion granting a stay of execution and enforcement of 
the district court judgment, "[t)he importance of the question 
and substantiality of the constitutional issues ~re beyond 
cavil." The district court opinion is arguably inconsistent with 
/ 
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Schlesinge~, and arguably does not afford su"fficient weight to 
the legislative determinations recently made by Congress . . Given 
the fundamental importance of the question raised, and the 
potentially serious impact of the district court's judgment on 
the conduct of the Nation's miliary operations, the Court should 
note probable jurisdiction. 
Response has been waived. 
9/25/80 
ME 
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(Rosenn [Circuit Judge] , 




1. BACKGROUND: Sixteen female citizens of the United 
States, ranging in age from eighteen to twenty-six, move for 
leave to intervene as appellants in this case. The potentiul 
intervenors believe "for a variety of reasons, with broad 
societal significance," that women should not be f o rced to 
register. "The Movants believe that it is imperative that this 
Court not determine the constitutionality of an all-male 
Selectiv e Se rvice System without full presentation and 
consider a tion of the r e asons, including sociologic 21, 
De/?f. ~v~~ ~ ,-YJ~i:.e ~e.;/ ~~/'>1~ ~ ~/c::l 
&~ ~ 
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( ' psychological and religious grounds, why million of women oppose 
compulsory service in the Armed Forces." 
Movants allege that the Government has not adequately 
presented the factors enumerated above. The Government seeks to 
justify the all-male draft solely on the grounds of military 
efficiency. Moreover, the Government is not tot·ally adverse to 
appellees' position, as evidenced by the fact that the Executive 
branch at one point supported the drafting of women. 
Movants did not attempt to intervene in this case earlier 
because they were unaware of it. They did, however, file a 
motion to intervene in the more publicized case of Barnett v. 
Rostker, No. 80-1578 (D.C. D.C., filed June 26, 1980). The 
district court in Barnett stayed proceedings pending final 
c\ disposition of this action before deciding on the motion to 
intervene. 
Movants are well suited to ar~ue the constitutionality of 
the Act. Their interests are mirror-image of appellees' 
concerns. Movants adequately typify the interests of similarly 
situated females who are now exempt and wish to remain so because 
of ~ number of social reasons such as physical inferio~ity to 
men, fear of sexual harassment, desire for motherhood, etc. It 
is clear that this advocacy i s needed since the district court 
failed to take into account the societal interests considered by 
Congress. "Such assessments of the broad social i mpact of a 
decision to draft women are within the unique prov i nce of 
Congress to make and are not for the courts to ignore, especially 
-~-
1 ~ where, as here, questions of our national defense and Congress' 
I ' 
power are concerned." 
2. DISCUSSION: A motion to intervene is rarely granted. 
Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice .432-38 (5th ed. 1978). 
On occasion, the Court has permitted intervention where the 
intervenor's interests are directly at stake. Id. See generally 
United States v. Jerminal Railroad Association, 236 U.S. 194 
(permitting intervention for the purposes of seeking modification 
of decree that operated prejudicially to intervenors). 
Here, rnovants have not demonstrated any special interest in 
the matter under review. Other than their status as females, it 
is not claimed that they speak for any particular groups or 
organizations possessing national prominence or support. 
Moreover, they have not demonstrated that the quality of their 
advocacy will materially advance resolution of this case. The 
Government is capable of presenting the legal argu~ents even 
though the Executive branch initially favored registration of 
women. It is clear that the Government has acted quickly and 
forcefully to overturn the decision below. Movants present no 
argument why their position could not adequately be presented by 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell March 10, 1981 
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No. No. 80-251: Rostker v. Goldberg 
Question Presented 
Whether the Military Selective Service Act 
discriminates unconstitutionally on the basis of sex because 
it requires all men of a certain age to register, while 




I. The Statutory Scheme 
Under § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 
u.s.c. App. § 454(a), the President is authorized to require 
every male citizen and resident between the ages of 18 and 26 
to register for the draft. Under § 4 (a), 50 u.s.c. App. § 
454 (a), each registrant who is classified appropriately is 
subject to conscription. However, under 50 U.S.C. App. § 
467(c), actual induction of draftees was prohibited after July 
j' 
7 1, 1973. Thus, although the President is now authorized to ., 
require registration, Congress would need to act before the 
draft could be resumed. In 1980, President Carter asked that 
funds be appropriated to pay for a resumption in draft 
registration. He also sought an amendment to the Act 
authorizing registration of women. Congress allocated funds 
to resume registration, H.R.J. Res. 521, but after various 
hearings refused to amend the act to require registration of 
women.l 
II. This Litigation 
This suit arose in 1971, when male citizens subject 
to registration and induction brought suit challenging the Act 
lsee SG' s Brief at n. 7. Some of these hearings occur red 
prior to the President's recommendation concerning registering 
women. Others ccurred after the recommendation. The Senate 
l Armed Services Committee made findings of fact on the subject that were endorsed by House-Se nate conf erees' considering the 1981 Defense Authorization Bill. J.S. App. at 26-28. 
3. 
on various constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was 
denied on the ground that the claims were insubstantial, but 
the CA3 reversed this ruling with respect to the sex-
discrimination claim. On remand, the District Court found 
this claim substantial and ruled that the plaintiffs had 
standing. A three-judge court was convened, which denied a 
motion to dismiss in 1974. 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974). -
The government's motion for summary judgment was denied in 
February 1980 (the suit was dormant for about five years), and 
the court allowed intervention by a plaintiff subject to the 
renewed draft registration. A class of all draft-eligible men 
was certified, and the court proceeded to rule on the basis of 
a five-volume stipulated record. 
In its opinion last July, the court upheld the 
standing of two groups of class members--those subject to 
registration now or in the near future, and those registered 
prior to 1975 who are still subject to possible induction. It 
found that registration itself was a "sufficient intrusion on 
1 individual rights" to give these persons standing, under Duke ---------- --
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 u.s. 59 
(1978), and Baker v. Carr, 369 u.s. 186, 204 (1962). Next, 
( the court held that there was sufficient immediate harm to 
create a "case of controversy" and that prudential doctrines 
of ripeness did not counsel it to delay this adjudication 
until after induction begins. It would make no sense, the 
court held, to wait until a national emergency requires a 
4. 
draft to begin. 
Turning to the merits, the court subjected this law 
Jl ,, 
to intermediate scrutiny, under Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190 
(1976), and other cases. It rejected the argument that strict 
scrutiny applies because fundamental interests are at stake. 
It also rejected the argument that mere "rational basis" 
scrutiny applies under Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 
(1975). The court then rejected the government's argument 
that a total exclusion of women from registration is related 
to the governmental interest in maintaining the flexibility of 
the armed forces in times of emergency. In so doing, it 
relied on a Defense Department estimate that a major 
mobilization would require 650,000 new recruits, and that up 
to 80,000 of these could be women without impairing the ------ --- --~--------------.. 
flexibility or strength of the forces. It found no basis for 
the congressional conclusion that women as volunteers should 
be increased, whereas the drafting of women should be totally 
ruled out: 
The die is already cast for substantial female 
involvement in the military. Furthermore, the 
military does not lose flexibility if women are 
registered because induction calJ.s for females can 
b~ made gg_cord.Jng to m1litary needs as they accrue 
in the"'-ruture. Tffough military flexibility might 
call for less utilization of femalL inductees than 
male inductees in a given crisis situation, it is 
the antithesis of "flexibility" to exclude women 
from the pool of registrants that could be called 
upon in a time of national need. 
J.S. App. at 41-43. 
I 
5. 
The court granted declaratory and injunctive relief, 
and refused to stay its order. Justice Brennan then entered a 
stay pending action in this Court. 
Discussion 
I. The Standard of Review 
The parties differ over the proper level of scrutiny 
to be applied to this act. This may be a critical issue. 
There are three competing alternatives: strict scrutiny, the 
rational basis test, and "intermediate scrutiny" as 
exemplified in Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190 (1976), and other 
sex-discrimination cases. 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
In the court below, respondents argued that a draft 
implicates "fundamental interests" and therefore its 
classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny, just like 
classifications in the area of voting, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972), and travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 u.s. 618 
(1969). See generally Gunther, Constitutional Law chap. 10, § 
4. They do not press this point here, however. There is some 
force to the argument that draft classifications must receive 
strict scrutiny, because the draft deprives individuals of a 
whole range of "fundamental interests"--liberty, and perhaps 
even life. However I tend to agree with the court below that 
such scrutiny would make no sense in this context. 
Classifications are necessary, yet almost any line would be 
6. 
unsupportable if subjected to the strictest of scrutiny. 
"Fundamental interests" analysis only makes sense in areas 
where there is a presumption against any deprivation of the 
relevant interest--the right to vote, or travel, for example. 
Here, it cannot be said that there is a presumption against 
governmental power to induct people to defend the Nation. 
B. Rational Relationship 
The United States argues that this classification 
should only be subjected to "mere rationality" scrutiny, 
To support -
this proposition, they refer to Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 
U.S. 498 (1975), in which the Court upheld differential 
periods of time applicable to male and female Naval officers 
during which they were required to be promoted or discharged. 
The Court in Schlesinger upheld the additional period of time 
given to women officers as justified compensation for other 
disadvantages imposed on women in the Navy. In so doing, it 
distinguished Reed v. Reed, 404 u.s. 71 (1971), and Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 6 77 ( 19 7 3) --two cases in which the 
intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications first began 
to appear. The Court relied on the fact 
) 
the Navy are ~ "similarlL situated" 
treated differently. ------
that women and men in 
and therefore may be 
The Court did not state that it was applying a lower 
level of scrutiny to the case because it involved the 
military. It did refer to the "complete rationality" of the 
classification, 419 U.S., at 509, and then stated the 
following: 
This Court has recognized that "it is the primary 
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready 
to fight wars should the occasion arise." Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17. See also Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 u.s. 83, 94. The responsibility for 
determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend 
to that business rests with Congress, see U.S. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and with the 
President. See u.s. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. l. 
We cannot say that, in exercising its broad 
constitutional power here, Congress has violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Id., at 510. 
I would not hold that this language requires the 
Court to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny to the draft 
A.~ laws. Rather, I would adopt appellees' view that the standard 
{~~should be the same in all contexts, although that standard 
~ will be easier to meet in some contexts than in others. 
~ Indeed that is the fairest reading of Schlesinger v. Ballard 
M ~ itself: 
~ 
~ LY ~ not similarly situated. 
5 ~ that Frontiero itself was a military case, and the fact that 
the Court in Schlesinger applied Frontiero. 
there are important governmental interests in the 
military area and those may on occasion be pursued through 
gender classifications that recognized that men and women are 
Any other reading neglects that fact 
In sum, I would not hold that the heightened 
scrutiny of sex classifications is not vitiated by the "war 
power" of the Congress. See United States v. Robel, 398 U.S. 
258, 263-64 (1967) ("'Even the war power does not remove 
8. 
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential 
liberties.'"); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse 
Co., 251 u.s. 146, 156 (1919) ("The War power, like other 
powers and like the police power of the states, is subject to 
applicable constitutional limitations."). Even if you are 
disposed to decide that this particular classification is 
valid, I would not ground the decision on a lower level of 
scrutiny--because to do so would create something of a 
dangerous precedent. In my view, First Amendment cases from 
the military context like Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), 
and Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348 (1980) , should be 
distinguished to the extent that they accord lesser free-
speech protections to military personnel. 
premised on the assumption~ 
discipline and organization to 
that the 
function 
These cases are 
military requires 
and that service 
personnel necessarily give up some of the freedoms possessed 
by civilians. Such a rationale cannot justify lesser scrutiny 
of the classification by which persons are forced to register 
for the draft. This classification affects only civilians, 
and, especially in light of the enormous personal interests at 
stake, there remains a need to see that it is related to an 
important governmental interest. On the other hand, when the 
proferred governmental interest implicates military expertise, 
there is plenty of room for deference to that expertise. This 
deference should come in at the next level--of assessing the 
importance and validity of the underlying state interests. 
9. 
The government seems to make a separate argument for 
lesser scrutiny based on the fact that women are ineligible 
for combat. They argue that this gender classification merely 
reflects a legitimate classification of people who are 
eligible and ineligible for combat. This argument might be 
rephrased; it might be argued that it is permissible to 
classify by gender where the sexes are necessarily situated 
differently with respect to a relevant characteristic, i.e., 
combat-eligibility. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, 419 
U.S. at 508 ("the different treatment of men and women 
reflects the demonstrable fact that male and female line 
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect 
~ to opportunities for professional service"); 
~. ,~~ Sonoma County Superior Court, No. 79-1344 
~r concurring) ("we have recognized that in 
Michael M. v. 
(Stewart, J., 
certain narrow 
circumstances men and women are not similarly situated, and in 
these circumstances a gender classification based on clear 
differences between the sexes is not invidious, and a 
legislative classification realistically based upon those 
differences is not unconstitutional."). 
On problem with this argument is that it conflates 
the question of the level of scrutiny with the second set of 
issues surrounding the state interests being asserted. If men 
women differ in a relevant way, this may be a 
justification for a gender classification, but it is not clear 
why it makes sense to alter the level of scrutiny itself. In 
10. 
any event, such an argument is probably inapplicable to the 
present case because a line between men and women does not 
accurately reflect the distinction between combat-eligibility 
and combat-ineligibility. Many men must register, even though 
they have exemptions from the draft. Moreover, many women may 
be physically capable of many tasks denoted as "combat" and 
actually are permitted into many jobs that involve combat in 
some sense. Finally, the draft does not exist solely to 
produce draftees for combat jobs. Historically, many draftees 
Thus, some men and some women may ~~· never performed such jobs. 
~ _.Jl. J.a well be "similarly situated" and yet treated differently by 
_ ~ ~ the draft laws. In such a case, the intermediate level of 
scrutiny applies. Indeed, the government may well have 
conceded this when they conceded below that this law is a pure 
gender classification. See Op. below, J.S. at 43a ("It is 
undisputed that the MSSA creates a gender-based 
classification"). 
II. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny 
A. The Standard 
u.s. 190 
As phrased by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren 429 
(1976), "classifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives." Id., at 197. 
These governmental objectives cannot include mere 
administrative convenience, id., at 198; Frontiero, supra, at 
690. Nor can the government seek to promote "old notions" 
11. 
about the proper roles of men and women. Craig v. Boren, at 
198; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15. Finally, a law is 
not "substantially related" to governmental objectives if it 
employs "gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane 
bases of classification." Craig v. Boren, at 198. 
"
1 [A] rchaic and overbroad 1 generalizations," id., about women 
are unacceptable even if there is some "congruence between 
gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purport[s] 
to represent," id., at 199. 
This standard must be applied to two sets of 
justifications for the refusal to register women: the SG 1 s 
military-based arguments, and the arguments by amici 
concerning preservation of the family and respect for the 
values of part of the population. 
B. The SG 1 s Justifications 
follows: 
The SG 1 s basic argument may be summarized as 
(1) Even in times of emergency, the armed forces 
could fulfill all of its needs by drafting from an exclusively 
male pool of registrants. ( 2) There is therefore no need to 
register women. (3) Indeed, if the government were forced to 
draft large numbers of women this would interfere with the 
defense of the nation in a time of emergency either by cutting 
--------------~-----,~-----------------~-------------------------down on the number of men who could be drafted, or by taking 
~.----~----------------'-----------------------up space in training facilities for unneeded women. (4) 
These conclusions are based in part on exclusions of women 
from combat positions that are unchallenged in this case. (5) 
12. 
As a result of these restrictions on women in combat, the 
government cannot draft large numbers of women, because it 
must maintain the flexibility that is produced by rotations 
between combat and non-combat positions. 
I would reject this argument, basically for the 
reasons stated by the District Court. In my view this 
argument does a very poor job of justifying the total 
exclusion of women from registration. At most, this argument 
shows why Congress found no military need to register women, 
and why there are strong state interests in not drafting too 
many women. But the argument does not begin to show why it 
would harm governmental interests to register women in case 
there is a situation in the future in which drafting them 
would be desirable. Such registration in itself can only 
enhance the flexibility of the armed forces by allowing this 
option to be available. And this case does not involve 
~ military decisions concerning assignment of women to combat or 
(3~ ~the number of women who should be in the service. Those 
~~ ~decisions should be left to the Army, regardless of whether 
~~ women are asked to register. 
~ To be sure, the Constitution does not compel 
registration of women if there is no prospect at all that they 
could ever be inducted without interfering with the defense of 
the country. But it fair to say that the Constitution does 
require women to register if a substantial number could be 
accomodated in the armed forces in time of emergency without 
13. 
limiting military flexibility. The bur den must be on the 
government to show that such an eventuality cannot come to 
pass. This is a burden that the government cannot satisfy, 
because the Defense Department's own studies show that up to 
80,000 women usefully could be taken into the Army in a time 





J .A. at 275-276 (Deposition of 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics); Opinion 
Below, J.A. at 31-32 (" [T]he figure of 80,000 female inductees 
does not represent an estimate of the number of positions 
women could fill--i.e. noncombat, noncombat reserve positions-
-but represents the number of female inductees that would be 
of overall benefit to the effectiveness of a mobilization 
plan."). 2 It is not surprising that so many representatives 
2These figures accept the various limitations on women in 
combat that are presently in force. No doubt these 
limitations are valid in themselves, but there is a likelihood 
that some of the "combat" jobs in the Army will in the future 
become open to women. The Defense Dept has sought repeal of 
1 
all statutory limitations on assignment of women, and has 
opened up many Army positions previously closed to them. See 
America's Volunteers, J.A. at 85-89. These changes are 
reflected in the large increase in the number of women 
volunteers accepted that has been and is taking place. If 
this process continues, the number of women who can be used in 
a mobilization will increase. 
Arguably, the Army could obtain 80,000 volunteers on 
an emergency basis, but this is only a possibility. Certainly 
it could only be more efficient to have registrations of women 
showing their available skills. 
14. 
of the Army testified that they would like to have an 
available pool of female registrants. See id., at 39-40, n. 
30. 
Appellees argue at length that the "flexibility" 
justification for not registering women should not be 
considered at all, since it is merely a post hoc 
rationalization by Congress in 1980 for an act passed in 1948. 
This argument seems overly technical to me, in view of the 
importance of this case and the serious consideration given to 
registering women by Congress in 1980. It would make no sense 
to invalidate the 1948 act if it could be reenacted 
immediately based on the 1980 legislative history. On the 
other hand, I am convinced that even the 1980 legislative 
history does not help the government. Most of it is concerned 
with the question whether drafting women is militarily 
necessary. But the real 
"' 
issue is whether 
1-f 
the mere 
registration of women is so pointless as to be irrational, or 
----~~----~---------------------------
somehow itself an interference with governmental objectives. 
This showing has not been made here. 
The case turns, in my view, on the validity of the 
"Battle of the Bulge" rationale--that draftees must be men in 
order to given the army flexibility and reserves in time of .., 
dire emergency. But this argument simply does not justify a 
refusal to register women or to induct some of them to fill in 
the thousands of support posit ions in the armed forces. In 
view of the fact that the justifications offered by the 
15. 
government for this classification are so weak,3 and even seem 
to defy common sense on occasion, it may well be fair to 
conclude that the real motivation for Congress's refusal to 
register women in 1980 was the same as in 1948--a desire to 
shield women from induction because such service is not 
"appropriate" for members of their sex. 
c. Other Justifications 
Various amici argue that the exclusion of women from 
registration is justified by the pervasive belief in our 
society that women should not be drafted, and by the need to 
shield the family from such an interference. These arguments 
are largely illegitimate or, at best, insufficient to justify 
a complete exemption of all women from the draft. To the 
extent that the argument is based on the beliefs of portions 
of the population, it probably cannot be controlling. The 
existence of "stereotypes" has been recognized in past cases, 
see supra, and it cannot itself be a justification for a 
gender classification. To the extent that beliefs about women 
and military service are religious in nature, they probably 
are sufficient to justify a conscientious-objector exemption 
under existing law. The non-religious beliefs of others are, 
3The Justice Dept appeared, to recognize the weakness in the 
available arguments support~ all-male registration when it 
asked Congress to provide new'Yationales during 1980 hearings-
-making explicit reference to the pending litigation in 
Philadelphia. J.A., at 218-221. 
16. 
from a purely legal point of view, no more relevant than the 
beliefs of many that the government should not draft anyone--
men or women. 
To be sure there are more tangible problems with 
drafting women--involving pregnancy, child care, the family in 
general. But these problems are present to a large degree -when men are drafted as well. If the Congress thinks they are 
serious, they should be handled by sex-neutral exemptions for 
parents, or single-parents, or married persons. Only such a 
selective approach satisfies the standard in Craig v. Boren 
requiring that gender not be used as a rough approximation of 
other, more salient characteristics, especially when archaic 
views of proper sex roles are implicated. In the end, these 
discussions about the need to preserve the family amount to 
invocations of stereotypes about the proper role for women in 
this society. These arguments are irrelevant to the legal 
issue. 
To be sure, it is partly the deep feelings of many 
opponents of draft registration for women that make this a 
"big" case. The prospect of political opposition or 
disruption may enter into your calculations at the level of 
what Alexander Bickel called the "passive virtues." The Court 
simply may not be ready to take on the deep-seated beliefs of 
many citizens in such a case. But it is worth recognizing 
that there are strong feelings on both sides of this issue, 
and registration may be a perfect place in which to continue 
7? 
17. 
the process of equalizing treatment of men and women. Long 
before there would be any actual induction of women, there 
would be time for the country to get accustomed to the idea 
that both sexes are available when needed. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The appropriate level of scrutiny for this explicit 
gender classification is drawn from ...;:C~r;..:;a:;;.:i:...giL.-_v.:_:_. ---=B=-o=-=.r...::;e=n • 
Schlesinger v. Ballard does not support a mere rationality 
approach in this case, and First Amendment military cases are 
distinguishable and refer to quite different problems. 
Applying the "important governmental interest" test 
to this classification, the SG argues that an exclusion of 
women enhances military flexibility. But this is contradicted 
by common sense and .--- ...._ e opinions of the Defense Department. *--
To be sure, the not to draft 
women in particular settings and should be able to make 
judgments about where women should be assigned. But the flat 
exclusion of women from registration serves no governmental 
c::: ~ 
interest at all, and cannot be justified on the theory that 
there will never be a setting in which the drafting of women 
would be desirable. 
The other justifications offered by amici are 
largely illegitimate or insufficient to justify a complete 
exclusion of women from registration. 
I would therefore invalidate this gender 
18. 
classification. In so doing, I would make clear the large 
measure of discretion left to the military and to Congress 
concerning actual induction of women and use of women 
soldiers. I would also leave to Congress the decision about 
whether to enact registration that includes women, rather than 
simply enlarging the class to which the present statute 
applies. 
Library: 
Please obtain for me as promptly as possible, my 
own personal copies, of the following documents: 
Senate Report, No. 96-826 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 
(1980) • 
Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration under 
the Military Selective Service Act: Bearing on s. 109 and 
s. 226 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the 
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 
(1979) (testimony of General Rogers). 
\ 
PS 03/17/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: No. 80-251, Rostker v. Goldberg 
I got the sense from your marginal notations on my 
original bench memo that I had not adequately explored the 
factual support for the state interests asserted here in 
favor of excluding women from the draft. Those state 
interests may be divided into two categories: military and 
societal. I will treat these separately. 
I. Military Justifications 
The single argument made by the government in 
favor of the exclusion of women from registration is that 
there would be no reason to draft women, even in a dire 
emergency, and that doing so would in fact interfere with 
the military effort by undermining flexibility. In my view, 
2. 
one can accept the present exclusions of women from various 
"combat" positions, and accept that idea that there needs to 
be considerable rotation of men from combat to non-combat 
positions during a war, and still find no real support for 
the view that registering women would harm our military 
preparedness. 
There are two reasons for this. First, as a 
matter of pure logic, as long as the Army is not required to 
draft women that it does not want, the mere registration of 
women can cause no harm. Indeed~ it can only be a positive 
event--giving the Army an additional option with which to 
face any possible future crisis. It was for this reason 
that the "representatives of the various armed services all 
testifed that they would have no objection to the 
registration of women." Op. below at 39a. As General 
Rogers put it: "Women should be required to register ••• in 
order for us to have an inventory of what the available 
strength which is within the military qualifed pool in this 
country." Id. 
To be sure, requiring registration of women would 
be a pointless exercise if there were no possibility of 
their use in a time of crisis that would not interfere with 
military flexibility. But that is where the second flaw in 
the government's argument comes in. They simply have not 
shown that all use of women draftees would inhibit 
flexibility. Instead, the "current uniform opinion of the 
3. 
armed services and Department of Defense is that women 
inductees could be utilized, and that it would be valuable 
to include women in the pool of registrants available for 
the draft." Op. below at 30a, n. 20. This is based in part 
on Defense Department estimates that 80,000 women could be 
inducted during a time of full mobilization and trained for 
proper jobs without any cost in terms of preparedness and 
flexibility. Op. below at 3la. These women would be 
drafted after the first 90 days of a mobilization, as part 
of a total mobilization of 650,000 over six months. JA at 
299. This view also makes common sense. It simply cannot 
be true that the military would be harmed if 80,000 non-
combat jobs, out of total armed forces of several million, 
were filled with women draftees. After all the rotations of 
troops into combat are hardly likely to involve all of the 
many personnel who will remain stationed here in the United 
States. Rather, it makes more sense to think that such a 
number of women would only be freeing men for combat. And 
they would not need to fill up "basic training" centers if 
they were intended for administrative duties similar to 
their civilian work. As an Assistant Secretary of Defense 
and the Director of Selective Service put it: 
It is in the interest of national 
security that, in an emergency requiring the 
conscription for military service of the nation's 
youth, the best qualified people for a wide 
variety of tasks in our Armed Forces be available. 
The performance of women in our Armed Forces today 
strongly supports the conclusion that many of the 
best qualified people for some military jobs in 
teh 18-26 age category will be women. The 
Administration strongly believes they should be 
available for service in the jobs they can do, 
just as men will be available for jobs they can 
do. 
4. 
J .A. at 212 (Statement of Asst. Sec' y Pirie and Director 
Rostker). 
To the extent that you think that I am merely 
disagreeing with Congress's perception of the military 
facts, it is important to recognize that Congress last year 
never found that there would be a cost to military 
flexibility if women were registered. It did make the 
findings quoted in full on pages 26a-27a of the opinion 
below. But these do not contradict the view of the defense 
establishment that it would be useful to have registration 
of women and not detrimental to have some drafting of women 
in a full mobilization. Congress found, inter alia, that 
there "is no military need to include women in a selective 
service system," that "manpower deficiencies under the All-
Volunteer Force are concentrated in the combat arms," that 
in time of mobilization "the primary manpower need would be 
for combat replacements," that the "need to rotate troops 
and the possibility that close support units could come 
under enemy fire also limits the use of women in non-combat 
jobs," and that "[i]f the law required women to be drafted 
in egual numbers with men, mobilization would be severely 
impaired because of strains on training facilities and 
administrative services." Id. 
?~-9~~ .. 
~~~~~~ 
None of these findings questions the assertion ~
that it could only help the country to have women registered~ 
and "on hand." And none questions the Defense Dept stu~ 
showing a possibility of drafting a significant number of~ 
women without ill effects. Instead, Congress focused~, 
consistently on two wrong questions-- (1) whether there i~ ? 
any military need to include women in the class of people~ 
who may be forced to serve, and (2) whether the militar~ 
should be required to draft soldiers on a sex-blind basis~~ 
¥o; 
Neither issue is presented here, where the real issue is / . .J _. ,, ,, ~
whether _:he military ~d b_: harmed by registrat~n. o;;;_~,.,.r 
that issue, the Court is left with the express findng of ~ 
three-judge district court that the United States failed ~ 
carry its "burden to establish that the exclusion of fem~'f 
from registration for selective service promotes an 
important government objective and is substantially ~ 
to the achievement of that objective." Op. below ~~~-it,.) 
"Though military flexibility might call for less utilization 
of female inductees than male inductees in a given crisis 
situation, it is the antithesis of 'flexibility' to exclude 
women from the pool of registrants that could be called upon 
in a time of national need." Id., at 42a-43a. 
II. Societal Justifications 
Petitioners do not rely on any other 
justifications for the exclusion of women. In my view, they 
do this because other, societal justifications would either 
.. 
6. 
be illegitimate--because based on sex-role stereotypes--or 
clearly insufficient to justify the complete exclusion of 
all women. The Congress's finding in this area was: 
Under the Administration's proposal there is no 
proposal for exemption of mothers of young 
children. The Administration has given 
insufficient attention to necessary changes in 
Selective Service rules, such as those governing 
the induction of young mothers, and to the strains 
on family life that would result from the 
registration and possible induction of women. 
Op. below at 27a. 
The concern expressed by Congress concerning the 
need to shield young mothers may well be a valid one--
considering the biological and deep-seated social reasons 
why many women play a predominant role in rearing young 
children. But such a concern cannot be a justification for 
excluding all women from registration. Indeed, it cannot be 
a justification for excluding any women from registration 
alone. Many men are accorded exemptions because of societal 
needs, but all are required to register, in part so that 
they can be located if the situation changes and they are 
needed. 
But Congress suggested more. It suggested that 
registration of any women would place strains on "family 
life." This assertion can only be based on an assumption 
that women continue to play a role in the family that 
differs from that of men--even where they are not raising 
children. In other words, it appears to be based on the 
7. 
assumption that women should never be required to serve in 
the military, merely because that would not be appropriate 
for women. This argument is fundamentally illegitimate 
under this Court's cases. Even if it is true that women 
tend to be less qualified for military service, and that 
their absence will place somewhat greater strains on "family 
life," these "loose-fitting characterizations" cannot be 
sufficient where a more selective categorization is 
possible. Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190, 199 (1976). Where 
there is a "weak 
characteristic or 
congruence between 





represent," the legislature must "realign [its] substantive 
laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or adopt procedures 
for identifying those instances where the sex-centered 
generalization actually comport[s] with fact." Id. 
Moreover, these concerns about disrupt ion cannot 
be too severe when one considers that women will not be 
drafted at all unless there is the kind of massive wartime 
mobilization that will create much more severe "strains" on 
society. This same fact makes it unlikely that an 
affirmance in this case will lead to further litigation 
concerning military decisions about the actual number of 
women to draft. Such a decision belongs to the military, 
and in any event the question would not arise until time of 
real emergency, when presumably people would have better 
things to worry about. 
8. 
* * * 
I know that the last thing you needed was another 
long memo to read, but I wanted to make sure that you were 
presented with the best arguments against the asserted state 
interests in this case--arguments which I view as 




Random Notes on Joint Appendix Material 
Principal sources presently available to me, in 
addition to the briefs, include the joint appendix, the 
report dated June 20, 1980, of the Armed Services Committee 
of the Senate, and report dated July 10, 1979, of the Senate 
Committee's Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel that 
contains testimony in 1979 of the various members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Conference Report on Defense 
Authorication Act of 1981. 
This memo will record notes as I read the Joint 
Appendix. 
Joint Appendix 
The complaint in this case is not in the appendix. 
For the most part, in appears to include reports, documents 
and excerpts from interrogatories and depositions - some of 
which date back to 1976. It is important to check the dates 
particularly when quotations appear in the briefs. 
President's recommendations (February 11, 1980). 
In a report to Congress expressed in the third person, it is 
said that the "President has decided to seek authority to 
register, classify and examine women for services in the 
armed forces." It is further stated that "equity can be 
achieved by registering both men and women and then 
( 
( 
providing that they serve in proportion to the ability of 
the armed forces to use them effectively." p. 34, 35. 
Note the emphasis on "equity" rather than combat 
readiness and effectiveness. This is a theme that runs 
through many of the Administration's statements and 
testimony. 
Further report of behalf of the President 
(2/11/80) - p. 38-80. 
59. 
Army policy excludes women from combat - 58. 
Performance of women in the voluntary service -
Report on use of women (May 1977, updated 
September 1978) - p. 98. 
This report does recognize that "the overriding 
issue is maintaining the combat effectiveness of the armed 
forces". 107. 
(Note that this pertains only to the volunteer 
system) • 
2. 
This report is made in the context of a volunteer 
service. It points out, correctly, that higher quality 
volunteers come from women than can be recruited from men -
who mostly are low quality. Thus, the report states that 
"use of more women can be a siginficant factor in making the 





Brookings Institution Study: Women in the 
Military (July 28, 1977). Apparently what is repoduced at 
p. 182-184 of the JA is an "information paper" that 
summarizes conclusions. It contains little relevant 
information beyond saying that the "military effectiveness" 
of bringing women into the armed services has resulted in a 
"healthy measure of uncertainty remaining". 184. Further 
study needed. 
Combat exclusion definition for women (p. 185). 
In a memorandum requesting approval by Secretary of the 
Army, a definition of the "combat role from which women will 
be excluded" was spelled out rather generally. No women to 
serve in "battalion and lower level combat maneuver units". 
p. 186. Nor should women serve with field artillery canon 
and certain air defense artillery battalions. 
Also excluded would be units such as airborne and 
air mobile forces, combat engineers, special forces," etc. 
p. 186. 
Special report by u.s. Army Research Institute 
(for behavioral and social sciences), dated May 30, 1978 -
p. 188-204. 
Prepared two years before this legislation was 
under consideration, this study - purporting to rely on 







conclusions. Apparently the study included only "army 
combat support and combat service support units at the 
divison and corps level, including "speciality areas such as 
maintenance, medical, military police, signal, supply and 
transportation." In these units the study concluded that 
"women had little or no adverse impact on the performance of 
their units", and "in a general sense" had a favorable 
impact. p. 190. An exception exists where "physical 
strength was a factor". p. 192. Under a caption entitled 
"training for tactical and sustainment tasks in the field", 
the following enlightening "findings" were made. 
"Women demonstated a general lack of 
training for and knowledge of life in the 
field and of tactical operations. This lack 
of training and knowledge is detrimental to 
unit survivability in a combat environment. 
Further, it places an added burden on and 
causes morale problems among male members of 
the unit who must take up the slack in any 
situation where females do not carry their 
fair share of the load. Under current 
methods of warfare, no unit is completely 
safe from ground attack no matter how far 
removed from the main battle area. Enemy 
guerilla bands operate in the rear areas 
seeking opportunities to disrupt the 
logistics chain. As a result, every unit, 
combat or combat support/combat service 
support, must be capable of establishing a 
strong perimeter defnse and be prepared to 
withstand a full-scale attack, particularly 
during hours of darkness. Women must be 
prepared to fight in these situations, 
operate individual and crew-served weapons 
effectively, as well as being able to pitch 
tents, dig latrines, and stand guard duty if 
they are to carry their fair share of the 
load. Failure to perform these tasks during 
REF WAC 77 was not always due to lack of 
ability. Many women made an effort to 
( ( 
acquire the knowledge they needed. However, 
either the common tendency of men to be 
protective or male nonacceptance of females 
often thwarted their efforts to learn. In 
units where commanders insisted that each 
individual, man and woman, carry a full share 
of the load in common tasks, the quality of 
unit performance was much higher than in 
units where women were protected or ignored." 
192-193. 
Note: The above statement is important, and 
5. 
reflects a good deal of my thinking and knowledge of combat 
and military affairs. Modern war is no longer limited to 
fixed lines. It envelopes large and unpredictable areas. 
See also examples of women saying they did not wish to fight 
even in an emergency. p. 193. 
An apparently conflicting statement, made only two 
pages later, is that "women are capable of rendering a 
proficient performance in any combat support/combat service 
support unit. MOS not requiring a large measure of physical 
strength." Women also have as much "stamina and endurance" 
as men. 195. 
Under a caption entitled "leadership and 
management", this study concluded that the units it observed 
were badly led because they were "protective of women or 
ignored women" (seems unlikely!). "This mismanagement 
resulted in low morale ••. and a mediocre unit 
performance. It created unreit among the male members who 
were required to perform extended duty periods of duty to 
( 
c 
( ( . 
fill in where the women were either excused or not 
employed." 196. 
6. 
The report found substantial "bias against women". 
Its findings included the following: 
"Senior officers - fartherest removed from the 
problem - fully accepted women. 
"Junior officers" were "indifferent to the 
problem". 
"Old soldier NCO's were openly opposed to women in 
word and action". 
"Although NCO's generally admitted that women can 
perform well in their tasks, most NCO's just do not want 
them around." - 197. 
With respect to "female field health and 
sanitation", this study also made some interesting findings: 
women complained about the "great distance and infrequency 
of visits to showers". This requirement for "frequent 
showering" received support from the medical observers who 
verified that "gynecologically speaking, a woman has a 
greater need for more frequent attention to budy cleanliness 
than a man." 199-200. (In the African Campaign, 1942-43, we 
went for four months without a shower, hot water, or indoor 
and private closed latrines.) 




" Pit type latrines were not satisfactory for 
women, who sought other sources for relief. They expressed 
the added concern of possible assault while visiting a 
darkened latrine site some distance from their billet, 
although no such attack was reported." p. 200. It also was 
noted that "no obstetrician-gynecologist was available 
within the First Infranty Division, nor was one authorized". 
200. Nor were other facilities available for "particular 
female medications" or "examining women". p. 200. 
Statement by Richard Danzig on behalf of the 
Administration. (p. 206-208) - strongly supports 
registration of women, stating this is the President's 
position, and is "consistent with the Administration's 
positions on equal rights for women and the principle of 
fairness in imposing obligations on our citizens". 206. 
While the statement praises past and present service of 
women generally (a view with which I quite agree), it does 
not mention that the purpose of armed services is to fight 
and win wars; not to promote to equal rights for women or 
any other citizens. p. 206. 
The statement emphasizes the "equity" of having 
both men and women serve "in proportion to the ability fo 
the armed forces to use them effectively". 208. It also 






women will be used, and that the rate of induction for women 
as well as men will be determined by military need". p. 208. 
Statement of Robert B. Pirie, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense. (March 5, 1980) (p. 209). This is a statement 
before the Armed Services Committee of the House, 
representing the Administration's view, emphasizes "equity". 
"The President's decision to ask for 
authority to register women is based on 
equity. p. 211." 
Hearings before House Armed Services Committee 
(March 5, 1980). The testimony of members of the 
Administration (Robert B. Pirie, Bernard D. Rostker, and 
Larry L. Simms - see p. 215 - before a subcommittee is 
reproduced from pp. 214-250. It does not appear to be 
significantly helpful, although it follows the 
Administration's line closely. 
Testimony of Lt. Gen. Moore (Oct. 14, 1976), when 
this case was in any early stage. p. 252-258. Although 
called by plaintiff's counsel, his testimony does not seem 
particularly helpful. General Moore does say (and I would 
agree) that "we have found that a dedicated female soldier 
is a very effective soldier". (p. 257) The General 




(The Korean war started over a weekend). 257. Perhaps his 
most important statement was that 
"Between 80 and 90% of the replacements in a 
wartime situation are for combat arms units". 
This was the experience in our last three 
wars. p. 258. 
General Moore also stated that there has been no 
difficulty "in recruiting sufficiently high quality 
9. 
volunteer women to fill the authorized slots, and authorized 
skills" (p. 258). 
Deposition of Gen. Edward c. Meyer (Oct. 19, 
1976). (p. 259-265). Although a good deal of Gen. Meyer's 
testimony seems meaningless, he did emphasize the 
"tremendous management problem" that would arise in wartime 
as to the disposition of women in relation to men (ratios, 
etc.) among units. He stated: 
"Traditionally there have been some women 
drivers, and things like that in a 'broader 
theater', but it would be difficult, indeed 
it would be almost impossible, in my view, 
the management of people at that critical 
point. I just see the next war as being so 
demanding that anything that complicates the 
management of people in an early stage would 
make it neigh on impossible to be effective." 
(p. 261) • 
General Meyer continues: 
"I would say that any women in any units 
would have this [adverse] effect on 
management. It would just be a flat 




Depositon of Maj. Gen. Dean Tice. (May 13, 1980), 
also called - as all of these witnesses were - by the 
plaintiff. (p. 281). Gen. Tice's first statement about the 
battle of the Bulge hardly helped the plaintiff: 
"Everybody immediately went into combat • • • 
We even retrained all the clerks and cooks in 
France and sent them to the front line." 281 
* * * 
The Joint Appendix includes statements or brief 
excerpts from testimony of several other people, all called 
as witnesses for the plaintiff. None of this seemed 
particularly relevant. Apparently, the United States didn't 
put on any testimony but relied on the findings and reports 
of the Congress, plus testimony before the Armed Services 
Committee that is a matter of public record. 
lfp/ss 3/20/81 
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Random Notes on Joint Appendix Material 
Principal sources presently available to me, in 
addition to the briefs, include the joint appendix, the 
report dated June 20, 1980, of the Armed Services Committee 
of the Senate, and report dated July 10, 1979, of the Senate 
Committee's Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel that 
contains testimony in 1979 of the various members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Conference Report on Defense 
Authorication Act of 1981. 
This memo will record notes as I read the Joint 
Appendix. 
Joint Appendix 
The complaint in this case is not in the appendix. 
For the most part, in appears to include reports, documents 
and excerpts from interrogatories and depositions - some of 
which date back to 1976. It is important to check the dates 
- particularly when quotations appear in the briefs. 
President's recommendations (February 11, 1980). 
In a report to Congress expressed in the third person, it is 
said that the "President has decided to seek authority to 
register, classify and examine women for services in the 
armed forces." It is further stated that "equity can be 
achieved by registering both men and women and then 
providing that they serve in proportion to the ability of 
the armed forces to use them effectiv~ly." p. 34, 35. 
Note the emphasis on "equity" rather than combat 
readiness and effectiveness. This is a theme that runs 
through many of the Administration's statements and 
testimony. 
Further report of behalf of the President 
(2/11/80) - p. 38-80. 
59. 
Army policy excludes women from combat - 58. 
Performance of women in the voluntary service -
Report on use of women (May 1977, updated 
September 1978) - p. 98. 
This report does recognize that "the overriding 
issue is maintaining the combat effectiveness of the armed 
forces". 107. 
(Note that this pertains only to the volunteer 
system). 
2. 
This report is made in the context of a volunteer 
service. It points out, correctly, that higher quality 
volunteers come from women than can be recruited from men -
who mostly are low quality. Thus, the report states that 
"use of more women can be a siginficant factor in making the 
all volunteer force continue to work". 107. 
3. 
Brookings Institution Study: Women in the 
Military (July 28, 1977). Apparently what is repoduced at 
p. 182-184 of the JA is an "information paper" that 
summarizes conclusions. It contains little relevant 
information beyond saying that the "military effectiveness" 
of bringing women into the armed services has resulted in a 
"healthy measure of uncertainty remaining". 184. Further 
study needed. 
Combat exclusion definition for women (p. 185). 
In a memorandum requesting approval by Secretary of the 
Army, a definition of the "combat role from which women will 
be excluded" was spelled out rather generally. No women to 
serve in "battalion and lower level combat maneuver units". 
p. 186. Nor should women serve with field artillery canon 
and certain air defense artillery battalions. 
Also excluded would be units such as airborne and 
air mobile forces, combat engineers, special forces," etc. 
p. 186. 
Special report by u.s. Army Research Institute 
(for behavioral and social sciences), dated May 30, 1978 -
p. 188-204. 
Prepared two years before this legislation was 
under consideration, this study - purporting to rely on 
empirical data - produced some rather interesting 
4. 
conclusions. Apparently the study included only "army 
combat support and combat service support units at the 
divison and corps level, including "speciality areas such as 
maintenance, medical, military police, signal, supply and 
transportation." In these units the study concluded that 
"women had little or no adverse impact on the performance of 
their units", and "in a general sense" had a favorable 
impact. p. 190. An exception exists where "physical 
strength was a factor". p. 192. Under a caption entitled 
"training for tactical and sustainment tasks in the field", 
the following enlightening "findings" were made. 
"Women demonstated a general lack of 
training for and knowledge of life in the 
field and of tactical operations. This lack 
of training and knowledge is detrimental to 
unit survivability in a combat environment. 
Further, it places an added burden on and 
causes morale problems among male members of 
the unit who must take up the slack in any 
situation where females do not carry their 
fair share of the load. Under current 
methods of warfare, no unit is completely 
safe from ground attack no matter how far 
removed from the main battle area. Enemy 
guerilla bands operate in the rear areas 
seeking opportunities to disrupt the 
logistics chain. As a result, every unit, 
combat or combat support/combat service 
support, must be capable of establishing a 
strong perimeter defnse and be prepared to 
withstand a full-scale attack, particularly 
during hours of darkness. Women must be 
prepared to fight in these situations, 
operate individual and crew-served weapons 
effectively, as well as being able to pitch 
tents, dig latrines, and stand guard duty if 
they are to carry their fair share of the 
load. Failure to perform these tasks during 
REF WAC 77 was not always due to lack of 
ability. Many women made an effort to 
acquire the knowledge they needed. However, 
either the common tendency of men to be 
protective or male nonacceptance of females 
often thwarted their efforts to learn. In 
units where commanders insisted that each 
individual, man and woman, carry a full share 
of the load in common tasks, the quality of 
unit performance was much higher than in 
units where women were protected or ignored." 
192-193. 
Note: The above statement is important, and 
s. 
reflects a good deal of my thinking and knowledge of combat 
and military affairs. Modern war is no longer limited to 
fixed lines. It envelopes large and unpredictable areas. 
See also examples of women saying they did not wish to fight 
even in an emergency. p. 193. 
An apparently conflicting statement, made only two 
pages later, is that "women are capable of rendering a 
proficient performance in any combat support/combat service 
support unit. MOS not requiring a large measure of physical 
strength." Women also have as much "stamina and endurance" 
as men. 195. 
Under a caption entitled "leadership and 
management", this study concluded that the units it observed 
were badly led because they were "protective of women or 
ignored women" (seems unlikely!). "This mismanagement 
resulted in low morale ••• and a mediocre unit 
performance. It created unrest among the male members who 
were required to perform extended duty periods of duty to 
fill in where the women were either excused or not 
employed." 196. 
6. 
The report found substantial "bias against women". 
Its findings included the following: 
"Senior officers - fartherest removed from the 
problem - fully accepted women. 
"Junior officers" were "indifferent to the 
problem". 
"Old soldier NCO's were openly opposed to women in 
word and action". 
"Although NCO's generally admitted that women can 
perform well in their tasks, most NCO's just do not want 
them around." - 197. 
With respect to "female field health and 
sanitation", this study also made some interesting findings: 
women complained about the "great distance and infrequency 
of visits to showers". This requirement for "frequent 
showering" received support from the medical observers who 
verified that "gynecologically speaking, a woman has a 
greater need for more frequent attention to budy cleanliness 
than a man." 199-200. (In the African Campaign, 1942-43, we 
went for four months without a shower, hot water, or indoor 
and private closed latrines.) 
The following summary of findings also is 
interesting: 
7. 
" Pit type latrines were not satisfactory for 
women, who sought other sources for relief. They expressed 
the added concern of possible assault while visiting a 
darkened latrine site some distance from their billet, 
although no such attack was reported." p. 200. It also was 
noted that "no obstetrician-gynecologist was available 
within the First Infranty Division, nor was one authorized". 
200. Nor were other facilities available for "particular 
female medications" or "examining women". p. 200. 
Statement by Richard Danzig on behalf of the 
Administration. (p. 206-208) - strongly supports 
registration of women, stating this is the President's 
position, and is "consistent with the Administration's 
positions on equal rights for women and the principle of 
fairness in imposing obligations on our citizens". 206. 
While the statement praises past and present service of 
women generally (a view with which I quite agree), it does 
not mention that the purpose of armed services is to fight 
and win wars; not to promote to equal rights for women or 
any other citizens. p. 206. 
The statement emphasizes the "equity" of having 
both men and women serve "in proportion to the ability fo 
the armed forces to use them effectively". 208. It also 
states that "military efficiency will determine how many 
B. 
women will be used, and that the rate of induction for women 
as well as men will be determined by military need". p. 208. 
Statement of Robert B. Pirie, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense. (March 5, 1980) (p. 209). This is a statement 
before the Armed Services Committee of the House, 
representing the Administration's view, emphasizes "equity". 
"The President's decision to ask for 
authority to register women is based on 
equity. p. 211." 
Hearings before House Armed Services Committee 
(March 5, 1980). The testimony of ~embers of the 
Administration (Robert B. Pirie, Bernard D. Rostker, and 
Larry L. Simms - see p. 215 - before a subcommittee is 
reproduced from pp. 214-250. It does not appear to be 
significantly helpful, although it follows the 
Administration's line closely. 
Testimony of Lt. Gen. Moore (Oct. 14, 1976), when 
this case was in any early stage. p. 252-258. Although 
called by plaintiff's counsel, his testimony does not seem 
particularly helpful. General Moore does say (and I would 
agree) that "we have found that a dedicated female soldier 
is a very effective soldier". (p. 257) The General 
emphasized the need to be ready to fight without delay. 
(The Korean war started over a weekend). 257. Perhaps his 
most important statement was that 
"Between 80 and 90% of the replacements in a 
wartime situation are for combat arms units". 
This was the experience in our last three 
wars. p. 258. 
General Moore also stated that there has been no 
difficulty "in recruiting sufficiently high quality 
9. 
volunteer women to fill the authorized slots, and authorized 
skills" (p. 258). 
Deposition of Gen. Edward c. Meyer (Oct. 19, 
1976). (p. 259-265). Although a good deal of Gen. Meyer's 
testimony seems meaningless, he did emphasize the 
"tremendous management problem" that would arise in wartime 
as to the disposition of women in relation to men (ratios, 
etc.) among units. He stated: 
"Traditionally there have been some women 
drivers, and things like that in a 'broader 
theater', but it would be difficult, indeed 
it would be almost impossible, in my view, 
the management of people at that critical 
point. I just see the next war as being so 
demanding that anything that complicates the 
management of people in an early stage would 
make it neigh on impossible to be effective." 
(p. 261). 
General Meyer continues: 
"I would say that any women in any units 
would have this [adverse] effect on 
management. It would just be a flat 
difficult of management." (p. 261). 
·~o...----~,.i/< .. --------~-------"'· 
10. 
Depositon of Maj. Gen. Dean Tice. (May 13, 1980), 
also called - as all of these witnesses were - by the 
plaintiff. (p. 281). Gen. Tice's first statement about the 
battle of the Bulge hardly helped the plaintiff: 
"Everybody immediately went into combat • • • 
We even retrained all the clerks and cooks in 
France and sent them to the front line." 281 
* * * 
The Joint Appendix includes statements or brief 
excerpts from testimony of several other people, all called 
as witnesses for the plaintiff. None of this seemed 
particularly relevant. Apparently, , the United States didn't 
put on any testimony but relied on the findings and reports 
of the Congress, plus testimony before the Armed Services 
Committee that is a matter of public record. 
lfp/ss 3/20/81 
80-2! 1 Goldberg 
Comments on Opinion of Three-Judge Court 
The purpose of this memorandum is to make 
miscellaneous notes on the opinion below as I read it. No 
attempt is made to be comprehensive. I will merely record 
points and observations as they occur to me. 
One must remember at the outset that this is a 
suit brought by men who claim a denial of equal protection 
because women also are not subject to registration for the 
draft. I note that if women are registered and assigned 
only to noncombat roles, men will have an even more potent 
reason for making the same argument. 
The DC had before it a "five volume joint 
documentary and stipulated record" (2a) . 
The act in question 50 u.s.c. App. §451, et seq. 
is the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA). 
The DC does not state the vote in either house. 
The vote in the Senate Armed Services Committee was 12 to 5. 
The House Subcommittee tabled the proposal to register 
women, so that the full House did not vote on it. 
Standard of Review 
As the classification "constitutes discrimination 
based on gender", the government has the burden of 
"justifying the classification". 12a. The DC noted that 
2. 
"ordinarily", a gender-based classification, fails unless it 
is "substantially related to an important government 
interest" citing Craig v. Boren, Frontiero v. Richardson, 
and a case last year - Wangler v. Druggist. The DC held 
that the Boren standard {important government interest test) 
applies. 14a. 
It was recognized that drafting persons into the 
services though a substantial limitation on freedom, is not 
unconstitutional. Thus, the DC stated that the issue in 
this case: 
"Is whether the deprivation of rights is 
applied equally between the sexes. Thus, the 
key focus is on the difference in the sexes 
not the nature of the deprived right." 16a {I 
agree generally with this). 
The DC rejected the government's argument that the 
"rational basis" test applies. 18a. The government relied 
on Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 u.s. 498, where we sustained 
- applying the rational basis test - a distinction between 
male and female naval officers with respect to the length of 
time they could remain in grade before a mandatory 
discharge. We concluded that "male and female 
officers • are not similarly situated with respect to 
opportunities for professional service." Ballard, at 508. 
The DC found the Ballard case unpersuasive. It noted that 
we had said that "administrative convenience would not 
justify the discrimination"; nor, according to the DC here, 
3. 
were the "classes in Ballard similarily situated". 19a. The 
DC further noted that the standard of analysis was not 
identified in Ballard. 
said: 
Against defining the question for decision, the DC 
"We need only decide if there is a 
substantial relationship between the 
exclusion of women and the raising of 
effective armed forces. we need not decide 
if women must serve in all roles in the 
military, including combat. we need not 
decide if women must be conscripted in equal 
numbers to men." 2la, 22a. 
My note: The two questions thus left open 
identify the "slippery slope" that may lie ahead: If we 
decide now that women may not be excluded from the Act 
(which commands both registration and a draft} , the DC 
leaves open (i} whether women must serve in combat, and (ii} 
must be "conscripted in equal numbers to men". 
The DC also followed its statement of the issue 
with this curious observation: 
"This careful consideration of what issues 
are and are not before us should dispel any 
concern that we are injecting ourseleves in 
an inappropriate manner into military 
affairs." 22a 
4. 
My note: It is not easy to think of many greater 
intrusions on military affairs, as well as on the authority 
of Congress than for the judiciary to decide the sex of the 
armed services. 
At 24a of its opinion, the DC quoted a number of 
excerpts from the report of the full Senate Armed Services 
Committee (the portions quoted appear on pages 157, 158 of 
the Committee's report). Then, the DC erroneously stated 
that the findings of fact by the full Committee actually had 
been made by the subscommittee on manpower and personnel. 
See p. 26a, 27a of the opinion. The 11 findings of fact are 
contained in the report of the full Senate Committee at pp. 
160, 161. 
follows: 
The DC summarized the government's argument as 
" . • women cannot fill all positions in the 
armed services, especially combat positions; 
in a time of mobilization the primary need of 
the military services will be in combat 
related positions and in support position 
personnel who can readily be deployed into 
combat; therefore, in order to maximize the 
flexibility of personnel management, women 
should be excluded from the MSSA. Further, 
defendants argue that we should defer to the 
congressional determination that this is the 
best way to run our armed forces." 28a-30a. 
The DC recognized that this argument "is 
superficially appealing", but found it unpersuasive. 30a. 
5. 
In n. 19 (p. 29a, 30a), the DC quote fairly 
reported General Rogers' testimony as to what happened at 
the Battle of the Bulge, but then noted that General Rogers 
"testified" in favor of the registration of women. See n. 
30. (My friend Rogers was doing what he had to do under 
President's orders, or resign his post). 
The DC, pp. 3la-37a, emphasized the need for women 
(see p. 3la for the present statistics, 32a for the 
"scenario" in the event of mobilization), and quoted 
extensively - primarily in the notes - from the testimony of 
administrative officials who supported the President's 
proposal, including General Tice, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Robert Pirie, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower (not 
womenpower), Richard Danzig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Manpower. The DC then concluded that "military 
opinion, backed by extensive study is that the availability 
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility 
not hamper it". p. 37a. 
My note: I should do some analysis of the 
"military opinion". I do not think it is as supportive as 
the DC indicated, despite administrative pressure. 
The DC, relying on quotations from administration 
members, then stated: 
"It is difficult for us to accept the 
inconsistent positions of Congress 
(inconsistent with the Administration). 
Congress has continuously allocated funds for 
the increase of the number of women in the 
armed services • • • There can be no doubt 
that the experience of women in the all 
volunteer army has been a success story." (I 
fully agree with this). It is incongruous 
that Congress believes on the one hand that 
it substantially enhances our national 
defense to constantly expand the utilization 
of women, and on the other hand exclude women 
from the pool of registrants ..• Congress 
rejects the current opinion of each of the 
military services and asserts that women can 
contribute to the military effectiveness only 
as volunteers and not as inductees." 39a 
After making, persuasively, the argument for 
inducting women based on the excerpts from the 
Administration's testimony, the DC also said: 
"The military does not lose flexibility if 
women are registered became induction for 
females can be made according to military 
needs as they accrue in the future." 42a. 
6. 
My note: This seems to contract the DC's earlier 
statement that it need not decide "if women must be 
conscripted in equal numbers to men". p. 22a. If fewer 
women are conscripted than men, there certainly will be 
another lawsuit despite the DC's dictum on page 42a. 
My note: The DC, in support of its dictum, relied 
on testimony of Mr. Pirie quoted in n. 31. His testimony is 
interesting. It assumes that the DOD could determine the 
7. 
number of women needed at any particular time on a 
discriminatory basis. Mr. Pirie expressly conceded that "a 
female draft can[not] be justified on the argument that 
wartime personnel requirements cannot be met without them. 
The pool of draft eligible men is sufficiently large to meet 
projected wartime requirements. Furthermore, men, unlike 
women, can be assigned to any military position including 
close combat jobs". n. 31, p. 42a. 
The DC, in its conclusion, said that "flexibility 
is not enhanced, but is in fact limited by the complete 
exclusion of women", and that the "complete exclusion of 
women from the pool of registrants does not serve important 
governmental objectives and is not substantially related to 
any alleged governmental interest." 43a 
Observations on the DC's Opinion 
Without undertaking more than a random 
observations at this time, I note the following: 
1. The DC showed no deference to congressional 
judgment. It did set forth substantial excerpts from the 
Senate Committee report, together with the 12 specific 
findings. But I do not recall that any of our cases 
emphasizing the duty of courts to defer to congressional 
action is discussed. 
8 0 
2. The DC basically acted as a legislative body, 
weighing the evidence and making its own judgments with 
respect to conclusions to be drawn. 
3. The evidence (testimony and public statements) 
relied on for the most part was from administrative 
spokesmen - both military and civilian - who were obligated 
to support the President. 
4. The DC approached its task as if it were 
reviewing findings of fact by a lower court, with hardly a 
perfunctory genuflect to the findings and decision of the 
Congress. 
5. To be sure, equal protection analysis requires 
a weighing of an asserted governmental interest against the 
mandate for equal protection of the laws. Most of our equal 
protection cases have involved action by states, usually 
with little or no evidence of legislative or administrative 
findings that purported to justify the discrimination. 
Similarly, in the relatively few cases invalidating a 
congressional classification, there has been little or no 
indication of mature consideration - or findings of fact -
by the Congress. Compare, for example, my dissent recently 
in Schweiker (no evidence whatever of any congressional 
reason for the discrimination) with our opinion last Term in 
Fullilove (where findings by the Congress were conclusive) . 
Cf. also Harris v. McCree. 
9. 
6. Three judges, without any obvious qualifying 
experience, rejected the findings of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, made after extensive hearings, and that 
eventually were approved by both houses of Congress. See 
Conference Committee Report No. 96-895 at 100. The Armed 
Services Committees have the primary responsibility in the 
legislative branch for hearings, study and making policy 
judgments with respect to the military. These Committees 
include many members who have served for years, acquiring 
extensive knowledge from testimony they have heard each year 
and from the studies of their extensive staffs. 
7. I do not suggest by these preliminary comments 
that reasonable people cannot differ on the question of 
conscripting women. I personally can testify that even in 
World War II women performed fine service in appropriate 
places. There is a place for women in the armed services, 
and the volunteer system has worked well with respect to 
women - just as it has worked almost disastrously with 
respect to men. 
As pointed out in testimony that I believe was not 
mentioned in the DC's opinion, the quality of women 
volunteers exceeded that of men volunteers. Job 
opportunities for women in the armed services have been more 
attractive for women for a variety of reasons. The men 
volunteering, for the most part, have been unemployable, 
unskilled and uneducated. To a large extent they have come 
from the poor and minority segments of our population 
resulting in an army that lacks the skill to employ the 
sophisticated equipment required in modern armies. 
10. 
Moreover, the volunteer system is grossly inequitable as if 
war occurred our nation would be defended - not by a fair 
cross section of the male population of the country - but by 
an army from whom the middle and upper classes largely are 
excluded. 
But conscription - unlike a volunteer service -
would be by random lot. There would be no assurance, 
therefore, that the quality of women on the average would be 
anything like as high as at present. Thus, one must bear in 
mind that testimony as to the volunteer service is only 
partially relevant when one thinks of a conscripted service. 
If it were clear that conscription of women could 
be limited to actual needs, and that they could be assigned 
only to duties chosen by the military, more could be said 
for such a system. Only 10 countries either register or 
conscription both men and women. Sixty-two other countries 
do not conscript women. See n. 18 p. 29a. But even under the 
equal protection analysis of the DC in this case (much less 
under ERA if it is adopted), the questions purportedly left 
open by the DC undoubtedly would be litigated with 
unpredictable results. Men, like the plaintiffs in this 
case, would challenge conscription of the sexes other than 
on an equal basis~ they also would challenge drawing a line 
11. 
between combat and noncombat roles for women, bringing law 
suits with respect to a variety of twilight zone cases. Now 
women may serve no closer to combat than division 
headquarters. What about moving them to regimental 
headquarters so that men also would enjoy the additonal 
safety of divisional headquarters service? And women 
themselves would bring suits. We know from the prison guard 
case from Alabama that some women will want "combat" duties. 
Other, more rational women, will want the opportunity for 
full promotion which goes only - in most instances - with 
varied combat experience. 
9. In the testimony and statements of 
Administration supporters- including President Carter's 
statement -great emphasis was placed on "equity". See, 
~~~· 
e.g., 43a and Joint Apend ix 35, 206, 208 1 1\ As appealing as 
this is, it is hardly the basic criterion for constituting 
the military services. The only purpose of military 
services is related to war: First to deter aggression, and 
second if war is imposed on us to win it and to do so as 
rapidly as possible. Moreover, the "equity" concept could 
require equality in the conscripting of men and women and in 
the assignment to military duties. 
10. Although the findings of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee were based primarily on military 
considerations, the Committee expresly recognized societal 
interests that are implicated in so many ways - rooted in 
12. 
the history of our civilization, recopgnizing that women are 
different (thank goodness!) and in some contexts need and 
should receive protections never traditionally accorded to 
men. A judgment in this area by the Congress is peculiarly 
a legislative function, an argument ignored by the DC. 
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Comments on Opinion of Three-Judge Court 
The purpose of this memorandum is to make 
miscellaneous notes on the opinion below as I read it. No 
attempt is made to be comprehensive. I will merely record 
points and observations as they occur to me. 
One must remember at the outset that this is a 
suit brought by men who claim a denial of equal protection 
because women also are not subject to registration for the 
draft. I note that if women are registered and assigned 
only to noncombat roles, men will have an even more potent 
reason for making the same argument. 
The DC had before it a "five volume joint 
documentary and stipulated record" (2a). 
The act in question 50 u.s.c. App. §451, et seq. 
is the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA). 
The DC does not state the vote in either house. 
The vote in the Senate Armed Services Committee was 12 to 5. 
The House Subcommittee tabled the proposal to register 
women, so that the full House did not vote on it. 
Standard of Review 
As the classification "constitutes discrimination 
based on gender", the government has the burden of 
"justifying the classification". 12a. The DC noted that 
2. 
"ordinarily", a gender-based classification, fails unless it 
is "substantially related to an important government 
interest" citing Craig v. Boren, Frontiero v. Richardson, 
and a case last year - wangler v. Druggist. The DC held 
that the Boren standard (important government interest test) 
applies. 14a. 
It was recognized that drafting persons into the 
services though a substantial limitation on freedom, is not 
unconstitutional. Thus, the DC stated that the issue in 
this case: 
"Is whether the deprivation of rights is 
applied equally between the sexes. Thus, the 
key focus is on the difference in the sexes 
not the nature of the deprived right." 16a (I 
agree generally with this}. 
The DC rejected the government's argument that the 
"rational basis" test applies. 18a. The government relied 
on Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 u.s. 498, where we sustained 
- applying the rational basis test - a distinction between 
male and female naval officers with respect to the length of 
time they could remain in grade before a mandatory 
discharge. we concluded that "male and female • • • 
officers • . . are not similarly situated with respect to 
opportunities for professional service." Ballard, at 508. 
The DC found the Ballard case unpersuasive. It noted that 
we had said that "administrative convenience would not 
justify the discrimination"; nor, according to the DC here, 
3. 
were the "classes in Ballard similarily situated". 19a. The 
DC further noted that the standard of analysis was not 
identified in Ballard. 
said: 
Against defining the question for decision, the DC 
"We need only decide if there is a 
substantial relationship between the 
exclusion of women and the raising of 
effective armed forces. We need not decide 
if women must serve in all roles in the 
military, including combat. We need not 
decide if women must be conscripted in equal 
numbers to men." 2la, 22a. 
My note: The two questions thus left open 
identify the "slippery slope" that may lie ahead: If we 
decide now that women may not be excluded from the Act 
(which commands both registration and a draft) , the DC 
leaves open (i) whether women must serve in combat, and (ii) 
must be "conscripted in equal numbers to men". 
The DC also followed its statement of the issue 
with this curious observation: 
"This careful consideration of what issues 
are and are not before us should dispel any 
concern that we are injecting ourseleves in 
an inappropriate manner into military 
affairs." 22a 
4. 
My note: It is not easy to think of many greater 
intrusions on military affairs, as well as on the authority 
of Congress than for the judiciary to decide the sex of the 
armed services. 
At 24a of its opinion, the DC quoted a number of 
excerpts from the report of the full Senate Armed Services 
Committee {the portions quoted appear on pages 157, 158 of 
the Committee's report). Then, the DC erroneously stated 
that the findings of fact by the full Committee actually had 
been made by the subscommittee on manpower and personnel. 
See p. 26a, 27a of the opinion. The 11 findings of fact are 
contained in the report of the full Senate Committee at pp. 
160, 161. 
The DC summarized the government's argument as 
"· •• women cannot fill all positions in the 
armed services, especially combat positions; 
in a time of mobilization the primary need of 
the military services will be in combat 
related positions and in support position 
personnel who can readily be deployed into 
combat7 therefore, in order to maximize the 
flexibility of personnel management, women 
should be excluded from the MSSA. Further, 
defendants argue that we should defer to the 
congressional determination that this is the 
best way to run our armed forces." 28a-30a. 
The DC recognized that this argument "is 
superficially appealing", but found it unpersuasive. lOa. 
5. 
In n. 19 (p. 29a, 30a), the DC quote fairly 
reported General Rogers' testimony as to what happened at 
the Battle of the Bulge, but then noted that General Rogers 
"testified" in favor of the registration of women. See n. 
30. (My friend Rogers was doing what he had to do under 
President's orders, or resign his post). 
The DC, pp. 3la-37a, emphasized the need for women 
(see p. 3la for the present statistics, 32a for the 
"scenario" in the event of mobilization), and quoted 
extensively - primarily in the notes - from the testimony of 
administrative officials who supported the President's 
proposal, including General Tice, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Robert Pirie, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for l-ianpower (not 
womenpower), Richard Danzig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Manpower. The DC then concluded that "military 
opinion, backed by extensive study is that the availability 
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility 
not hamper it". p. 37a. 
My note: I should do some analysis of the 
"military opinion". I do not think it is as supportive as 
the DC indicated, despite administrative pressure. 
The DC, relying on quotations from administration 
members, then stated: 
"It is difficult for us to accept the 
inconsistent positions of Congress 
(inconsistent with the Administration). 
Congress has continuously allocated funds for 
the increase of the number of women in the 
armed services • • • There can be no doubt 
that the experience of women in the all 
volunteer army has been a success story." (I 
fully agree with this). It is incongruous 
that Congress believes on the one hand that 
it substantially enhances our national 
defense to constantly expand the utilization 
of women, and on the other hand exclude women 
from the pool of registrants ••• Congress 
rejects the current opinion of each of the 
military services and asserts that women can 
contribute to the military effectiveness only 
as volunteers and not as inductees." 39a 
After making, persuasively, the argument for 
inducting women based on the excerpts from the 
Administration's testimony, the DC also said: 
"The military does not lose flexibility if 
women are registered became induction for 
females can be made according to military 
needs as they accrue in the future." 42a. 
6. 
My note: This seems to contract the DC's earlier 
statement that it need not decide "if women must be 
conscripted in equal numbers to men". p. 22a. If fewer 
women are conscripted than men, there certainly will be 
another lawsuit despite the DC's dictum on page 42a. 
My note: The DC, in support of its dictum, relied 
on testimony of Mr. Pirie quoted in n. 31. His testimony is 
interesting. It assumes that the DOD could determine the 
7. 
number of women needed at any particular time on a 
discriminatory basis. Mr. Pirie expressly conceded that "a 
female draft can{not] be justified on the argument that 
wartime personnel requirements cannot be met without them. 
The pool of draft eligible men is sufficiently large to meet 
projected wartime requirements. Furthermore, men, unlike 
women, can be assigned to any military position including 
close combat jobs". n. 31, p. 42a. 
The DC, in its conclusion, said that "flexibility 
is not enhanced, but is in fact limited by the complete 
exclusion of women", and that the "complete exclusion of 
women from the pool of registrants does not serve important 
governmental objectives and is not substantially related to 
any alleged governmental interest." 43a 
Observations on the DC's Opinion 
Without undertaking more than a random 
observations at this time, I note the following: 
1. The DC showed no deference to congressional 
judgment. It did set forth substantial excerpts from the 
Senate Committee report, together with the 12 specific 
findings. But I do not recall that any of our cases 
emphasizing the duty of courts to defer to congressional 
action is discussed. 
8. 
2. The DC basically acted as a legislative body, 
weighing the evidence and making its own judgments with 
respect to conclusions to be drawn. 
3. The evidence (testimony and public statements) 
relied on for the most part was from administrative 
spokesmen - both military and civilian - who were obligated 
to support the President. 
4. The DC approached its task as if it were 
reviewing findings of fact by a lower court, with hardly a 
perfunctory genuflect to the findings and decision of the 
Congress. 
5. To be sure, equal protection analysis requires 
a weighing of an asserted governmental interest against the 
mandate for equal protection of the laws. Most of our equal 
protection cases have involved action by states, usually 
with little or no evidence of legislative or administrative 
findings that purported to justify the discrimination. 
Similarly, in the relatively few cases invalidating a 
congressional classification, there has been little or no 
indication of mature consideration - or findings of fact -
by the Congress. Compare, for example, my dissent recently 
in Schweiker (no evidence whatever of any congressional 
reason for the discrimination) with our opinion last Term in 
Fullilove (where findings by the Congress were conclusive). 
Cf. also Harris v. McCree. 
9. 
6. Three judges, without any obvious qualifying 
experience, rejected the findings of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, made after extensive hearings, and that 
eventually were approved by both houses of Congress. See 
Conference Committee Report No. 96-895 at 100. The Armed 
Services Committees have the primary responsibility in the 
legislative branch for hearings, study and making policy 
judgments with respect to the military. These Committees 
include many members who have served for years, acquiring 
extensive knowledge from testimony they have heard each year 
and from the studies of their extensive staffs. 
7. I do not suggest by these preliminary comments 
that reasonable people cannot differ on the question of 
conscripting women. I personally can testify that even in 
World War II women performed fine service in appropriate 
places. There is a place for women in the armed services, 
and the volunteer system has worked well with respect to 
women - just as it has worked almost disastrously with 
respect to men. 
As pointed out in testimony that I believe was not 
mentioned in the DC's opinion, the quality of women 
volunteers exceeded that of men volunteers. Job 
opportunities for women in the armed services have been more 
attractive for women for a variety of reasons. The men 
volunteering, for the most part, have been unemployable, 
unskilled and uneducated. To a large extent they have come 
from the poor and minority segments of our population 
resulting in an army that lacks the skill to employ the 
sophisticated equipment required in modern armies. 
10. 
Moreover, the volunteer system is grossly inequitable as if 
war occurred our nation would be defended - not by a fair 
cross section of the male population of the country - but by 
an army from whom the middle and upper classes largely are 
excluded. 
But conscription - unlike a volunteer service -
would be by random lot. There would be no assurance, 
therefore, that the quality of women on the average would be 
anything like as high as at present. Thus, one must bear in 
mind that testimony as to the volunteer service is only 
partially relevant when one thinks of a conscripted service. 
If it were clear that conscription of women could 
be limited to actual needs, and that they could be assigned 
only to duties chosen by the military, more could be said 
for such a system. Only 10 countries either register or 
conscription both men and women. Sixty-two other countries 
do not conscript women. See n. 18 p. 29a. But even under the 
equal protection analysis of the DC in this case (much less 
under ERA if it is adopted), the questions purportedly left 
open by the DC undoubtedly would be litigated with 
unpredictable results. Men, like the plaintiffs in this 
case, would challenge conscription of the sexes other than 
on an equal basis: they also would challenge drawing a line 
11. 
between combat and noncombat roles for women, bringing law 
suits with respect to a variety of twilight zone cases. Now 
women may serve no closer to combat than division 
headquarters. What about moving them to regimental 
headquarters so that men also would enjoy the additonal 
safety of divisional headquarters service? And women 
themselves would bring suits. we know from the prison guard 
case from Alabama that some women will want "combat" duties. 
Other, more rational women, will want the opportunity for 
full promotion which goes only - in most instances - with 
varied combat experience. 
9. In the testimony and statements of 
Administration supporters - including President Carter's 
statement -great emphasis was placed on "equity". See, 
e.g., 43a and Joint Apendix 35, 206, 208. As appealing as 
this is, it is hardly the basic criterion for constituting 
the military services. The only purpose of military 
services is related to war: First to deter aggression, and 
second if war is imposed on us to win it and to do so as 
rapidly as possible. Moreover, the "equity" concept could 
require equality in the conscripting of men and women and in 
the assignment to military duties. 
10. Although the findings of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee were based primarily on military 
considerations, the Committee expresly recognized societal 
interests that are implicated in so many ways - rooted in 
12 . 
the history of our civilization, recopgnizing that women are 
different (thank goodness!) and in some contexts need and 
should receive protections never traditionally accorded to 
men. A judgment in this area by the Congress is peculiarly 
a legislative function, an argument ignored by the DC. 
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Notes of Senate Armed Services Committee Report No. 96-826 
This report dated June 20, 1980, is the 
recommendation of the Committee of Appropriations for fiscal 
year 1981 for the DOD. It is 239 pages, and miserably 
indexed. The discussion of including women is confined, I 
believe, to pages 156-161. 
This memo records notes on what the Committee 
said. 
Proposal Rejected 
The opening sentence is that "The Committee 
rejected a proposal to require the registration of young 
women under the Military Selective Service Act". 
Although the report is on an appropriations bill, 
the language and findings reflect present as well as earlier 
consideration of this issue, and is a response to the 
Administration's made earlier in 1980 that women be included 
in the revived selective service Act. (See my notes on 
Joint Appendix Material). 
Reference was made to "Congress' constitutional 
duty under Article I, §8 "to raise and support armies", "to 
provide and maintain a navy" and "to make rules for the 
government and regulation of the land and navy forces". The 
Committee "expressed its serious concern over manpower 
I 
problems that are so severe that the military services are 
not now capable of meeting our national security 
requirements ••• " p. 157 
It was noted that in 1979 when the Committee 
2. 
reported a bill (S. 109) mandating peacetime registration of 
males, the "issue of whether women should be registered 
became a dominant part of the discussion • II • • 
The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the 
Armed Services Committee "held several additonal hearings in 
1980 on the registration plan presented by the President, on 
the question of including women in the plan, and on the 
military issues involved ••• " This report then states: 
"The Committee remains convinced that 
registration is vitally necessary and that 
women should not be included in any 
registration and induction system. This 
judgment is based upon the Committee's 
assessment of the military needs of the 
nation, and its comprehensive study of the 
registration issue. It is also based on the 
Committee's assessment o~ the societal impact 
of the registration and possible induction of 
women • " p • 15 7 
Would not be assigned to combat positions 
But in the event of mobilization manpower 
requirements would be greatest to fill combat roles 
especially in infantry and armored units. Note was taken of 
the testimony in prior hearings that "it is in these combat 
skills where the all volunteer force has failed to supply 
',, \ .. 
3. 
sufficient recruits, and where current strengths of combat 
units is often woefully inadequate. Although only 6% of 
army enlisted skills are closed to women, fully 42% of all 
"billets filled by enlisted personnel in the army are in 
specialties, skills or units not available to women. These 
include non-combat positions in close support units that 
could come under enemy fire." p. 158. 
After noting that "all the military services 
testified at length about their mobilization plans, and the 
place of women in those plans", this report states that 
"Both the civilian and military leadership 
agreed that there is no military need to 
draft women. Because of the combat 
restrictions, the need would be primiarly for 
men, and women volunteers would fill [only] 
the requirements for women. The argument for 
registrationand induction of women, 
therefore, is not based on military 
necessity, but on considerations of equity. 
* * * 
"Selective service plans provide for drafting 
only men during the first 60 days, and only a 
small number of women would be included in 
the total drafted for the first 180 days." p. 
158. 
Other reasons 
Other military reasons preclude large numbers of 
women from serving: 
"Military flexibility requires that a 
commander be able to move units or ships 
quickly. Units or ships not located at the 
front or not previously scheduled for the 
front nevertheless must be able to move into 
action if necessary. In peace and war, 
significant rotation of personnel is 
necessary. we should not divide the military 
into two groups - one in permanent combat and 
one in permanent support. Large numbers of 
non-combat positions must be available to 
which combat troops can return for duty 
before being redeployed." p. 158 
As noted above, the Committee found "no military 
need to draft women". The report then identified negative 
4. 
reasons, indicating difficulties and problems resulting from 
including women. As the above quotation indicates, the 
Committee believe that "miltiary flexibility would be 
adversely affected under conditions of combat. 
In addition, "administrative problems" would 
result such as "housing and different treatment with regard 
to dependency, hardship and physical standards". p. 159. 
Important "societal reasons" also suggested the 
unwisdom of including women. Determining who should "fight 
for the nation and how best to accomplish that end is a 
social issue of the highest order, with sweeping 
implications for our society". p. 159. The report goes on 
to say: 
"In addition witnesses representing a variety 
of groups testified before the subcommittee 
that drafting women would place unprecedented 
strains on family life, whether in peacetime 
or in time of emergency. If such a draft 
occurred at a time of emergency, 
unpredictable reactions to the fact of female 
conscription would result. A decision which 
would result in a young mother being drafted 
and a young father emaining home with the 
family in a time of national emergency cannot 
be taken lightly, nor its broader 
implications ignored. The committee is 
strongly of the view that such a result, 
which would occur if women were registered 
and inducted under the administration plan, 
is unwise and unacceptable to a large 
majority of our people." p. 159 
5. 
My note: Although I think the Committee may have 
exaggerated the "societal reasons", they certainly are not 
insignificant. 
Constitutionality 
The Committee noted the argument that "the 
Constitution requires both men and women to be treated 
equally", a view based on the perception that equal 
protection of the laws "mandates an equal sharing among men 
and women of the burdens of registration and conscription". 
The Committee, however, "took note" of a Justice 
Department opinion that concluded male only registration is 
constitutional. 
Specific findings 
In addition to concluding that exclusion of women 
is constitutional, the Committee made 11 specific findings, 
as follows: 
6. 
(See Exhibit A attached for the findings) 
* * * 
Comment: The Senate Armed Services Committee 
voted 12 to 4 to adopt this report, including these 
findings. The Senate and House Conference Committee on the 
Appropriations Act, specifically included - by reference -
these findings. 
Houses of Congress. 
Thus, they were approved by both 
For me the findings thus approved are controlling 
- unless arguments and subsequent discussion present more 
compelling views to the contrary than I have yet identified. 
I do note that the Senate Committee's discussion 
and finding No. 10 make a "worst case" argument as to what 
would happen ".if the law required women to be drafted in 
equal numbers with men". The Carter Administration, of 
course, insist that although women would register on an 
equal basis with men, only such women as were needed would 
be inducted. Even if it worked out this way, other reasons 
stated by the Committee would remain relevant. 
The Committee's report may overstate the 
opposition of the most senior military officers (the Joint 
Chief of Staff) to President Carter's proposal. See the 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee taken in the spring 
and summer of 1979 on s. 109 and s. 226 - both Senate bills 
7. 
relating to registration and induction. (I have a copy of 
these hearings). The generals and admirals who testified 
often sounded a bit more like politicians than military men, 
as they were extremely cautions in expressing certain 
opinions. In general, they praised the performance of women 
in peacetime, non-combat roles, and there a number of 
affirmative statements with respect to the registration of 
women. The same officers usually said, however, that the 
drafting of women was not needed for military purposes. 
Thus, some - but perhaps not all - were drawing a 
distinction between mere registration and induction. 
As I recall, all of the generals testified that 
the real need in the event of mobilization would be for men. 
There also is quite strong testimony as to the inability, in 
certain combat conditions, to distinguish between combat and 
non-combat personnel. Consider, for example, General 
Rogers' testimony as follows: 
"General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may I add 
a footnote to my comment to Senator Warner? 
"Senator Nunn. Yes, General. 
"General Rogers. One thing which is 
often lost sight of , Senator, is that in an 
emergency during war, the Army has often had 
to reach back into the support base, into the 
supporting elements in the operating base, 
and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks 
in an emergency, that is, to hand them a 
rifle or give them a tanker suit and put them 
in the frorit ranks. 
"Senator warner. General Patton did that 
at one time, I believe in the Battle of the 
Bulge. 
"General Rogers. Absolutely. 
"Now, if that support base and that 
operating base to the rear consist in large 
measure of women, then, we don't have that 
opportunity to reach back and puyll them 
forward, because women should not be placed 
in a forward fighting position or in a tank, 
in my opinion. So that, too enters the 
equation when one considers the subject of 
the utility of women under contingency 
conditions." p. 16, Senate Subcommittee 
Report, 1979.* 
8. 
*This is the same General Rogers whose statement, in another 
connection, is quoted by the district court with approval. 
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')IV 
Notes of Senate Armed Services Committee Report No. 96-826 
I 
This report dated June 20, 1980, is the 
recommendation of the Committee ~Appropriations for fiscal 
year 1981 for the DOD. It is 239 pages, and miserably 
indexed. The discussion of including women is confined, I 
believe, to pages 156-161. 
This memo records notes on what the Committee 
said. 
Proposal Rejected 
The opening sentence is that "The Committee 
rejected a proposal to require the registration of young 
women under the Military Selective Service Act". p. IS'~ 
Although the report is on an appropriations bill, 
the language and findings reflect present as well as earlier 
consideration of this issue, and is a response to the -
Administration's~made earlier in 1980 that women be included 
in the revived ~lective...$ervice Act. (See my notes on 
Joint Appendix Material). 
Reference was made to "Congress' constitutional 
duty under Article I, §8 "to raise and support armies", "to 
provide and maintain a navy" and "to make rules for the 
government and regulation ·of the land and navy forces". The 
Committee "expressed its serious concern over manpower 
2. 
problems that are so severe that the military services are 
not now capable of meeting our national security 
requirements. . II p. 157 
It was noted that in 1979 when the Committee 
reported a bill (S. 109) mandating peacetime registration of 
males, the "issue of whether women should be registered 
became a dominant part of the discussion . II 
The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the 
Armed Services Committee "held several additonal hearings in 
1980 on the registration plan presented by the President, on 
the question of in6luding women in the plan, and on the 
military issues involved •.. " This repo~ ~ ~ 
J\ 
"The Committee remains convinced that 
registration is vitally necessary and that 
women should not be included in any 
registration and induction system. This 
judgment is based upon the Committee's 
assessment of the military needs of the 
nation, and its comprehensive study of the 
registration issue. It is also based on the 
Committee's assessment of the societal impact 
of the registration and possible induction of 
women." p. 157 
Would not be assigned to combat positions 
But in the event of mobilization manpower 
requirements would be greatest to fill combat roles 
especially in infantry and armored units. Note was taken of 
the testimony in prior hearings that "it is in these combat 
skills where the all volunteer force has failed to supply 
3. 
sufficient recruits, and where current strengths of combat 
units is often woefully inadequate. Although only 6% of 
army enlisted skills are closed to women, fully 42% of all 
"billets filled by enlisted personnel in the army are in 
specialties, skills or units not available to women. These 
include non-combat positions in close support units that 
could come under enemy fire." p. 158. 
After noting that "all the military services 
testified at length about their mobilization plans, and the 
place of women in those plans", this report states that 
"Both the civilian and military leadership 
agreed that there is po military need tn 
draft women. Because of €he combat 
restrictions, the need would be primiarly for 
men, and women volunteers would fill [only] 
the requirements for women. The argument for 
registratio~nd induction of women, 
therefore, is not based on military 
necessity, but on considerations of equity. 
* * * 
"Selective service plans provide for drafting 
only men during the first 60 days, and only a 
small number of women would be included in 
the total drafted for the first 180 days." p. 
158. 
Other reasons 
Other military reasons preclude large numbers of 
women from serving: 
"Military flexibility requires that a 
commander be able to move units or ships 
quickly. Units or ships not located at the 
front or not previously scheduled for the 
front nevertheless must be able to move into 
action if necessary. In peace and war, 
significant rotation of personnel is 
necessary. We should not divide the military 
into two groups - one in permanent combat and 
one in permanent support. Large numbers of 
non-combat positions must be available to 
which combat troops can return for duty 
before being redeployed." p. 158 
As noted above, the Committee found "no military 
need to draft women". The report then identified negative 
4. 
reasons, indicating difficulties and problems resulting from 
including women. As the above quotation indicates, the 
Committee believe that "miltiary flexibility would be 
adversely affected under conditions of combat. 
In addition, "administrative problems" would 
result such as "housing and different treatment with regard 
to dependency, hardship and physical standards". p. 159. 
Important "so; i<::-al_:__easons" also suggested the 
... 
unwisdom of including women. Determining who should "fight 
for the nation and how best to accomplish that end is a 
social issue of the highest order, with sweeping 
implications for our society". p. 159. The report goes on 
to say: 
"In addition witnesses representing a variety 
of groups testified before the subcommittee 
that drafting women would place unprecedented 
strains on family life, whether in peacetime 
or in time of emergency. If such a draft 
occurred at a time of emergency, 
unpredictable reactions to the fact of female 
conscription would result. A decision which 
would result in a young mother being drafted 
and a young father nemaining home with the 
family in a time of national emergency cannot 
be taken lightly, nor its broader 
implications ignored. The committee is 
strongly of the view that such a result, 
which would occur if women were registered 
and inducted under the administration plan, 
is unwise and unacceptable to a large 
majority of our people." p. 159 
5. 
My note: Although I think the Committee may have 
exaggerated the "societal reasons", they certainly are not 
insignificant. 
Constitutionality 
The Committee noted the argument that "the 
Constitution requires both men and women to be treated 
equally", a view based on the perception that equal 
protection of the laws "mandates an equal sharing among men 
and women of the burdens of registration and conscription". 
The Committee, however, "took note" of a Justice 
Department opinion that concluded male only registration is 
constitutional. 
Specific findings 
In addition to concluding that exclusion of women 
is constitutional, the Committee made 11 specific findings, 
as follows: 
6. 
(See Exhibit A attached for the findings) 
* * * 
Comment: The Senate Armed Services Committee 
voted 12 to 4 to adopt this report, including these 
findings. The Senate and House Conference Committee on the 
Appropriations Act, specifically included - by reference -
these findings. y> I t>l> Thus, they were approved by both 
Houses of Congress. 
For me the findings thus approved are controlling 
- unless arguments and subsequent discussion present more 
compelling views to the contrary than I have yet identified. 
I do note that the Senate Committee's discussion 
and finding No. 10 make a "worst case" argument as to what 
would happen "if the law required women to be drafted in 
equal numbers with men". The Carter Administration, of 
course, insist that although women would register on an 
equal basis with men, only such women as were needed would 
be inducted. Even if it worked out this way, other reasons 
stated by the Committee would remain relevant. 
The Committee's report may overstate the 
opposition of the most senior military officers (the Joint 
Chief of Staff) to President Carter's proposal. See the 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee taken in the spring 
and summer of 1979 on S. 109 and S. 226 - both Senate bills 
7. 
relating to registration and induction. (I have a copy of 
these hearings). The generals and admirals who testified 
often sounded a bit more like politicians than military men, 
as they were extremely cautions in expressing certain 
opinions. In general, they praised the performance of women 
in peacetime, non-combat roles, and 
~ 
there~a number of 
affirmative statements with respect to the registration of 
women. The same officers usually said, however, that the 
drafting of women was not needed for military purposes. 
Thus, some - but perhaps not all - were drawing a 
distinction between mere registration and induction. 
As I recall, all of the generals testified that 
the real need in the event of mobilization would be for men. 
There also is quite strong testimony as to the inability, in 
certain combat conditions, to distinguish between combat and 
non-combat personnel. Consider, for example, General 
Rogers' testimony as follows: 
"General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may I add 
a footnote to my comment to Senator warner? 
"Senator Nunn. Yes, General. 
"General Rogers. One thing which is 
often lost sight of , Senator, is that in an 
emergency during war, the Army has often had 
to reach back into the support base, into the 
supporting elements in the operating base, 
and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks 
in an emergency; that is, to hand them a 
rifle or give them a tanker suit and put them 
in the front ranks. 
"Senator Warner. General Patton did that 
at one time, I believe in the Battle of the 
Bulge. 
"General Rogers. Absolutely. 
"Now, if that support base and that 
operating base to the rear consist in large 
measure of women, then, we don't have that 
opportunity to reach back and pu~ll them 
forward, because women should n6t be placed 
in a forward fighting position or in a tank, 
in my opinion. So that, too enters the 
equation when one considers the subject of 
the utility of women under contingency 
conditions." p. 16, Senate Subcommittee 
Report, 1979.* 
8. 
*This is the same General Rogers whose statement, in another 
connection, is quoted by the district court with approval. 
EXHIBIT A 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS -. , 
-· ~-
( 1) Article I, section 8 of the Constitution commits exclusively to 
the Congress the powers to raise and suppo1t armies, provide and 
maintain a Navy, and makes rules for Government and regulation ?f 
the land and naval forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies withm 
the discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions for expan· 
sion of our Armed Forces, and the means best suited to such expansion 
should it prove necessary. 
(2) An ability to mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation 
of our national security. 
(3) A functioning registration system is a vital part of any mobili· 
zation plan. 
(4) ·women make an important contribution to our national de· 
fens~, and are volunteering in increasing numbers for our armed 
servwes. 
( 5) Women should not be intentionally or routinely placed in com· 
bat positions in our military services. 
(6) There is no established military need to include women in a 
selective service system. 
(7) Present manpower deficiencies under the All-Volunteer Force 
are concentrated in the combat arms-infantry, armor, combat en· 
gineers, field artillery and air defense. 
(8) If mobilization were to be ordered in a wa~time scenario, the 
primary manpower need would be for combat replacements. 
(9) The need to rotate personnel and the possibility that close sup· 
port units could come under enemy fire also limits the use of women 
in non-combat jobs. 
(10) If the law required women to be drafted in equal numbers with 
men, mobilization would be severely impaired because of strains on 
training facilities and administrative systems. 
_(11) _Under the administration's proposal there is no nroposal for 
exemption of mothers of vou11cr h'll Th d ...,_ ,r_ · .·· ' 
u' , •• · . ffi ·- · ·---.- :..::......z- "' c I. c ren. e a nnmstrat10n has 
~~1 r~t msh Cient attentiOn .to neces?ary changes in Selective Service 
Ill e~ , sue . as those govermng the mduction of youno- mothers and 
to tl11e st;balm~ odn f~mily life that would result from t"'J.le regisfr~tion 
nne poss1 e m uct10n of women . 
. (12) .A ~egistration and induction system which excludes women 
JS constitutiOnal. 
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1k-~~~·~- 2-~ 
Bernard ~ostker, 1Director of On Appeal from the United 
Selective Service, Appellant, States District Court for 
v. the Eastern District of 
~ t _ ~r~ \;. Goldberg et al. Pennsylvania. 
~ [May -, 1981] 
-ht~~ JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
/Y"'I ... hU~ The question presented is whether the Military Selective .... c~ -.;;...- - Service Act, 50 U. S. ~· App. § 451 et s~q., .viol~tes the ~i~th 
'~ ndment to the Umted States ConstitutiOn m authonzmg 
l '_ . . IJ the President to require the registration of males and not 
~ cf.- females. 
'-" ..,. I 
tf/!J>· ~-~n the power under the Constitution "To 
~ raise and support Armies," "To provide and maintain a 
~ ..,l, ,Lp);;;;:t Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regu-
,, ~- lation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14 . 
. . · _ d ~ ' . 
0 
Pursuant to this grant of authority Congress has enacted the 
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq. 
~ ~ ("the MSSA" or "the Act"). Section 3 of the Act, 50 U.S. C. 
v .f App. § 453, empowers the President, by proclamation, to re-/o ,/o J d~ . quire the registration of "every male citizen" and male resi-
~~v dent aliens between the a.ges of 18 and 26. ·The purpose of 
this registration is to facilitate any eventual conscription: 
pursuant to § 4 (a) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a), 
those persons required to register under § 3 are liable for 
training and service in the Armed Forces. The MSSA regis-
tration provision serves no other purpose beyond providing 
a pool for subsequent induction. 
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Registration for the draft under § 3 was discontinued in 
1975. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 Weekly Camp. 
of Pres. Doc. 318 (April 7, 1975). In ea.ply 1980, President 
Carter determined that it was necessa11y to reactivate the 
draft registration process.1 The immediate impetus for thiEl 
decision was the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan. · 16 
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980) (Stat~ 
of the Union Address). According to the Administration's 
witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, th~ 
resulting crisis in Southwestern Asia convinced the President 
that the "time has come" "to use his present authority to 
require registration . . . as a necessary step to preserving or. 
enhancing our national security interests." Department of 
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year. 
1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the Senate Committee ori 
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1805 (1980) (hereafte~ 
Hearings on S. 2294) (joint statement of Dr. John P. White, 
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Dr. 
Bernard Rostker, Director, Selective Service System, and 
Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense). The Selective Service System had been inactiv~, 
however, and funds were needed prior to reactivating regis-
tration. The President therefore recommended that funds 
be transferred troffi' the Department of DeTense to ~ep­
ifate Self}1't~r:i,ce Sy.§tem. H. R. Doc. No. 96-267, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1980). He also recommended that Con ... JL 
gress take action to amend the MS · o permit the r~istra­
tionand conSc'riP'tlo"i'l o1 wome'i; as well as men. See Presi-. 
dential ecommen ations for Selective Service Reform-A 
Report to Congress Prepared Pu:rsul'tnt to :Pub, :L. 96-107 
(Feb. 11, 1980), J. A. 57-61. 
a The President did nol.1?~k conscriPtion. Since the Act was amended 
in 1973 to preclude cont>cription, Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, .'){) U.S. C. 
App. § 467 (c) , any actual conscri tion would require further congres-
sion:U action .. See . ep. No .. 96.-82.6, 9 t ong., 2d Sess., 980)~ 
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Congress agreed that it was necessary to reactivate the 
registration process, and allocated funds for that purpose in 
a joint resolution which passed the House on April 22 and 
the Senate on June 12. H. R. J. Res. 521, Pub. L. 96-282, 
94 Stat. 552. The resolution did not allocate all the funds 
originally requested by the President, but only those neces-
sary to register males. See S. Rep. No. 96-789, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess., 1, n. 1; 2 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. 
Nunn) (June 10, 1980). Although Congress considered the 
question at great length, see infra, at 12-14, it declined to 
amend the MSSA to permit the re istration of women. 
n u y , 8 , the President, by proclamation, ordered 
the registration of specified groups of young men pursuant 
to the authority conferred by § 3 of the Act. Registration 
was to commence on July 21, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771, 
45 Fed. Reg. 45247. 
These events of last year breathed new life into a lawsuit 
which had been essentially dormant in the lower courts for 
nearly a decade. It began in 1971 when several men sub.iect 
to registration for the draft and subsequent induction into 
the Armed Services filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania chal-
lenging the MSSA on several grounds.2 A three-judge dis-
2 Plaintiffs contended that the Act amounted to a taking of property 
witho'Ut due pr6Cks, imposed involuntary servitude, violated rights of 
free expression and assemhly, was unlawfully impiemented to advance an 
unconstitutional war, and impermissibly discriminated between ... males and 
females. The District Court denied plaintJffii' application to convene a 
three-]uclge district court and dismissed the suit, Rowland v. Tarr, 341 
F. Supp. 339 (ED Pa. 1972). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the discrimination 
claim, and remanded the case to the District Court to determine if this 
claim was substantial enough to warrant the convening of a three-judge 
court under then-applicable 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.) and whether 
plaintiffs had standing to assert that claim. 480 F. 2d 545 (1973). On 
remand, the District Court answered both questions in the affirmative, 
resulting in the convening of ti1e tflree--j'udge- court whicfl decided the-
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trict court was convened in 1974 to consider the claim of 
unlawful gender-based discrimination which is now before 
us.9 On July 1, 1974, the court declined to dismiss the case 
as moot, reasoning that although authority to induct regis-
trants had lapsed, see n. 1, supra, plaintiffs were still under 
certain affirmative obligations in connection with registra-
tion. 378 F. Supp. 766. Nothing more happened in the case 
for five years. Then, on June 6, 1979, the court clerk, acting 
pursuant to a local rule governing inactive cases, proposed 
that the case be dismissed. Additional discovery thereupon 
ensued, and defendants moved to dismiss on various justicia-
bility grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss, 
ruling that it did not have before it an adequate record on 
the operation of the Selective Service System and what ac-
tion would be uecessary to reactivate it. Civ. Action No. 
71-1480 (Feb. 19, 1980). On July 1, 1980, the court certified 
a plaintiff class of "all male persons who are registered or 
subiect to registration under 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 or are 
liable for training and service in the armed forces of the 
United States under 50 U. S. C. App. § 454, 456 (h) and 467 
(c) ." App. to Juris. Statement 2a-4a.4 
clilie below. The Act authorizing three-judge courts to hear claims surh 
W:l this wat> repealed in 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119 
( AuJ!.. 12, 1!)76), but remains applicable to suits filed before repeal, ·id., 
§ 7, 00 Stat . 1119. 
3 A~ the Court t>tated in Schl13singer v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 500, n. 3 
( 1!J75), "Although it contains no Equal Protection Clause as does the 
Fourl~enth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause 
prohibit~ the federt~l government from engtLging in discrimination that is 
',;o unjustifiable al:i to be violative of due process.' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U. S. 497, 499.'' 
4 When entering its judgment on July 18, the District Court redefined 
the class to includ~ " All male persons who are registered under 50 U. S. C. 
App. § 453 or are liable for training and service in the armed forces of 
the United States under 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 454, 456 (h) and 467 (c); 
and who are also either subject to registration under Presidential Procla-
mation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently registered with the· 
Selective Serviee System."· App .. to Juris. Statement 4'4a. 
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On Friday, July 18, 1980, three days before registration a;c_ t-
was to commence, the District Court issued an opinion find- ~ lJ 
ing that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from 
requiring registration under the Act. The court initially de-
termined that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case 
was ripe, determinations which are not challenged here by 
the Government. Turning to the merits, the court rejected 
plaintiffs' suggestions that the equal protection claim should 
be tested under "strict scrutiny," and also rejected defend-
ants' argument that the deference due Congress in the area 
of military affairs required application of the traditional 
"minimum scrutiny" test. Applying the "important govern-
ment interest" test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 
190 (1976) , the court struck down the MSSA. The court 
stressed that it was not deciding whether or to what extent 
women should serve in combat, but only the issue of registra-
tion, and felt that this "should dispel any concern that we 
are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner in mili-
tary affairs." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. See also id., at 
27a, n. 17; 28a, n. 18. The court then proceeded to examine 
the testimony and hearing evidence presented to Congress 
by representatives of the military and the Executive Branch, 
and concluded on the basis of this testimony that "military 
opinion, backed by extensive study, is that the availability 
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility, 
not hamper it." Id., at 37a. It rejected Congress' contrary 
determination in part because of what it viewed as CongTess' 
"inconsistent positions" in declining to register women yet 
spending funds to recruit them and expand their opportuni· 
ties in the military. Id., at 37a-39a. 
The United States immediately filed a notice of appeal and 
the next day, Saturday, July 19, 1980, JusTICE BRENNAN, 
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, 
stayed the District Court's order enjoining commencement 
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Monday. On December 1, 1980, we noted probable juriEdic., 
tion. - U. S. -. 
II 
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an 
Act of Congress-"the gravest and most delicate duty that 
this Court is called upon to perform," Blodgett v. Holden, 
275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)-the Conrt accords I 
"great wei ht to the decisions of Congress." CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic National ornrntttee, . S. 94, 102 (1973). 
The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose mem-
bers take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution 
of the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Cornrn'ittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 
164 (1951) (concurring opinion), we must have "due regard 
to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judg- ~ 
ment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have 
taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the 
responsibility for carrying on government." The customary 
deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly 
appropna. e w en, as ere, Congress specifically considered 
the question of the Act's constitutionality. See. e. g .. S. R3p. 
No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 159-161 (1980); 126 Cong. 
Rec. S6531- S6533 (Sen. Warner) (June 10, 1980), S6541 
(Sen. Hatfield) (June 10, 1980). 
This is not, however, merely a case involving the custom., 
ary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case 
arises in the context of Congress' authority _.2ver mjlita~ af- ; 
fairs, and perhaps in no oth r ~ the Court accorded 
~gress greater deference. In rejecting the registration of 
wo~tly relied upon its constitutional 
powers under Art. I, § 8, cis. 12-14. The "specific findings" 
section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by 
stating: 
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elusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support 
armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules 
for Government and regulation . of the land and naval 
forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the 
discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions fol' 
expansion of our Armed Forces, and the means best 
suited to such expansion should it prove necessary." S. 
Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160. 
See also S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979), 
'rhis Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad con .. 
stitutional power" to raise and regulate armies and navies, 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 510 (1975). As the 
Court noted in considering a challenge to the selective serv-
ice laws, "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and 
support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to 
that end is broad and sweeping." United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). See Lichter v. United States, 334 
U. S. 742, 755 (1948). 
Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in 
this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of 
the courts is marked. In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 
(1973), the Court noted: ~
"It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence. The 
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the com-
position, training, equipping, and control of a military 
force are essentially professional milita.ry judgments, 
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and 
Executive branches." 
Fortunately for the continued well-being of the country, 
"judges are not ~iven the task of running the Army." Orloff 
v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93 (1953).5 
1 See all:lo Simmous v. United States, 406 F. 2d 456, 459 (CA5 1969) 
("That th(' court i~ not com{letent or empowered to sit as a super-
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The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and 
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident 
in several recent decisions of this Court. In Parker v. Levy, 
417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974), the Court rejected"both vagueness 
and overbreadth challenges to army regulations, noting that 
"Congre~:;s is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth 
and with greater flexibility" when the statute governs mili-
tary society, and that " [ w] hile the members of the military 
are not excluded from the protection granted by the First 
Amendment, the different character of the military commu-
nity and of the military mission requires a different applica-
tion of those protections." In Middendoti_ v,_ !l.!nru, 425 
U. S. 25 (1976), the Court noted that i n considerfug due 
process claims in the context of summary court martial it 
"must give particular deference to the determination of Con-
gress, made under its military authority to regulate the land 
and naval forces. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8," concerning what 
rights were available. Id., at 43. See also id., at 49-50 
(PowE~J., concurring). Deference to the judgment of 
Other branches in the area of military affairs also played a 
major role in Greer v.:. SrJQ c[c, 424 U. S. 828, 837-838 (1976), 
where the Court upheld a ban on political speeches by civil-
ians on a milit-ary base, and Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348 
(1980) , where the Court upheld reg ulations imposing a prior 
rpst.raint on the right to petition of milita.ry personnel. See 
also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953); United States v. 
Mar1ntosh , 283 U. S. 605, 622 (1931). 
The c s mo relevant to our present inquiry is Schle-
sing"r v. Ballard, 419 . 498 (1975). In that case the 
Court considered a due process challenge, brought by males, 
to the navy policy of according females a longer period than 
f'xeculive authority to review the de<'i~ions of the Executive and Legislative 
hranch~ ol government in regard to the necessity, method of selection, 
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males in which to attain promotions necessary to continued 
service. The Court distinguished previous gender-based dis-
criminations held unlawful in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 
(1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). 
In those cases, the classifications were based on "overbroad 
generalizations." See 419 U. S., at 506-507. In the case be-
fore it, however, the Court noted: 
"the different treatment of men and women naval offi-
cers ... reflects, not archaic and overbroad generaliza-
tions, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and 
female line officers in the N av are not similar I Situated 
In light of the combat restrictions women did not have the 
same opportunities for promotion as men. The Court pro- , 
ceeded to recognize that "'it is the primary business of 
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight-war ssllould 
tfie occas1~ariSe,'" it.;'"' at 510 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 
U. S. 11, 17), and concluded that: 
"The responsibility for determining how best our Armed 
Forces shall attend to that business rests with Congress, 
see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and with the 
President. . . . We cannot say that, in exercising its 
broad constitutional power here, Congress has violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Ibid. 
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard 
the Constitution when it acts in the area of military a.ffairs. 
In that area as any other Congress remains subject to the 
limitations of the Due Process Clause, see Ex parte Milligan, 
4 Wall. 2 (1866); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware-
house Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919), but the tests and limi-
tations to be applied may differ because rof the military 
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context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate respo11i 
sibility to decide the c ns 1 u .wna uestion, but simply rec-
ognize that the ons 1tution itself requires such added defer-
ence. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 
U. S., at 103. In deciding the question before us w~st l ~A __L,_h-~~JL­
be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of ­
what is desira le for t a o ongress, or our own eva uation 
of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative 
Branch. 
The District Court purported to recognize the appropriate-
ness of deference to Congress in the area of military affairs, 
App. to Juris. Statement 28a, but it stressed that "we are not 
here concerned with military operations or day-to-day con-
duct of the military into which we have no desire to intrude." 
Ibid. Appellees also stress that this case involves mvilians, 
not the military, and that "the impact of registration on the 
military is only indirect and attenuated." Appellees Brief, 
at 19. We find these efforts to divorce registration from the 
military anu national defense context, with all the deference 
called for in that context, singularly unpersuasive. United 
States v. O'Brien, supra, recognized the broad deference due 
Congress iu the selective service area before us in this case. 
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but 
rather the first step in the induction process into the military 
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of reg-
istratioll to induction, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, 
at 156, 160. Congressional judgments concerning registra-
tion and the draft are based on judgments concerning mili-
tary operations and ueeds, see, e. g., id., at 157 ("the starting 
point for any discussion of the appropria.teness of registering 
women for the draft is the question of the proper role of 
women in combat''), and the deference unquestionably due 
the latter judgments is necessarily required in assessing the 
former as well. Although the District Court stressed that it 











ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG 11 
.on assessments of military need and flexibility in a time of 
mobilization. See, e. y., App. to Juris. Statement 3la-43a. 
It would be blinking reality to say that our precedents com-
pelling great deference to Congress in military affairs are not 
implicated by the present case.6 
The ~General arg,ues, largely on the basis of the 
foregoing cases emphasizing the deference due Congress in 
the area of military affairs and national security, that this 
Court should scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the 
distinction drawn between men and women bears a rational 
:r~ to some legitimate government purpose, see Unifed 
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, - U. S. -
( 1980), and should n_ot examine !the Act under the heightened 
scruti&, with which ~e ha~ approac!i'e'Cf" gender-basectdis-
crimination, see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County, ·--- U. S. - (1981); f!!_aiy v. Boren, supra; Reed 
v. Reed, supra.1 We do not think that the substantive guar-
antee of due process or certainty in the law will be advanced 
8 Congress recognized that its decision on registration involved judg-
ments on military needs and operations, and that its decisions were 
entitled to particular deference: "The Supreme Court's most recent teach-
ings in the field of equal protection cannot be read in isolation from its 
opinions giving great deference to the judgment of Congress and military 
commanders in dealing with the management of military forces and the 
requirements of military discipline. The Court has made it unmistakably 
clear that even our most fundamental constitutiona1 rights must in some 
circumstance::; be modified in the light of military needs, and that Con-
gress' judgment as to wha~ is nece::;sary to pre~erve our national security 
is entitled to gre.at deference." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supr·a, at 159-160. 
Deference to Congress' judgment was a consistent and dominant theme 
in lower court decisions assessing the present claim. See, e. g., United 
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333, 335 (ED La. 1970); Unit·ed States v. 
Offm·d, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (ED Wis. 1974). 
1 It is clear that "r g] ender has never been rejected as an impermissible 
cla<;::;ifica.tion in all in~tancet>." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 356, n. 10 
(1974) . In making this observation Justice Douglas noted that "Con-
gress has not so far drafted women into the Armed Services, 50 U, S. C. 
App .. § 454." Ibid. 
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by any further "refinement" in the applicable tests as sug. 
gested by the Government. Rather, we think it more appro-
priate to recognize that in reviewing congressional decisions 
in the area of military affairs, we are dealing in planes, rather 
than lines, and that while the equafi;rotection test rei'llii:lns 
t~ within or w~tthe military context, the clefer-
en~due Co'rigTeSSi~alJ'Udgments in assessin the merits of 
an equa protec 1011 c a1m rna e considerably greater in the 
roi 1tary cont~xt. c esmger v. Ballar di not purport to 
apply a different equal protection test because of the military 
context, but did stress the deference due congressional judg-
ments in assessing the merits of an equal protection claim 
in that context. In this case as well we cannot ignore Con-
gress' broad authority and our own limited competence in 
the military area when we are urged to declare unconstitu-
tional a studied congressional judgment on the point at issue. 
III 
This case is quite different f:mm 1everal gender-based dis-
crimination cases which have previously come oefore the 
cfoiirt. Appellees' assertions notwithstanding, this rather 
clearly is not a case in which Congress acted "unthinkingly'' 
or "reflexively and not for any considered reason" in drawing 
a distinction based on gender. Appellees' Brief, at 35. 'rhe 
question of registering women for the draft not only received 
considerable national attention and was the subject of wide-
ranging public debate, but also was extensively considered 
by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee. 
Hearings held by both Houses of Congress in response to the 
President's request for authorization to register women ad· 
duced extensive testimony and evidence concerning the issue. 
See Hearings on S. 2294; Hearings on National Service Leg-
islation before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of 
the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d. 
Sess. (1980) (hereafter House Hearings). These he.attings 
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built on other hearings held the previous year addressed to 
the same question.8 
The House declined to provide for the registration of 
women when it passed the Joint Resolution allocating funds 
for the Selective Service System. See 126 Cong. Rec. H2728-
H2729, H2747 (April 22, 1980). When the Senate consid-
ered the Joint Resolution, it defeated, after extensive debate, 
an amendment which in effect would have authorized the 
registration of women. 126 Cong. Rec. S6527-S6549 (June 
10, 1980).9 As noted earlier, Congress in H. R. J. Res. 521 
only authorized funds sufficient to cover the registration of 
males. The Report of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions on H. R. J. Res. 521 noted that the amount authorized 
was below the President's request "due to the Committee's 
decision not to provide $8,500,000 to register women," and 
that "The amount recommended by the Committee would al~ 
low for registration of young men only." S. Rep. No. 96-
789, supra, at 21; see 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. Nunn) 
(June 10, 1980). 
While proposals to register women were being rejected in 
the course of transferring funds to register males, committees 
in both Houses which had conducted hearings on the issue 
were also rejecting the registration of women. The House 
Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed 
Services Committee tabled a bill which would have amended 
the MSSA to authorize registration of women, H. R. 6-569, on 
March 6, 1980. Legislative Calendar, House Committee on 
8 See Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration Under the Military 
Selective Service Act: Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226 before the Sub-
committee on Manpower & Per~ormel of the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Seven months before the President's 
caJI for the registration of women, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
rejected the idea, seeS. Hep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1979). 
9 The amendment provided that, no funds "shall be made av~tilable for 
implementing a ~:>ystem of registration which does nob include womeiJ!'.~ 
1:26; Cong. Rec. S652t •. 
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Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 54 (Sept. 30, 1980). 
The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected a proposal 
to register women, S. 2440, as it had one year before, see S. 
Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 8-9, and adopted specific findings 
supporting its action. See S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 
156-161. These findings were stressed in debate in the Sen-
ate 011 Joint Resolution 521, see 126 Cong. Rec. S6544-S6545 
(Sen. Nunn) (June 10, 1980); S6531-S6532 (Sen. Warner) 
(June 10, 1980). They were later specifically endorsed by 
House and Senate conferees considering the Fiscal Year 1981 
Defeuse Authorization Bill. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 96-895, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1980).10 Later both Houses 
adopted the findings by passing the Report. 126 Cong. Rec. 
H7800, S11646 (Aug. 26, 1980). The Senate Report, there-
fore, is considerably more significant than a typical report 
of 9, single House, and its findings are in effect findings of the 
en tire Congress. 
The foregoing clearly establishes that the decision to ex-
empt women from registration was not the "accidental by-
product of a traditional way of thinking about women." 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,320 (1977) (quoting Cali-
fano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 233 (1977) (STEVENS, J., 
concurriug) ). In Michael M., supra, at-, n. 6, we rejected 
p, similar argumentbecauseof action by the California Legis-
lature considering and rejecting proposals to ma.ke a statute 
challenged on discrimination grounds gender-neutral. The 
eause for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here. 
Whatever one's views on the merits, it is clear that Congress, 
decision to exempt women from registration wa.s not reflex-
ive, or simply the incidental baggage of out-moded views. 
The issue was considered at great length, and Congress 
10 The findings were before the conferees because the Senate Armed 
Scrvice;o Committee had added a provision to the 1981 Defense Authoriza-
tion Bill authonzing the transfer of funds to register young men as a 
stop-gap measure should Joint Resolution 521 fail. See S. Rep. No. 
96- 895, supra, ut 100. 
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clearly expressed its purpose and intent. Contrast Califano 
v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 87 (1979) ("The gender qualifica-
tion . . . escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and flool' 
debate").11 
For the same reasons we reject appellees' argument that we 
must consider the constitutionality of the MSSA solely on 
the basis of the views expressed by Congress in 1948, when 
the MSSA was first enacted in its modern form. Contrary 
to the suggestions of appellees and various amici, reliance on 
the legislative history of Joint Resolution 521 and the ac-
tivity of the various committees of the 96th Congress con-
sidering the registration of women does not violate sound 
principles that appr~griations....!$isl~on should not be con-
sidered as modifying substantive legislation. Congress did 
not change the MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly recon-
sider the question of exempting women from its provisions, 
and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative history is, ( 
therefore, highly relevant in assessing'the constitutiona1 va-
lidity of the~
The MSSA established a plan for maintaining "adequate 
armed strength ... to ensure the security of [the] nation." 
50 U. S. C. App. § 451 (b). Registration is the first step 
"in a united and continuous process designed to raise an 
army speedily and efficiently," Falbo v. United States, 320 
U. S. 549, 553 (1944), see United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 
1, 9 (1953), and Congress provided for the reactivation of 
registration in order to "provide the means for the early 
delivery of inductees in an emergency." S, Rep. No. 96-826, 
supra, at 156. Although the three-judge District Court often 
11 Nor can we agree with the characterization of the MSSA in the 
Brief for Amicus Curiae National Organization of Women as a law which 
"coerce[sJ or preclude[s] women as a class from performing tasks or jobs 
of which they are capable," or the suggPstion that this case involves "[t]he 
exclusion of women from the military." !d., at 19-20. Nothing in the l 
MSSA restricts in any way the opportunities for women to volunteer fot 
military servrce.-- --- _ __......_ -
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tried to sever its consideration of registration from the par-
ticulars of induction, see, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 42a-
43a, Congress rather clearly linked the need for renewed reg-
istratio~;iews ~;'char-;cr-e~-;-r-;;"'s_u_b-se-q~u.-.e-n...;t-d-r-aft. 
Th speCifically found that "A-;-ab'rrity to 
mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our na-
tional security. A functioning registration system is a vital 
part of any mobilization plan." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 
160. As Senator 'Y;lrner put it, "I equate registration with 
the draft."- Heari';gs ·on S. 2294, supra, at 1197. See also 
id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen), 1671 (Sen. Exon). Such an ap-
proach is certainly logical, since under the MSSA induction 
is interlocked with registration: only those registered may be 
drafted, and registration serves no purpose beyond providing 
a pool for the draft. Any assessment of the congressional 
purpose and its chosen means must therefore consider the 
registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of na-
tional emergency. Any other approach would not be testing 
the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought to achieve. 
Congress determined that any future draft, which would 
be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be charac-
tedzed by a need for combat troo.J]s. The Senate Report 
explained, in a specificflndillg later adopted by both Houses, 
that "if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime sce-
nario, the primary manpower need would be for combat re-
placements." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, a 0; see 2d., at 
158. This conclusion echoed one made a year before by the 
same Senate Committee, see S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 
2-3, 6. As Senator Jepsen put it, "The shortage would be in 
the combat arms. · That is why you have drafts." Hearings 
on S. 2294, supra, at 1688. See also id., at 1195 (Sen. Jep-
sen); 126 Cong. Rec. H2750 (Rep. Nelson) (April 22, 1980). 
Congress' determination that the need would be for combat 
troops if a draft took place was sufficiently supported by tes-
timony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free-
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to make their own judgment on the question. See Hearings 
on S. 2294, supra, at 1528-1529 (Marine Corps Lt. Gen. 
Bronars) ; 1395 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Army Clark); 1391 (Gen. Yerks); 748 (Gen. Meyer); House 
Hearings, supra, J. A., at 224 (Assistant Secreta.ry of Defense 
for Manpower Pirie). See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, 
S'Upra, at 24, 54 (Gen. Rogers). The }?Urp<?_se of reg~ration, I · ~ 
therefore, was to prepare for a draft o combat troops. - -:::::::-Women as a group, however, un ike men as a group, are 
not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation 
of womenin~ in the Navy and Air Force are statu-
tory. Under 10 U. S. C. § 6015 "women may not be as~ 
signed to duty on vessels Qr in aircraft that are engaged in 
combat missions," and under 10 U. S. C. § 8549 female mem-
bers of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in air-
craft engaged in combat missions." The Army and Marine 
Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of 
established policy. See J. A. 86, 34, 58. Congress specifi-
cally recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from 
combat in exempting women from registration. In the 
words of the Senate Report: 
wrhe prin~ women should not intentionally and 
routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys 
wide support among our people. It is universa.lly sup-
ported by military leaders who have testified before the 
Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women 
from being assigned to combat in our military forces, 
and the Committee reaffirms this policy." S. Rep. No. 
96-826, supra, at 157. 
The Senate Report specifically found that "Women should 
not be intentionalJy or routinely placed in combat positions 
in our military services." Id., at 160. See S. Rep. No. 96-
226, supra, at 9.12 The President expressed his intent to 
n No major rountry has women in combat jobs in their standing army. 
Sec J. A. 143. 
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continue the current military policy precluding women from 
. combat, see Presidential Recommendations for Selective 
Service Reform, supra, J. A. 34, and appellees present their 
argument concerning registration against the background of 
such restrictions on the use of women in combat.13 Consist-
ent with the approach of this Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
supra, we must examine appellees' constitutional claim con-
cerning registration with these combat restrictions firmly in 
mind. 
The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates 
the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from reg-
istration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a 
draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from 
combat, they would not be neededrn tfle event of ;-draft, 
aii'atnerefore there was no reason to register them. Again 
turning to the Senate Report: 
"In the Committee's view, the starting point for any 
discussion of the appropriateness of registering women 
for the draft is the question of the proper role of women 
in combat. . . . The policy precluding the use of women 
in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most impor-
tant reason for not including women in a registration 
system." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 157. 
The District Court stressed that the milita.ry need for 
women was irrelevant to the issue of their registration. As 
that court put it: "Congress could not constitutionally re-
quire registration under MSSA of only black citizens or only 
white citizens, or single out any political or religious group 
~imply because those groups contained sufficient persons to 
fill the needs of the selective service system."· App. to Juris. 
Statement 2la. This reasoning is beside the point. Women 
18 See Appellees' Brief, at 1-2, n. 2 (denying ar1y concession of the 
validity of combat restrictions, but submitting restrictions are frrelevan't 
to the present case). See also J:. A: 256, 
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ttre not exempt from registration because military needs can 
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbi-
trarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated 
groups, such as would be the case with an all-black or all-
white, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Repub- I 
lican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, be-
cause of the combat re t ictions on women, are simply -;;t 
similarly Situate for pur oses of a ra t or registration fop 
a draft. ---CongTess' decision to authorize the registration of only 
men, therefore, is not violative of the Due Process Clause. 
The exemption of women from registration is not only suffi-
ciently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authoriz-
ing registration. See Michael M., supra, at -; Craig v. 
Boren, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra. The fact that Con!5ress 
and the Executive have decided that women shouia not serve 
in com a u 'ustifies Congress in not authorizmg their 
registration, since t e purpose of registration is to develop 
a pool of potential combat troops. As was the case in Schles-
inger v. Ballard, supra, "the gender classification is not in-: 
vidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes 
are not similarlv situated" in this case. Michael M., supra, 
""- ............._, b&W.. --
at -. In light of combat restrictions and Congress' deci-: 
sion that the need in the event of a draft would be for 
combat troops, re istration of women for a draft would be 
an empty and seless esture. e onstitution requires 
that Congress treat similarly situated persons in an equal 
manner, not that it engage such empty gestures of superficial 
equality. 
In striking down the MSSA the District Court relied 
heavily on the President's decision to seek authority to reg-
ister women and the testimony of members of the Executive 
Branch and the military in support of that decision. See, 
e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 37a, 39a, and n. 30. As stated 
by the Administration's witnesses before Congress, howe·ve~, 
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tho PresiJent's "dec' 'on t 
women is based ~:---....... --r~""'-_......,...,. __ -:--_....._,._ 
(sta emen ss1 ant ec ary of Defense Pirie and Di-
rector of Selective Se · ce System Rostker) ; see also Presi-
tlential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform, 
supra, J. A. 35, 59, 60; Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1657 
(statement of Executive Associate Director of Office of Man-
agement and Budget Wellford, Director of Selective Service 
System Rostker, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defe11se Danzig). This was also the basis for the testimony 
by military officials. earings on . 2294, at 710 (Gen. 
M~. Allen). The Senate Report, evaluating 
the testimony before the Committee, recognized that "the 
argument for registration and induction of women ... is not 
based on military necessity, but on considerations of equity." 
S. Rep. No. 96- 826, supra, at 158. Congress was C'Mtainly 
entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise 
anti regulate armies and navies. to focus on the question of 
m'litar need rather than "equity." 14 As Be1lat0r "'Nunn of 
the Senate Armed erviCes ommittee put it: 
"Our Committee went into very great detail. We 
found that there was no military necessity cited by any 
witnesses for the registration of females. 
"The main point that those who favored the registra-
tration of females made was that they were in favor of 
this because of the equality issue which is, of course, a 
legitimate view. But as far as military necessity, and 
that is what we are primarily, I hope, considering in the 
overall registration bill, there is no military necessity 
for this." 126 Cong. Rec. S6544. 
See also House Hearings, supra, J. A. 230 (Rep. Holt) ("You 
are talki11g about equity. I am talking about military." ). 15 
14 The grant of conslitutiOiwl authority is, after all, to C011gress ~mel 
not to the Executive or military officials. 
10 The Di~;trict Comt al::~o foclli>ed on what it tem1ed Congre::;:;• 
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Although the military experts who testified in favor of 
registering women uniformly opposed the actual draftin of 
women. see, e. (!., Hearing on . 1 and 6, supra, at 11 
(Geii: Rogers) , there was testimony that in the event of a 
draft of 650,000 the military could absorb some 80,000 female 
inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1661, 1828. The 
80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men 
to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking 
down the MSSA, the District Court palpably exceeded its 
authority when it ignored Congress' considered response to 
this line of reasoning. 
In the first place, assuming that a small uumber of women 
could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did 
not consider it worth the added burdens of including women 
in draft and registration plans. "It has been suggested that 
all women be registered, but only a handful actually be in-
ducted in an emergency. The Comimttee finds this a con-
fused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution." S. Rep. No. I 
96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senate Committee recognized 
2. year before, "training would be needlessly burdened by 
wo en recruits who cou m combat. . Rep. 
No. 96- ·, sup a, a. 9. ee also ep. o. 96- 826, supra, 
at 159 ("Other administrative problems such as housing and 
different treatment with regard to dcnrndenf1· h'n~~h\p 4J}d 
A 1 1_ '- 1 l!'l 1 "(l!llii11Str•l1"\\ ( pro!J1f"lt SIH 1lH W HI h a)(, 
"'. . . t . 'l tll.'l.!l •' lth l_pH'Ill(l I • 1 1(''·' 1 1 ' h f'l. 1·111' I 1lr<.'!ilt8l~oit nt jJCJlll on::; Jl1 !'l1courngmg won:lcb fo vo nnterr 01 m J!Hry 
servict~ ttll(l expanding their opportunities in the <;crvicc, on tlw om hail(!, 
and exempting them from registration and the draft o~'l lhi:! other. Ap'[:\. 
to J urit>. Statement 37a-41a. This reasoning fui1s to 'ltp~~eciate the 
different purpo::;es Herved by encouraging women volunteers and registra-
tion for the draft Women volunteerl:l do not occupy combat positions, 
so encouraging women to volunteer is not related to concerns about the 
a>ailability of combat troops. In the event of a draft, however, the need 
would be for eornbat troop~:> or troops which could be rotated into combat. 
See 15- 16, sup1·a. Congress' positions are clearl) not inconsistPrlt and in 
t.l'eating them a~ such the Di<ltrict Court failed to understand Congress' 
purpose behind regi~tration as dit>tinguished from its purpose in encour-
ing wot:r~en volunteer.,, 
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physical standards would also exist."). It is not for this 
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the con-
text of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future 
mobilization. 
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women 
for noncombat roles during mobilization, wi;th~r 80,000 or 
less, it CQJ!ld be~y vol ur.:..te .. ers. SeeS. Rep. No. 96-826, 
supra, at 160; id., at 158 ("Because of the combat restric-
tions, the need would be primarily for men, and women 
volunteers would fill the requirements for women."); House 
Hearings, supra, J. A. 227-228 (Rep. Holt). See also Hear-
ings on S. 2294, supra, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers). 
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing non-
combat positions with JWom~n duMng a mobilization would 
be positively detrimental to the important goal of mititii'ry 
flexibility. 
"There are other military reasons that preclude very 
large numbers of women from serving. Military flexi-
bility requires that a commander be able to move units 
or ships quickly. Units or ships not located at the front 
or not previously scheduled for the front nevertheless 
must be able to move into action if necessary. In peace 
and war, significant rotation of personnel is necessary. 
e s ould not IVIde t military into two groups-one 
in permanent comb and one in permanent support. 
Large numbers of non-combat positions must be avail-
able to which combat troops can return for duty before 
being redeployed." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158. 
The point was repea.ted in specific findings, id., at 160; see 
also S. Rep. No. 96- 226, supra, at 9. In sum, Congress 
carefully evaluated the testimony that 80,000 women con-
scripts could be usefully employed in the event of a draft and 
rejected it in the permissible exercise of its constitutional re-
sponsibility. See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra, 
at 16 (Gen. Rogers); Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1682. 
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'The District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an inde-
pendent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an 
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evalua-
tion of that evidence. 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress acted 
well within its constitutional authority when it authorized 
the registration of men, and not women, under the Military 
Selective Service Act. The decision of the District Court 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: Justice Rehnquist's Opinion in Rostker v. Goldberg, No. 
80-251 
My view is that Justice Rehnquist has produced a 
draft that decides this difficult case fairly narrowly, 
without calling into question the whole area of equal 
protection limits on sex discrimination. He makes a point 
of applying Craig v. Boren, although he also argues that 
this intermediate scrutiny must apply with special deference 
in the military area. One could quibble with this argument-
-because it does not make a lot of sense to say that the 
level of scrutiny is more than mere rationality but there is 
still a need for great deference to Congress. But I doubt 
there is much point in pressing such an analytical argument. 
2. 
Certainly there is room for deference in this area--as the 
cases written by you and cited by WHR demonstrate. And it 
also seems worthwhile, at least for symbolic purposes, to 
reaffirm that Craig v. Boren provides the general standard 
in this area. 
I think that Justice Rehnquist is not always 
completely honest in his interpretation of the record before 
Congress. He believes that Congress found that drafting of 
any women--even 80,000--would be detrimental to national 
security. I believe that Congress never really drew such a 
conclusion, and merely excluded women because it found no 
military need to draft them. But here again I see no need 
to quibble with the opinion. Based on the deference 
argument, perhaps I am asking too much of Congress. 
Justice Rehnquist's clerk mentioned that they 
wrote this opinion as moderately as possible in order to 
increase their chances of getting Just ice Brennan's vote. 
They may well have succeeded. As a result, I have no real 
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UNITED STATE! 
~~ 
On Appeal from the United / ~ 
States District Court for _L..., 
the Eastern District of [17~ ~ 
Robert L. Goldberg et al. Pennsy 1 vania. 
[May -~ 1981] 
JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Colj!£;~ ~ ~- z}-
The question presented is whether the Military Selective 
Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq., violates the UJ'7::;W~a~'A-L~ 
JI~.L4~'"""'fllltendment to the United States Constitution in authori · 1g 
he President to require the registration of males and~- _ ~ "' _ . 
fum~~ 
J[ 
Congress is given the power under the Constitution "To J ~ 
raise and support Armies," "To provide and maintain a • 
Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regu~
lation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8, cis. 12-14. 
Pursuant to this grant of authority Congress has enacted th 
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq. 
("the MSSA" or "the Act" ) . Section 3 of the Act, 50 U.S. C. 
App. § 453, empowers the President, by proclamation, to re-
quire the registration of "every male citizen" and male resi-
dent aliens between the ages of 18 and 26. The purpose of 
this registration is to facilitate any eventual conscription : 
pursuant to § 4 (a) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a) , 
those persons required to register under § 3 are liable for 
training and service in the Armed Forces. The MSSA regis-
tration provision serves no other purpose beyond providing 
a pool for subsequent induction. 
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Registration for the draft under § 3 was discontinued in 
1975. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 Weekly Comp. 
of Pres. Doc. 318 (April 1, 1975). In early 1980, President 
Carter determined that it was necessary to reactivate the 
draft registration process.1 The immediate impetus for this 
decision was the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan. 16 
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980) (State 
of the Union Address). According to the Administration's 
witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the 
resulting crisis in Southwestern Asia convinced the President 
that the "time has come" "to use his present authority to 
require registration . , . as a necessary step to preserving or 
enhancing our national security interests." Department of 
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1805 (1980) (hereafter 
Hearings on S. 2294) (joint statement of Dr. John P. White, 
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Dr. 
BPrnard Rostker, Director, Selective Service System, and 
Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense) . The Selective Service System had been inactive, 
however, and funds were needed prior to reactivating regis-
tration. The President therefore recommended that funds 
be transferred from the Department of Defense to the sep-
arate Selective Service System. H. R. Doc. No. 96-267, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1980). He also recommended that Con-
gress take action to amend the MSSA to permit the registra-
tion and conscription of women as well as men. See Presi-
dential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform-A 
Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to Pub. L, 96-107 
(:Feb. 11, 1980), J. A. 57-61. 
1 The President did not seek conscription. Since the Act was amended 
in 1973 to preclude conscription, Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U. S. C. 
A pp. § 467 (c) , any actual conscription would require further COJlgres-
sional action. SeeS. Rep. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., ' l55 (1980). 
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Congress agreed that it was necessary to reactivate the 
registration process, and allocated funds for that purpose in 
a joint resolution which passed the House on April 22 and 
the Senate on June 12. H. R. J . Res. 521, Pub. L. 96-282, 
94 Stat. 552. The resolution did not allocate all the funds 
originally requested by the President, but only those neces-
sary to register males. See S. Rep. No. 96-789, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess., 1, n. 1; 2 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. 
Nunn) (June 10, 1980) . Although Congress considered the 
question at great length, see infra, at 13-16, it declined to 
amend the MSSA to permit the registration of women. 
On July 2, 1980, the President, by proclamation, ordered 
the registration of specified groups of young men pursuant 
to the authority conferred by § 3 of the Act. Registration 
was to commence on July 21, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771 ~ 
45 Fed. Reg. 45247. 
These events of last year breathed new life into a lawsuit 
which had been essentially dormant in the lower courts for 
nearly a decade. It began in 1971 when several men subject 
to registration for the draft and subsequent induction into 
the ·Armed Services filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania chal-
lenging the MSSA on several grounds.2 A three-judge dis-
! Plaintiffs contended tlmt the Act amounted to a taking of property 
without due proces~, impo~>ed involuntary :,;crvitude, violated rights of 
free expression and assembly, was unlawfully implemented to advance an 
unconstitutional war, and impermbsibly discriminated between males and 
females . The Dii:>triet. Comt. denied plaintiffs' application to convene a 
three-judge district court and dismissed the suit, Rowland v. Tarr, 341 
:r. Supp. 339 (ED Pa. 1972) . On appeal, the Court. of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the discrimination 
claim, and remanded the case to the District, Court to determine if this 
claim was substantial enough to warrant the convening of a. three-judge 
court under then-applicable 28 U. S. C. § 2282 ( 1970 ed.) and whether 
plaintiffs had standing to assert that claim. 480 F . 2d 545 (1973) . On 
remand, the District Courl answered both questions in the affirmative, 
resulting in the convening of the three-judge court which decided thtl 
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trict court was convened in 1974 to consider the claim of 
unlawful gender-based di5crimination which is now before 
us.3 On July l , 1974, the comt declined to dismiss the case 
as moot, reasoning that although authority to induct regis-
trants had lapsed, see n. 1, S'Upra, plaintiffs were still under: 
certain affirmative obligations in connection with registra-
tion. 378 F. Supp. 766. Nothing more happened in the case 
for five years. Then, on June 6, 1979, the court clerk, acting 
pursuant to a local rule governing inactive cases, proposed 
that the case be dismissed. Additional discovery thereupon 
ensued, and defendants moved to dismiss on various justicia-
bility grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss, 
ruling that it did not have before it an adequate record on 
the operation of the Selective Service System and what ac-
tion would be necessary to reactivate it. Civ. Action No. 
71- 1480 (Feb. 19, 1980) . On July 1, 1980, the court certified 
a. plaintiff class of "all male persons who are registered or 
subject to registration under 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 or are 
liable for training and service in the armed forces of the 
United States under 50 U. S. C. App. § 454, 456 (h) and 467 
(c)." App. to Juris. Statement 2a-4a.4 
case below. The Act authorizing three-judge courts to hear rlairns >'ncb 
11s this was repealed in 1975, Pub. L. 94- 381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat . 1119 
(Aug. 12, 1976), but remain~:! applicable to suits filed before repeal, id., 
§ 7, 90 Stat. 1119. 
8 As the Court stated in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 500, n . 3 
{1975), "Although it contains no Equal Protection Clause as does the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment 's Due Process Clause 
prohibits the federal government. from engaging in discrimination that is 
'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U. S. 497, 499 .. " 
"'When entering its judgment on July 18, the District Court redefined 
the class to include "All male persons who are registered under 50 U. S. C, 
App. § 453 or are liable for training and service in the armed forces of 
the United States under 50 U S. C. App. §§ 454, 456 (h) and 467 (c) ; 
»nd who are abo either subject to registration under Presidential Procla-
mation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently registered with the•-
Selective Service System." App. to Juris. Statement 44a. 
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On Friday, July 18, 1980, three days before registration 
was to commence, the District Court issued an opinion find· 
ing that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from 
requiring registration under the Act. The court initially de-
termiued that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case 
was ripe, determinations which are not challenged here by 
the Government. Turning to the merits, the court rejected 
plaintiffs' suggestions that the equal protection claim should 
be tested under "strict scrutiny," and also rejected defend-
ants' argument that the deference due Congress in the area 
of military affairs required application of the traditional 
&'minimum scrutiny" test. Applying the "important govern-
ment interest" test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 
190 (1976), the court struck down the MSSA. The court 
stressed that it was not deciding whether or to what extent 
women should serve in combat, but only the issue of registra-
tion, and felt that this "should dispel any concern that we 
are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner in mili-
ta.ry affairs." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. See also id., at 
27a, n. 17; 28a, n. 18. The court then proceeded to examine 
the testimony and hearing evidence presented to Congress 
by representatives of the military and the Executive Branch, 
and concluded on the basis of this testimony that "military 
opinion, backed by extensive study, is that the availability 
of women registrants would materia1ly increase flexibility, 
not hamper it." ld., at 37a. It rejected Congress' contrary 
determination in part because of what it viewed as Congress9 
Hinconsistent positions" in declining to register women yet 
spending funds to recruit them and expand their opportuni~ 
ties in the military. ld., at 37a-39a. 
The United States immediately filed a notice of appeal and 
the next day, Saturday, July 19, 1980, JusTICE BRENNAN, 
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, 
stayed the District Court's order enjoining commencement 
of registration, - U, S, -, Registration began the next 
0 
.'' 
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Monday. On December 1, 1980, we noted probable juriedic· 
tion. - U. S. -. · 
II 
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of al) 
Act of Congress-"the gravest and most delicate duty that 
this Court is called upon to perform," Blodgett v. Holden, 
275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)-the Court accord~ 
."great weight to the decisions of Congress." CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Cornrnittee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973) . 
!The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose mem~ 
bers take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution 
pf the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint 
Ant·i-Fasc·ist Refugee Cornrnittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 
164 (1951) (concurring opinion) , we must have "due regard 
to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judg-
ment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have 
taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the 
responsibility for carrying on government." The customary 
deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly 
Rppropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered 
the question of the Act's constitutionality. See, e. g., S. R~p. 
No. 96- 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 159- 161 (1980); 126 Cong. 
Rec. S6531-S6533 (Sen. Warner) (June 10, 1980) , S6547 
(Sen. Hatfield) (June 10, 1980). 
This is not, however , merely a case involving the custom-
ary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case 
arises in the context of Congress' authority over military af-
fairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded 
Congress greater deference. In rejecting the registration of 
women, Congress explicitly relied upon its constitutional 
powers under Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14. The "specific findings" 
section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by 
stating : 
"Article I , section 8 of the Constitution commits ex-
••. ·t 
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elusively to the Congress the powers to raise and supporb 
armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules 
for Government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the 
discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions for 
expansion of our Armed Forces, and the means best 
suited to such expansion should it prove necessary." S. 
Rep. No. 96- 826, supra, at 160. 
See also S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979). 
This Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad con-
stitutional power" to raise and regulate armies and navies, 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 510 (1975). As the 
·,Court noted in considering a challenge to the selective serv-
ice laws, "The constitutional power of Congress to raise arid 
support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to 
that end is broad and sweeping." Un-ited States v. O'Br-ien, 
391 U. S. 367. 377 (1968). See Lichter v. United States, 3:34 
U. S. 742, 755 ( 1948). 
Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in 
this area broad, but the lark of competence on the part of 
tl1e courts is marked. In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 
(1973), the Court noted: 
ui t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence. The 
complex, subtle. and professional decisions as to the com-
position, training, equipping, aml control of a military 
force are essentially professional milita.ry .iudgmen ts, 
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and 
Executive branches.'1 
See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 (1953).5 ) 
5 See also SimmuniJ v. United States, 406 F . 2d 456, 459 (CA5 1969) 
("That the court is not competent or empowered to sit as a super-
executive authority to review the decisions of the Executive and Legislative 
branches of govemment in regard to the necessity, method of selection,. 
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The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and 
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident 
in several recent decisions of this Court. In Parker v. Levy! 
4:17 U. S. 733, 756 (1974), the Court rejected both vagueness 
and overbreadth challenges to army regulations, noting that 
f'Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth 
and with greater flexibility" when the statute governs mili-
tary society, and that "[w]hile the members of the military 
are not excluded from the protection granted by the First 
Amendment, the different character of the military commu-
nity and of the military mission requires a different applica-
tion of those protections." In Middendorf v. Henry, 425 
U. S. 25 (1976), the Court noted that in considering due 
process claims in the context of summary court martial it 
"must give particular deference to the determination of Con-
gress, made under its military authority to regulate the land 
and naval forces. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8," concerning what 
rights were available. ld., at 43. See also id., at 49-50 
(PowELL, J., concurring) . Deference to the judgment of 
other branches in the area of military affairs also played a 
major role in Greer v. Spack, 424 U. S. 828, 837-838 (1976), 
where the Court upheld a ban on political speeches by civil-
ians on a military base, and Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348 
(1980), where the Court upheld regulations imposing a prior 
rE>st.raint on the right to petition of military personnel. See 
also Burns v. Wifson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953); United States v. 
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) . 
In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975), the Court 
considered a due process challenge, brought by males, to 
the navy policy of according females a longer period than 
males in which to attain promotions necessary to continued 
service. The Court distinguished previous gender-based dis-
nud composition of our defense forces is obvious and needs no further· 
discussion"). 
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pdminations held unlawful in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 
(1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) . 
In those cases, the classifications were based on "overbroad: 
generalizations." See 419 U. S. , at 506-507, ln the c~e be~ 
fore it, however, the Court nored: 
"the different treatment of men and women naval offi~ 
cers . . . reflects, not archaic and overbroad generaliza-
tions, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and 
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated· 
with respect to opportunities for professional service. 
Appellee has not challenged the current restrictions on 
women officers' participation in combat and in most sea 
duty." /d., at 508. 
In light of the combat restrictions women did not have the 
same opportunities for promotion as men, and therefore it J 
0 
PI iSS 1 () ,J 
was not unconstitutional for Congress to distinguish between 
them. 
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard' 
the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. 
In that area as any other Congress remains subject to the 
limitations of the Due Process Clause, see Ex parte Milligan, 
4 Wall. 2 (1866) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware-
house Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919), but the tests and limi-
tations to be applied may d1ffer because of the military· 
context. We of course do not abdicate our ultima'!:€ respon-
sibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply rec- I 
ognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to 
Congressional choice. See CBS, inc. v. Democratic National' 
Committee, 412 U. S., at 103. In decidiug the question before 
us we must Le particularly careful not to substitute our judg-
ment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own 
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the · 
Legislative Branch. 
The District Court purported to recognize the appropriat€-
Iress of deference to Congress when that body was exercising-
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iLl:> constitutionally delegated authority over military affairs, 
A.pp. to Juris. Statement 28a, but it stressed that "we are not 
here concerned with military operations or day-to-day con-
duct of the military into which we have no desire to intrude." 
Ibid. Appellees also stress that this case involves civilians, 
not the military, and that "the impact of registration on the 
military is only indirect and attenuated." Appe1lees Brief, 
at 19. We find these efforts to divorce registration from the 
military and national defense context, with all the deference 
called for in that context, singularly unpersuasive. United 
States v. O'Brien, supra, recognized the broad deference due 
Congress in the selective service area before us in this case. 
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but 
rather the first step in the induction process into the military 
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of reg~ 
istration to induction, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, 
at 156, 160. CongressiOnal judgments concerning registra-
tion and the draft are based on j ud~rnen ts concerning mili-
tary operations and needs, see. e. g., id .. at 157 ("the starting 
point for any discussion of the appropriateness of registering 
women for the draft is the question of the proper role of 
women in combat"), and the deference unquestionably due 
the latter judgments is necessarily reqnired in assessing the 
former as well. Although the District Court stressed that it 
was not intruding on military questions, its opinion was based 
on assessments of military need and flexibility in a time of 
mobilization. See, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 3la-43a. 
It would be bliuking reality to say that our precedents re-
quiring deference to Congress iu military affairs are not 
implicated by the present case.6 
6 Congress recognized that its decision on registration involved judg-
ments on military needs and operation::., and that its decisions were 
entitled to particular deference : "The Supreme Court's most recent teach-
ings in the field of equal protection cannot be read in isolation from it:> 
opinions gh·ing great deferenct to the judgment of Congress and military 
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The Solicitor General argues, largely on the basis of the 
foregoing cases emphasizing the deference due Congress in 
the area of military affairs and national security, that this 
Court should scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the 
distinction drawn between men and women bears a rational 
relation to some legitimate government purpose, see United 
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, - U. S. -
(1980), and should not examine the Act under the heightened 
scrutiny with which we have approached gender-based dis-
crimination, see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County, - U. S. - (1981); Craig v. Boren, supra,· Reed 
v. Reed, supra.7 We do not think that the substantive guar-
antee of due process or certainty in the law will be advanced 
by any further "refinement" in the applicable tests as sug-
gested by the GovernmPnt. Auuouncec.l degrees of "defer-
ence" to legislative judgmPuts, .iust as levels of "scrutiuy!) 
which this Court announces that it applies to particular classi-
fications made by a legislative body, may all too readily 
become facile abstractions usec.l to justify a result. In thi 
case the courts are called upon to decide whether Cougress, 
acting under an explicit constitutional grant of authority, 
has by that action transcended an explicit guarantee of inc.li-
commanders in dealing with the management of military forces and the 
requirements of military discipline. The Court has made it unmista.kably 
clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some 
circumstances be modified in the light of military need~:>, and that Con-
gress' judgment as to what is necessary to preserve our national security 
is entitled to great deference." S. Rep. No. 9(}-826, supra, at 159-160. 
Deference to Congress' judgment was a consistent and dominant theme 
in lower court decisions assessing the pre::;ent claim . See, e. g., United 
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333, 335 (ED La. 1970); United States v. 
Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (ED W1s. 1974) . 
7 It is clear that 'T g] ender has never been rejected as an impermissible 
classification in all in:stances" Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 356, n . 1(} 
(1974) . In making thi;, ob~ervntion th£' Court uoted that ''Congre~s \ 
has not so far drafted women into the Armed Service:;, 50 U. S. (\ 
-i\pp. § 454." Ibid. 
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vidual rights which limits the authority so conferred. Simply 
labelling the legislative decisioll umilitary" on the oue hand 
or "gender-based" on the other does not automatically guide 
a court to the correct constitutional result. 
No one could deny that under the test of Craig v. Boren, 
supra, the Government's interest in raising and supporting 
armies is an "important governmental interest." Congress 
and its committees carefully considered and debated two al-
ternative means of furthering that iuterest: the first was to 
register only males for potential conscription, and the other 
was to register both sexes. Cougress chose the former alter-
native. When that decision is challenged 011 equal protection 
grounds, the question a court must decide is not which altet·-
native it would have chosen, had it been the primary decision-
maker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies equal 
protection of the laws. 
Nor can it be denied that the imposing number of cases 
from this Court previously cited suggest that judicial defer-
ence .to such congressional exercise of authority is at its 
apogee when legislative action under the congressional author-
ity to raise and support armies and make rules and regula-
tions for their governance is challenged. As previously noted, 
ante, at 9, deference does uot mean abdication. The recon-
ciliation between the deference due Congress and our own 
constitutional responsibility is perhaps best instanced in 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. R .. at 510, where we stated: 
"This Court has recognized that 'it is the primary 
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to 
fight wars should the occasion arise.' U. S. ex rel. Toth 
v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17. See also Orloff v. Wil-
louqhbu. 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). The responsibility 
for determiuiug how best our Armed Forces shall attend 
to that business rests with Congress, see U. S. Const..' 
Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and with the President. See U. S. 
Canst.. ,. Art. Il, § 2, cl. 1. 'We cannot say that, in ex-
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ermsmg Us broad constitutional power hel'e, C011gres~ 
has violated the Due Process CltHll;le of the Fifth 
Amendment." 
Or, as put a generation ago in a case not involving any claim 
of gender-based discrimination: 
I 
" [ JJ udges are not given the task of running the Army. 
The responsibility for setting up channels through 
which ... grievances can be considered and fairly settled 
rests upon the Congress and upo11 the President of the 
United States and his subordinates. The military con-
stitutes a specialized community governed by a separate 
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government 
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to inter-
. fere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be 
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters." Orloff 
v. Willoughby, 345 U. S., at 93-94. 
Schlesinger v. Ballard did not purport to apply a different 
equal protection test because of the military context, but did 
stress the deference due congressional choices among alterna-
tives in exercising the congressional authority to raise and 
support armies and make rules for their governance. In 
light of the floor debate and the report of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee hereinafter discussed, it is apparent that 
Congress was fully aware not merely of the many facts and 
figures presented to it by witnesses who testified before its 
committees, but of the current thinking as to the place of 
women in the Armed Services. In such a case, we cannot 
ignore Co11gress' broad authority conferred by the Constitu-
tion to raise and support armies when we are urged to declare 
unconstitutional its studied choice of one alternative in prefer-
ence to another for furthering that goal. 
III 
This case is quite different from several gender-based dis-
crimination cases which have previously come before the· 
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Court, Appellees' assertions notwithstanding, this rather 
clearly is not a case in which Congress acted "unthinkingly'' 
or "reflexively and not for any considered reason" in drawing 
e. distinction based on gender. Appellees' Brief, at 35. The 
question of registering women for the draft not only received 
considerable national attention and was the subject of wide-
ranging public debate, but also was extensively considered 
by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee. 
Hearings held by both Houses of Congress in response to the 
President's request for authorization to register women ad-
duced extensive testimony and evidence concerning the issue. 
See Hearings on S. 2294; Hearings on National Service Leg-
islation before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of 
the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d 
Se!"s. (1980) (hereafter House Hearings). These hearings 
built on other hearings held the previous year addressed to 
the same question.8 
The House declined to provide for the registration of 
women when it passed the Joint Resolution allocating funds 
for the Selective Service System. See 126 Cong. Rec. H272S-
H2729. H2747 (April 22, 1980) . When the Senate consid-
ered the Joint Resolution, it defeated, after extensive debate, 
an amendment which in effect would have authorized the 
registration of women. 126 C'ong. Rec. S6527-S6549 (June 
10, 1980) .9 As noted earlier, Congress in H. R. J. Res. 521 
only authorized funds sufficient to cover the registration of 
males. The Report of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
8 See Reinst itution of Procedures for Registration Under the Military 
Selective Service Act: Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226 before the Sub-
rommittee on Manpower & Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 96th Cong., 1st Se:::s. (1979) . Seven months before the President's 
call for the registration of women, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
rejrcted the idea, seeS. Rep. No. 9o-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess ., 8-9 (1979). 
9 The amendment provided that no funds "shall be made available for 
implementing a system of registration which does not include women." 
126 Cong. Rec. S6527. 
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tions on H R. J . Res. 521 noted that the amount authorized 
was below the President's request "due to the Committee's 
decision not to provide $8,500,000 to register women," and 
that "The amount recommended by the Committee would al-
low for registration of young men only." S. Rep. No. 96~ 
789, S'Upra , at 21; see 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. Nunn) 
(June 10, 1980). 
While proposals to register women were being rejected in 
the course of transferring funds to register males, committees 
in boLh Houses which had conducted hearings on the issue 
were also rejecting the registration of women. The House 
Subcolllmittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed 
Services Committee tabled a bill which would have amended 
the MSSA to authorize registration of women, H. R. 6569, ou 
March 6. 1980. Legislative Calendar, House Committee on 
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 54 (Sept. 30, 1980). 
The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected a proposal 
to register women, S. 2440, as it had one year before. see S. 
Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 8- 9, and adopted specific findings 
supporting its action. See S. Rep. No. 96- 826, supra. at 
156-161. These findings were stressed in debate in the Sen-
ate on Joint Resolution 521, see 126 Cong. Rec. S6544-S6545 
(Sen. Nunn) (June 10, 1980); S6531-S6532 (Sen. Warner) 
(June 10, 1980). They were later specifically endorsed by 
House and Senate conferees considering the Fiscal Year 1981 
Defense Authorization Bill. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 96- 895, 
96th Cong. , 2d Sess., 100 (1980). 10 Later both Houses 
adopted the findings by passing the Report. 126 Cong. Rec. 
H7800, S11646 (Aug. 26, 1980). The Senate Report. there-
fore , is considerably more significant than a typical report 
10 The findings were before the conferees because the Senate Armect 
Services Committee had added a provision to the 1981 Defense Authoriza-
t ion Bill authorizing the transfer of funds to register young men as !l: 
stop-gap measure should Joint Resolution 521 fail. See S. Rep. No. 
f)(}-895, supra, at 100, · 
80-251--0PINION 
16 . ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG 
I 
of a single House, and its findings are in effect findings of the 
en tire Congress. ' 
The foregoing clearly establishes that the decision to ex~ 
empt women from registration was not the "accidental by~ 
product of a traditional way of thinking about women.'~ 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,320 (1977) (quoting Cali~ 
fano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 233 (1977) (STEVENS, J., 
eoncurring) ) . In Michael M., supra, at-, n. 6, we rejected 
& similar argument because of action by the California Legis~ 
lature considering and rejecting proposals to make a statut~ 
~hallenged on discrimination grounds gender~neutral. ThE'l 
eause for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here. 
Whatever one's views on the merits, it is clear that Congress! 
decision to exempt women from registration was not reflex-
ive, or simply the incidental baggage of out-moded views. 
The issue was considered at great length, and Congress 
clearly expressed its purpose and intent. Contrast Califano 
v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 87 (1979) ("The gender qualifica-
tion ... escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and flooP 
debate").11 
For the same reasons we reject appellees' argument that we 
must consider the constitutionality of the MSSA solely on 
the basis of the views expressed by Congress in 1948, when 
the MSSA was first enacted in its modern form. Contrary 
to the suggestions of appellees and various amici, reliance on 
the legislative history of Joint Resolution 521 and the ac-
tivity of the various committees of the 96th Congress con-
sidering the registration of women does not violate sound 
principles that appropriations legislation should not be con-
11 Nor can we agreP with the characterization of the MSSA in the 
Brief for Amicus Curiae National Organization of Women as a law which 
"coerce[s] or preclude[s] women as a class from performing tasks or jobs 
of which they are capable," or the suggestion that this case involves "[t]he 
exclusion of women from the military." !d., at 19-20. Nothing in the-
MSSA restricts in any way the opportunitie:; for womeu to volunteer for 
military service. 
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tsidered as modifying substantive legislation. Congress did 
not change the MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly recon~ 
sider the question of exempting women from its provisions, 
and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative history is, 
thPrefore, highly relevant in assessing the constitutional va-
lidity of the exemption. 
The MSSA established a plan for maintaining "adequate 
armed strength ... to ensure the security of [the] nation." 
50 U. S. C. App. § 451 (b). Registration is the first step 
"in a united and continuous process designed to raise an 
army speedily and efficiently," Falbo v. United States, 320 
U. S 549, 553 (1944), see United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 
1, 9 (1953), and Congress provided for the reactivation of 
registration in order to "provide the means for the early 
delivery of inductees in an emergency." S. Rep. No. 96-826, 
supra, at 156. Although the three-:judge District Court often 
tried to sever its consideration of registration from the par-
ticulars of induction, see, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 42a-
43a, Congress rather clearly linked the need for renewed reg-
istration with its views on the character of a subsequent draft. 
The Senate Report specifically found that "An ability to 
mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our na-
tional security. A functioning registration system is a vital 
part of any mobilization plan." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 
160. As Senator Warner put it, "I equate registration with 
the draft." Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1197. See also 
id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen), 1671 (Sen . Exon). Such an ap-
proach is certainly logical, since under the MSSA induction 
is interlocked with registration: only those registered may be 
drafted, and registration serves no purpose beyond providing 
a pool for the draft. Any assessment of the congressional 
purpose and its chosen means must therefore consider the 
registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of na-
tional emergency. Any other approach would not be testing 
the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought to achie\-I!"J. 
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Congress determined that any future draft, which woul(l 
be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be charac-
terized by a need for combat troops. The Senate Report 
explained, in a specific finding later adopted by both Houses, 
that "if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime sce-
nario, the primary manpower need would be for combat re-
placements." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160; see id., at 
158. This conclusion echoed one made a year before by the 
Bame Senate Committee, see S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 
2- 3, 6. As Senator Jepsen put it, "The shortage would be in 
the combat arms. That is why you have drafts." Hearings 
on S. 2294, supra, at 1688. See also id., at 1195 (Sen. Jep-
sen); 126 Cong. Rec. H2750 (Rep. Nelson) (April 22, 1980). 
Congress' determination that the need would be for combat 
troops if a draft took place was sufficiently supported by tes-
timony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free 
to make their own judgment on the question. See Hearings 
on S. 2294, supra, at 1528- 1529 (Marine Corps Lt. Gen. 
Bronars) ; 1395 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Army Clark); 1391 (Gen. Yerks); 748 (Gen. Meyer); House 
Hearings, supra, J. A., at 224 (Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Manpower Pirie) . See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, 
3Upra, at 24, 54 (Gen. Rogers). The purpose of registration, 
therefore, was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. 
Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are I 
not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation 
of women fn" comb"atln the Navy and Air Force are statu-
tory. Under 10 U. S. C. § 6015 "women may not be as-
signed to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in 
combat missions," and under 10 U. S. C. § 8549 female mem-
bers of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in air-
craft engaged in combat missions." The Army and Marine 
Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of 
established policy. See J. A. 86, 34, 58. Congress specifi-
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,cally recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from 
combat in exempting women from registration. In the 
:words of the Senate Report: 
"The principle that women should not intentionally and 
routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys 
wide support among our people. It is universally sup-
ported by military leaders who have testified before the 
Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women 
from being assigned to combat in our military forces, 
and the Committee reaffirms this policy." S. Rep. No. 
96-826, supra, at 157. 
The Senate Report specifically found that "Women should 
not be intentionally or routinely placed in combat positions 
in our military services." !d., at 160. See S. Rep. No. 96-
226, supra, at 9.12 The President expressed his intent to 
continue the current military policy ptecluding women from 
combat, see Presidential Recommendations for Selective 
Service Reform, supra, J. A. 34, and appellees present their 
argument concerning registration against the background of 
such restrictions on the use of women in combat.18 Consist-
ent with the approach of this Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
~"'.J-pra, we must examine appellees' constitutional claim con-
cerning registration with these combat restrictions firmly in 
mind. 
The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates 
the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from reg-
istration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a 
draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from 
combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed 
12 No major rountry has women in rombat jobs in their standing army. 
See .T. A. 143. 
18 See Appellees' BriPf, at 1-2, n. 2 (denying any concession of the 
validity of combat restrictions, but submitting restrictions are irrelev~Jnt 
~o the present case). See also J. A. 256. 
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in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register. 
them. Again turning to the Senate Report i 
"In the Committee's view, the starting point for any 
discussion of the appropriateness of registering women 
for the draft is the question of the proper role of women 
in combat. . . . The policy precluding the use of women 
in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most impor .. 
tant reason for not including women in a registration 
system." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 157. 
The District Court stressed that the military need for 
women was irrelevant to the issue of their registration. As 
that court put it: "Congress could not constitutionally re-
quire registration under MSSA of only black citizens or only 
white citizens, or single out any political or religious group 
simply because those groups contained sufficient persons to 
fill the needs of the selective service system." App. to Juris. 
Statement 21a. This reasoning is beside the point. Women 
are not exempt from registration because military needs can 
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbi-
trarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated 
groups, such as would be the case with an all-black or all-
white, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Repub-
lican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, be- ) 
cause of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not 
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for 
a draft. 
CongTess' decision to authorize the registration of only 
inen, therefore, is not violative of the Due Process Clause. 
The exemption of women from registration is not only suffi-
ciently but closely related to Con11;ress' purpose in authoriz-
ing reg;stration. See Michael M ., swnra, at - ; Craig v. 
Boren, suvra,· Reed v. Reed, suvra. The fact that Congress 
and the Executive have decided that women should not serve 
in combat fully justifies Congress in not authorizing their 
registration, since the purpose of registration is to develop· 
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It pool of potential combat troops. As was the case in Schles .. 
inger v. Ballard, supra, "the gender classification is not in-
vidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes 
are not similarly situated" in this case. Michael M., supra, 
at - . The Constitution requires that Congress treat simi- / 
larly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures 
of superficial equality. 
In holding the MSSA constitutinally invalid the District 
Court relied heavily on the Presideut's decision to seek au-
thority to register women and the testimony of members of 
the Executive Branch and the military iu support of that de-
cision . See, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 37a, 39a, and n. 
30. As stated by the Administration's witnesses before Con-
gress, however, the President's "decision to ask for authority 
to register women ~q_uity." House Hearings, 
J. A. 217 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie 
and Director of Selective Service System Rostker) ; see also 
Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform, 
supra, J. A. 35, 59, 60; Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1657 
(statement of Executive Associate Director of Office of Man-
agement and Budget Wellford, Director of Selective Service 
'System Rostker, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Danzig). This was also the basis for the testimony 
by military officials. Hearings on S. 2294, at 710 (Gen. 
Meyer), 1002 (Gen. Allen) . The Senate Report, evaluating I 
'the testimony before the Committee, recognized that "the 
argument for registration and induction of women ... is not 
based on military necessity, but on considerations of equity." 
'S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158. Congress was certainly 
entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise 
·and regulate armies and navies, to focus on the question of 
military need rather than "equity." 14 As Senator Nunn of 
'the Senate Armed Services Committee put it: 
110ur Committee went into very great detail. We 
11 The gran1 of eonstitutional authority is, after all, to Congress and 
1110t to ;the Executive or military officials. 
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found that there was no military necessity cited by any 
witnesses for the registration of females. 
"The main point that those who favored the registra-
tration of females made was that they were in favor of 
this because of the equality issue which is, of course, . a 
legitimate view. But as far as military necessity, and 
that is what we are primarily, I hope, considering in the 
overall registration bill, there is no military necessity 
for this." 126 Cong. Rec. 86544. 
See also House Hearings, supra, J. A. 230 (Rep. Holt) ("You 
are talking about equity. I am talking about military.").15 
Although the military experts who testified in favor of 
registering women uniformly opposed the actual drafting of 
women. see, e. (]., Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra, at 11 
(Gen..:-Rogers), there was testimony that in the event of a 
draft~ 6stt.Doo the military could absorb some 80,000 female 
inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1661, 1828. The 
80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men 
to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking 
down the MSSA, the District Court palpably exceeded its 
authority when it ignored Congress' considered response to 
this line of reasoning. 
15 The District Court also focused on what it termed Congress' 
"inconsistent positions" in encouraging women to volunteer for military 
service and expanding their opportunities in the service, on the one hand, 
and exempting them from registration and the draft on the other. App. 
to Juris. Statement 37a-4la. This reasoning fails to appreciate the 
different purposes served by encouraging women volunteers and registra-
tion for the draft. Women volunteers do not occupy combat positions, 
!iO encouraging women to volunteer is not related to concerns about the 
availability of combat troops. In the event of a draft, however, the need 
would be for combat troops or troops which could be rotated into combat. 
See 15-16. supra. Congress' positions are clearly not inconsistrnt and in 
treating them as such the District Court failed to understand Congress' 
purpose behind registration as distinguishe~ from its purpose in encour'-
tng women volunteers .. 
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In the first place, assuming that a small number of women 
could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did 
not consider it worth the added burdens of including women 
in draft and registration plans. "It has been suggested that 
all women be registered, but only a handful actually be in-
ducted in an emergency. The Comimttee finds this a con-
fused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution ." S. Rep. No. 
96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senat€ Committee recognized 
a year before, "training would be needlessly burdened by 
women recruits who could not be used in combat." S. Rep. 
No. 96-226, supra, at 9. See also S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, 
at 159 ("Other administrative problems such as housing and 
different treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and 
physical standards would also exist.") . It is not for this 
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the con-
text of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future 
mobilization. 
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women 
for noncombat roles during mobilization, whether 80,000 01' 
less, it could be met by volunteers. SeeS. Rep. No. 96- 826, 
supra, at 160 ; id., at 158 ("Because of the combat restric-
tions, the need would be primarily for men, and women 
volunteers would fill the requirements for women.") ; House 
Hearings. supra, J. A. 227-228 (Rep. Holt). See also Hear-
ings on S. 2294, supra, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers). 
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing non- ) /J 
combat positions with women during a mobilization would J,.. 
be positively detrimental to the-rr;portant goal of military .. 
flexibility. 
"There are other military reasons that preclude very 
large numbers of women from serving. Military flexi-
bility requires that a commander be able to move units 
or ships quickly. Units or ships not located at the front 
or not previously scheduled for the front nevertheless 
must be able to move into action if necessary. In pea-ce. 
24 
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and war, significant rotation of personnel is necessary, 
We should not divide the military into two groups-one 
in permanent combat and one in permanent support. 
Large numbers of non-combat positions must be avail-
able to which combat troops can return for duty before 
being redeployed." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158. 
The point was repeated in specific findings, id., at 160; see 
also S. Rep. No. 9~226, supra, at 9. In sum, Congress 
~arefully evaluated the testimony that 80,000 women con-
scripts could be usefully employed in the event of a draft and 
rejected it in the permissible exercise of its constitutional re-
sponsibility. See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra, 
at 16 (Gen. Rogers); Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1682. 
The District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an inde-
pendent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an 
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evalua-
tion of that evidence. 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress acted 
well within its constitutional authority when it authorized 
the registration of men, and not women, under the Military 
Selective Service Act. The decision of the District Court 
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Dear Bill: 
I am writing you a separate "join" note in this 
case. Your opinion is quite persuasive, although I have 
rarely seen Justice Rehnquist so "deferential" to anything 
or anybody! 
/ ' 
In my view, Congress would have been irresponsible 
to have included women in the registration/draft law. We 
already have an army that probably cannot fight, as 
thoughtful articles recently in The Atlantic Monthly and the 
London Economist have documented. The Economist, for 
example, concluded: 
"Beneath a hard surface, the core is soft and 
spongy. The American army's weaknesses have 
to be cured, soon, if it is to face the 
challenges of the 1980's." The Economist, 
April 25, 1981, p. 23. 
But my purpose in writing is not to share my 
concerns. Rather, it is to suggest a possible addition or 
two. For the most part, your opinion relies on generalities 
in the record of hearings, and particularly with respect to 
the "policy" against women in combat. It seems to me that 
the reasons for this policy merit greater emphasis. You do 
have a good quote commencing on page 23 of your opinion from 
the Senate Report. I suggest the addition of General 
Rogers' testimony on page 16 of the Senate Subcommittee 
Report, 1979, commencing "General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may 
I add a footnote .•• ", and continuing with his description 
of emergencies that often require "non-combatant" soldiers 
to fight. 
In recent wars there rarely have been stabilized 
front lines. With modern mobility on land and in the air, 
no one can predict when and where fighting may occur. In my 
.,... • r 
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view, there are relatively few places in the armed services 
for personnel - male or female - who cannot fight. 
Apart from the foregoing, another point made by 
witnesses and included in the Senate Report, relates to 
"societal reasons". See page 159 of the Senate Report, 
emphasizing that "drafting women would place unprecedented 
strains on family life, whether in peacetime or in time of 
emergency". 
Finally, I do not recall that you have included 
a reference to "administrative problems" that would result 
from drafting women, such as "housing and different 
treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and physical 
standards". Senate Report, p. 159. 
In sum, I think the opini9h would be strenghtened 
by greater emphasis on the facts that prompted Congress to 
reject the P~esident's novel view that military needs should 
be subordinated to "equitable" considerations. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
May 7, 1981 
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
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emphasizing that "drafting women would place unprecedented 
strains on family life, whether in peacetime or in time of 
emergency•. 
Finally, I do not recall that you have included 
a reference to "administrative problems" that would result 
from drafting women, such as "housing and different 
treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and physical 
standards". Senate Report, p. 159. 
In sum, I think the opinion would be strenghtened 
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May 11, 1981 
Re: No. 80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your "join" and letter of May 7th. 
Taking your comments in inverse order, the opinion in 
its present form does refer to the "administrative problems" 
of drafting women, quoting on page 23 the language from the 
Senate Report which you quote in your letter. I would have 
gone into this concern at greater length, but neither the 
reports nor hearing testimony did so. If you have read the 
record more carefully than I, I would cheerfully consider 
any additional references to the administrative problems it 
contains. 
As to the "societal reasons", I made a conscious 
decision to leave them out of the opinion. I recognize a 
strong argument can be made on this score, as was done, for 
example, in the brief amicus curiae of Stacey Acker, et al. 
I was less certain that there were five votes to uphold 
male-only registration on the grounds that women have 
different roles in family life and in society than men. 
This would run into some broad language in previous opinions 
about "sexual stereotyping", most if not all of which I 
dissented from. Since I felt a solid Court could be lined 
up behind an opinion based solely on military 
considerations, I did not think it worthwhile to confuse the 
case by a possibly divisive discussion of societal 
considerations. 
As to your first suggestion, I do cite to Gen. Rogers' 
testimony on page 24. I hesitate to include a lengthy 
quotation, since elaborating the evidentiary support for 
Congress' determination detracts from the view that 
decisions such as this one are within Congress' province and 
- 2 -
that courts should be loath to go over with a fine-tooth 
comb the factual basis for Congress' exercise of its 
constitutional authority. Ample factual support is there, 
but giving it too much prominence in an opinion might 
suggest it is necessary in every ca_9e. SlnceJ: o cite Gen. 
Rogers' testimony, however, if Y9U feel stron about the 
point I am willing to quote it i t\-a- ·· · to the citation 
on page 24. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
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Re: No. 80-251 - Rostker v. Goldberg 
Dear Bill: 
May 12, 1981 
I wonder if you would consider the following changes in 
your opinion: 
1. The elimination, on page 14 of the recir-
culation of May 6, of the first full sentence and the 
following reference to the Appellees' Brief, 
2. The elimination of the sentence beginning 
with "Whatever one's views," just above the center of 
page 16, 
3. The insertion of t~e words "in part" in the 
second sentence of the first full paragraph on page 
16. This is the sentence referring to Michael M. 
4. Indicating, on pages 16, 20, and 21, where 
Michael M. is cited, that the opinion there was for 
only a plurality and not a majority. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-251 
Bernard Rostker, Director of On Appeal from the United 
- Selective ~ervice, Appellant, States District Court for 
v. the Eastern District of 
~obert L, Goldberg et al. Pennsylvania. 
[May-, 1981] 
JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question preEented is whether the Military Selective 
Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq., violates the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in authorizing 
the President to require the registration of male~ ~nd not 
females. 
I 
MAY 1 3 1981 
Congress is given the power under the Constitution "To 
raise and support Armies/ ' "To provide and maintain a 
Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I , § 8, cis. 12-14. 
Pursuant to this grant of authority Congress has enacted the 
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq. 
("the MSSA" or " the Act" ). Section 3 of the Act, 50 U.S. C. 
App. § 453, empowers the President, by proclamation, to re-
quire the registration of "every male citizen" and male resi-
dent aliens between the ages of 18 and 26. The purpose of 
this registration is to facilitate any eventual conscription: 
pursuant to § 4 (a ) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a), 
those persons required to register under § 3 are liable for 
training and service in the Armed Forces. The MSSA regis-
tration provision serves no other purpose beyond providing 
a pool for subsequent induction. · 
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Registration for the draft under § 3 was discorltinued in 
1975. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 Weekly Comp. 
of Pres. Doc. 318 (April 7, 1975). In early 1980, President 
Carter determined that it was necessary to reactivate the 
draft registration process.1 The immediate impetus for this 
decision was the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan. 16 
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980) (State 
of the Union Address). According to the Administration's 
witnPsses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the 
resulting crisis in Southwestern Asia convinced the President 
that the tctime has come" tcto use his present authority to 
require registration . . . as a necessary step to preserving or 
enhancing our national security interests." Department of 
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1805 (1980) (hereafter 
Hearings on S. 2294) (joint statement of Dr. John P. White, 
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Dr. 
BPrnard Rostker, Director. Selective Service System, and 
Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense). The Selective Service System had been inactive, 
however, and funds were needed prior to reactivating regis-
tration. The President therefore recommended that funds 
be transferred from the Department of Defense to the sep-
arate Selective Service System. H. R. Doc. No. 96-267, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1980). He also recommended that Con-
gress take action to amend the MSSA to permit the registra-
tion and conscription of women as well as men. See Presi-
dential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform-A 
Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to Pub. L. 96-107 
(Feb. 11, 1980), J. A. 57-61. 
1 The President did not seek conscription. Since the Act was amended 
in 1973 to preclude conscription, Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U. S. C. 
App. § 467 (c) , any actual conscription would require further congres-
sional action. See S. Rep. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 155 (1980). 
• 
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Congress agreed that it was necessary to reactivate the 
i'egistration process, and allocated funds for that purpose in 
a joint resolution which passed the Hous~ on April 22 and 
the Senate on June 12. H. R. J. Res. 521, Pub. L. 96-282, 
94 Stat. 552. The resolution did not allocate all the funds 
originally requested by the President, but only those neces-
sary to register males. See S. Rep. No. 96-789, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess., 1, n. 1; 2 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. 
Nunn) (June 10, 1980). Although Congress considered the 
question at great length, see infra, at 13-16, it declined to 
amend the MSSA to permit the registration of women. 
On July 2, 1980, the President, by proclamation, ordered 
the registration of specified groups of young men pursuant 
to the authority conferred by § 3 of the Act. Registration 
was to commence on July 21, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771, 
45 Fed. Reg. 45247. 
These events of last year breathed new life into a lawsuit 
which had been essentially dormant in the lower courts for 
nearly a decade. It began in 1971 when several men subject 
to registration for the draft and subsequent induction into 
the Armed Services filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania chal-
lenging the MSSA on several grounds.2 A three-judge dis-
2 Plaintiffs contended that the Act amounted to a taking of property 
without due process, imposed involuntary servitude, violated rights of 
free expression and assembly, was unlawfully implemented to advance an 
unconstitutional war, and impermissibly discriminated between males and 
females . The Dh;trict Court d!:'nied plaintiffs' application to ronvene a, 
three-judge district court and di:smi&;ed the suit, Rowland v. Tarr, 341 
F . Supp. 339 (ED Pa. 1972) . On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the discrimination 
claim, and remanded the case to the District Court to determine if this 
claim was substantial enough to warrant the convening of a three-judge 
court under then-applicable 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.) and whether 
plaintiffs had standing to assert that claim. 480 F. 2d 545 (1973). On 
remand, the District Court answered both questions in the affirmative, 
·resulting in the convening of the three-judge court which decided the- · 
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• 
trict court was convened in 1974 to consider the claim o~ 
unlawful gender-based discrimination which is now before 
us.3 On July 1, 1974, the court declined to dismiss the case 
as moot, reasoning that although authority to induct regis-
trants had lapsed, see n. 1, supra, plaintiffs were still under. 
certain affirmative obligations in connection with registra-
tion. 378 F. Supp. 766. Nothing more happened in the case 
for five years. Then, on June 6, 1979, the court clerk, acting 
pursuant to a local rule governing inactive cases, proposed 
that the case be dismissed. Additional discovery thereupon 
ensued, and defendants moved to dismiss on various justicia-
bility grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss, 
ruling that it did not have before it an adequate record on 
the operation of the Selective Service System and what ac-
tion would be necessary to reactivate it. Civ. Action No. 
71- 1480 (Feb. 19, 1980) . On July 1, 1980, the court certified 
a plaintiff class of "all male persons who are registered or 
subject to registration under 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 or are 
liable for training and service in the armed forces of the 
United States under 50 U. S. C. App. § 454, 456 (h) and 467 
(c)." App. to Juris. Statement 2a- 4a.4 
' ra~e brlow. ThE' Art authorizing three-judge courts to hear claims such 
as this was repcalrd in 1976, Pub. L. 94-3 1, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119 
(Aug. 12, 1976), but remains applicable to sui:s filed before repeal, id., 
§ 7, 90. tnt. 1119 
3 As the Court ::-latcd in Schle8inger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 500, n. 3 
(1975), "Although 1l contnins no Equnl Protection Clausr ns docs the 
Fourteenth Amrndment , the Fifth Amendment's Due Procel:'s Clause 
prohibits tht• l'eclrrnl government. from E'ngnging in discrimination thnl is 
1:;o unjustifiable n:o lo be violative of due prorrss.' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
u. s. 497, 499." 
4 When entering its judgment on July 18, the District Court rrdl'fined 
the clnss to inrlude "All male persons who arc registered under 50 U.S. C. 
App. § 453 or are liable for training and service in the armed forces of 
the United States unrlrr 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 454, 456 (h) :mel 467 (c) ; 
and who a rc also either subjrct to registration under Presidential Procla-
mation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently registered with the · 
Selective Service System." App. to Juris. Statement 44a. 
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On Friday, July 18, 1980, three days before registration 
.was to commence, the District Court issued an opinion find-. 
ing that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from 
requiring registration under the Act. The court initially de-
termined that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case 
was ripe, determinations which are not challenged here by 
the Government. Turning to the merits, the court rejected 
plaintiffs' suggestions that the equal protection claim should 
be tested under "strict scrutiny," and also rejected defend-
ants' argument that the deference due Congress in the area 
of military affairs required application of the traditional 
"minimum scrutiny" test. Applying the "important govern-
ment interest" test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 
190 (1976), the court struck down the MSSA. The court 
stressed that it was not deciding whether or to what extent 
women should serve in combat, but only the issue of registra~ 
tion, and felt that this "should dispel any concern that we 
are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner in mili-
tary affairs." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. See also id., at 
27 a, n. 17; 28a, n. 18. The court then proceeded to examine 
the testimony and hearing evidence presented to Congress 
by representatives of the military and the Executive Branch, 
and concluded on the basis of this testimony that "military 
opinion, backed by extensive study, is that the availability 
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility, 
not hamper it." !d., at 37a. It rejected Congress' contrary 
determination in part because of what it viewed as Congress' 
11inconsistent positions" in declining to register women yet 
spending funds to recruit them and expand their opportuni-
ties in the military. !d., at 37a:-39a. 
The United States immediately filed a notice of appeal and 
the next day, Saturday, July 19, 1980, JusTICE BRENNAN, 
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, 
stayed the District Court's order enjoining commencement 
of registrat ion. - U. S. -. Registration began the next 
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Monday. On December 1, 1980, we noted probable juriEdic-: 
tion. - U. S. -. 
II 
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an 
Act of Congress-"the gravest and most delicate duty that 
this Court is called upon to perform," Blodgett v. Holden; 
;275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)-the Court accords 
"great weight to the decisions of Congress." CBS, Inc. v; 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973). 
The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose mem~ 
bers take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution 
of the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 
164 (1951) (concurring opinion), we must have "due regard 
to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judg-
ment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also hav~ 
taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the 
responsibility for carrying on government." The customary 
deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly 
appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered 
the question of the Act's constitutionality. See, e. g .. S. R3p. 
No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 159-161 (1980); 126 Cong. 
Rec. S6531-S6533 (Sen. Warner) (June 10, 1980), S6547 
(Sen. Hatfield) (June 10, 1980). 
This is not, however. merely a case involving the custom~ 
ary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case 
arises in the context of Congress' authority over military af-
fairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded 
Congress greater deference. In rejecting the registration of 
women, Congress explicitly relied upon its constitutional 
powers under Art. I, § 8, cis. 12- 14. The "specific findings" 
section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by 
stating: 
"Article I , sect.ion 8 of the Constitution coinmits ex-
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plusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support 
armies, provide anti maintain a Navy, and make rule~ 
for Government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the 
discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions fo~ 
expansion of our Armed Forces, and the means best 
suited to such expansion should it prove necessary." S. 
Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160. 
St>e also S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979). 
This Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad con-
stitutional power" to raise and regulate armies and navies, 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 510 (1975). As the 
Court noted in considering a challenge to the selective serv-
ice laws, "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and 
ilUpport armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to 
that end is broad and swe<>ping." United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U. S. 367. 377 (1968). See Lichter v. United States, 334 
u. s. 742, 755 (1948). 
Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in 
this area broad. but the lark of comn-etence on the part of 
the courts is marked. In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 
( 1973), the Court noted: 
"It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence. The 
complex, snbtle. and professional decisions as to the com-
position, training, equipping, and control of a military 
force are essentially professional military judgments, 
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and 
Executive branches." 
See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 (1953).~ 
5 See also Simmons v United States, 406 F . 2d 456, 459 (CA5 1969) 
("That the rourt i~ not competent or empowered to sit as a super-
executive authority to reYiew the decisions of the Executive and Legislative 
branches of government in regard to the necessity, method of selection, 
89-251-ePINION 
8 ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG 
The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and 
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident 
in several recent decisions of this Court. In Parker v. Levy, 
417 U. S. 733. 756 (1974), the Court rejected both vagueness 
and overbreadth challenges to army regulations, noting that 
"Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth 
and with greater flexibility" when the statute governs mili-
tary society, and that "[w]hile the members of the military 
are not excluded from the protection granted by the First 
Amendment, thf' different character of the military commu-
nity and of the military mission requires a different applica-
tion of those protections." In Middendorf v. Henry, 425 
U. S. 25 (1976), the Court noted that in considering due 
process claims in the context of summary court martial it 
11must give particular deference to the determination of Con-
gress, made under its military authority to regulate the land 
and naval forces. U. S. Canst., Art. I. § 8," concerning what 
rights were available. I d., at 43. See also id., at 49-50 
(PowELL, J., concurring). Deference to the j11dgment of 
other branches in the area of militarv affairs also played a 
major role in Greer v. Spack, 424 U. S. 828, 837-838 (1!176). 
where the Court upheld a ban on political speeches by civil-
ians on a military base, and Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 34'g 
(1980) , where the Court upheld regulations imposing a prior 
restraint on the right to petition of military personnel. See 
also Burns v. Wilson. :146 U. S. 137 (1953); United States v. 
Macintosh, 2S3 U.S. 605, 622 (1!131). 
In Schlesingrr v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975), the Court 
considered a due process challenge, brought by males, to 
the navy policy of according females a longer period than 
males in which to attain promotions necessary to continued 
service. The Court distinguished previous gender-based dis-
and <'Omposition of our deft•nse forces is obvious and needs no further 
discussion"). 
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.r.riminations held unlawful in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 
(1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). 
In those cases, the classifications were based on "overbroad 
generalizations." See 419 U. S., at 506-507. In the case be-
fore it, however, the Court noted: 
i 
"the different treatment of men and women naval offi-
cers ... reflects, not archaic and overbroad generaliza-
tions, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and 
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situatrd 
with respect to opportunities for professional service. 
Appellee has not challenged the current restrictions on 
women officrrs' participation in combat and in mo t sea 
duty." Id., at 508. 
In light of the rombat restrictions women did not have the 
same opportunities for promotion as men, and therefore it 
was not uncoustitutional for Congress to distinguish between 
them. 
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard 
the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. 
In that arra as any other Congress remains subject to the 
limitations of the Due Prorcss Clause, see Ex parte Milligan, 
4 Wall. 2 (1R66); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware-
house Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919), but the tests and limi-
tations to be applied may differ because of the military 
context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate respon-
sibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply rec-
ognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to 
Congressional choice. Sec CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee , 412 U. S .. at 103. In deciding the question before 
us we must br particularly careful not to substitute our judg-
ment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own 
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the 
Legislative Branch. 
The District Court purported to recognize the appropriate-
tress of flpferrnce to Congress when that body was exercising·· 
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its constitutionally delegated authority over military affairs, 
App. to Juris. Statement 28a, but it stressed that "we are not 
here concerned with military operations or day-to-day con-
duct of the military into which we have no desire to intrude.'' 
Ibid. Appellees also stress that this case involves civilians, 
not the military, and that "the impact of registration on the 
military is only indirect and attenuated." Appellees Brief, 
at 19. We find these efforts to divorce registration from the 
military and national defense context , with all the deference 
called for in that cont0xt, singularly unpersuasive. United 
States v. O'Brien, supra, recognized the broad dcfen•nce due 
f'ongress in the selective service area b0fore us in this rase. 
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but 
rather the first step in the induction process into the military 
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of reg-
istration to induction, s e, e. g .. S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, 
at 156, 160. Congressional judgments concerning registra-
tion and the draft are based on judgments concerning mili-
tary operations and needs, see. e. g., id., at 157 ("the starting 
point for any clisrussion of the appropriateness of registering 
women for the draft is the question of the proper role of 
women in combat" ). and the deference unquestionably due 
the latter judgments is necessarily required in assessing the 
former as well. Although the District Court stressed that it 
was not intrudin?: on military questions. its opinion was based 
on assessment of military need and flexibility in a time of 
mobilization. SeE'. e. g. , App. to Juris. Statement 31a-43a. 
Tt would be blinking reality to say that our precedents re-
quiring deference to Congress in military affairs are not 
imp1icated by the present case.6 
11 Congress rerognized that Hs decision on registration involved judg-
ments on militar~r needs and operations, and that its drcisions were 
entitled to partirnlar deference : "The Supreme Court's most recent teach-
ings in the field of equal protection cannot be read in i8olation from its 
opinions giving great deference to the judgment of Congre::<s and military 
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The Solicitor General argues, largely on the basis of the 
foregoing cases emphasizing the deference due Congress in 
the area of military affairs and national security, that this 
Court should scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the 
distinction drawn between men and women bears a rational 
relation to some legitimate government purpose, see United 
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, - U. S. -
(1980) , and should not examine the Act under the heightened 
scrutiny with which we have approached gender-based dis-
crimination, see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County, - U. S. - (1981); Craig v. Boren, supra; Reed 
v. Reed, supra.1 We do not think that the substantive guar-
antee of due process or certainty in the law will be advanced 
by any further "refinement" in the applicable tests as sug-
gested by the Government. Announced degrees of "defer-
ence" to legislative judgments. just as levels of "scrutiny" 
which this Court announces that it applies to particular classi-
fications made by a legislative body, may all too readily 
become facile abstractions used to justify a result. In this 
case the courts are called upon to decide whether Co11gress, 
acting under an explicit constitutional grant of authority, 
has by that action transcended an explicit guarantee of indi-
commanders in dealing with the management of military forces and the 
requirements of militarr di~cipline . The Court has made it unmistaknbly 
clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some 
circumstances be modified in the light of military needs, and that Con-
gress' judgment as to what is ueces8ary to preserve our national security 
is entitled to great deference." S. Rep. No. 9G-826, supra, at 159-160. 
Deference to Congress' judgment was a consistent and dominant theme 
in lower court deri:::ions assessing the present claim. See, e. g., United' 
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333. 335 (ED La. 1970); United States v. 
Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (ED Wis. 1974) . 
7 It is clear that "fg]ender has never been rejected as an impermissible 
classification in all instanceB." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 356, n. 10 
(1974) . In making thi::; observation the Court noted that "Congress 
has not so far drafted women into the Armed Services, 50 U. S. C, 
App. § 454." Ibid. 
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vidual rights which limits the authority so conferred. Simply 
labelling the legislative decision "military" on the one hand 
()r "gender-based" on the other does not automatically guide-
a court to the correct constitutional result. 
No one could deny that under the test of Craig v. Boren, 
supra, the Government's interest in raising and supporting 
armies is an "important governmental interest." Congress 
and its committees carefully considered and debated two al-
ternative means of furthering that interest: the first was to 
register only males for potential conscription, and the other 
was to register both sexes. Congress chose the former alter-
native. When that decision is challenged on equal protection 
grounds, the question a court must decide is not which alter-
native it would have chosen, had it been the primary decision-
maker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies equal 
protection of the laws. 
Nor can it be denied that the imposing number of cases 
from this Court previously cited suggest that judicial defer-
ence to such congressional exercise of authority is at its 
apogee when legislative action under the congressional author-
ity to raise and support armies and make rules and regula-
tions for their governance is challenged. As previously noted, 
ante, at 9, deference does not mean abdication. The recon-
ciliation between the deference due Congress and our own 
constitutional resnonsibility is perhaps best instanced in 
S chlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S., at 510, where we stated: 
"This Court has recognized that 'it is the primary 
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to 
fight wars should the occasion arise.' U. S . ex rel. Toth 
v. Quarles. 350 U. S. 11 , 17. See alF:o Orloff v. Wil-
lrmqhbu , 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). The responsibility 
for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend 
to that business rests with Congress, see U. S. Const.,' 
Art. I , § 8, cls. 12- 14, and with the President. See U. S. 
' Const., Art. :II; §. 2, ;cl. 1. We cannot say that, in ex .. 
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E>rCJsmg lts broad constitutional power here, Congress 
has violated the Due Procerss Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment." 
Or, as put a generation ago in a case not involving any claim 
of gender-based discrimination: ' 
"[J] udges are not given the task of running the Army. 
The responsibility for setting up channels through 
which .. . grievances can be considered and fairly settled 
rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the 
UHited States and his subordinates. The military con-
stitutes a specialized community governed by a separate 
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government 
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to inter-
fere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be 
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters." Orloff 
v. Willoughby, 345 U. S., at 93-94. 
Schlesinger v. Ballard did not purport to apply a different 
equal protection test because of the military context, but did 
stress the deference due congressional choices among alterna-
tives in exercising the congressional authority to raise and 
support armies and make rules for their governance. In 
light of the floor debate and the report of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee hereinafter discussed, it is apparent that 
Congress was fully aware not merely of the many facts and 
figures presented to it by witnesses who testified before its 
committees, but of the current thinking as to the place of' 
women in the Armed Services. In such a case, we cannot 
ignore Congress' broad authority conferred by the Constitu-
tion to raise and support armies when we are urged to declare 
unconstitutional its studied choice of one alternative in prefer-
ence to another for furthering that goal. 
III 
This case is quite different from several gender-based dis-
crimination cases which have previously come before the· 
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Court Appellres' assertions notwithstanding, this rather 
clearly i. not a case in which Congress acted "unthinkingly'' 
or "rdlrxively and not for any considered reason" in dr~ 
e. distinction bused on gender. Appellees' Brief, at 35. I The 
question of registering women for the draft not only received 
considerable national attention and was the subject of wide-
ranging public debate, but also was extensively considered 
by Congress in hearings, floor debate. and in commit~ 
Hearings held by both Houses of Congrrss in response to the 
Presidrnt's request for authorization to register women ad-
duced rxtensiv0 testimony and evidence concerning the issue. 
Ree Hearings on S. 2204; Hearings on National Service L<'g-
islation befor0 t.he Subcommittee on Military Personnel of 
the Uousr C'ommittre on Armed Services, 06th Cong., 2d 
Re:::s. (1980) (hereaftrr House Hearings). These hearings 
built on other hearings held the previous year addressed to 
thf' Rame question.8 
The House declined to provide for the registration of 
women when it passed the Joint Resolution allocating funds 
for the Selective Service System. See 126 Cong. Rec. H27213-
H2729. H2747 (April 22, 1980). When the Senate consid-
ered the Joint Resolution , it defeated, after extensive debate, 
an amendment which in effect would have authorized the 
registration of women . 126 Cong. Rec. S6527- S6549 (JunE' 
10, 1980).9 As notrd earlier, Congress in H. R. J. Res. 521 
only authorized funds sufficient to cover the registration of 
malt>s. The Report of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
8 See RE'in~titution of Procedure~ for Registration Under the Militnry 
Selective Servirr Act: Hen ring on S. 109 and S. 226 before the Sub-
committee on Manpower & Pf:'r~onnel of the Senate Committee on Armed 
Sen ices, !)6th Con g., 1st SrFs. (1979). Seven months before the Prf:'sident's 
call for the regi~tration of women, tlw Senate Armed Sen·ice:s Committee 
rejec ted the iden, seP S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Con g., 1st SPss., 8-9 (1979) . 
ll The nmrndment provided that no funds "shall be made nvailable for 
implementing a system of regi:;tration which does not include women."· 
126 Cong. Rec. S6527. 
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tions on H. R. J. Res. 521 noted that the amount authorized 
was below the President's request "due to the Committee's 
decision not to provide $8,500,000 to register women," and 
that "The amount recommended by the Committee would al-
low for registration of young men only." S. Rep. No. 96-
789, supra, at 21; see 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. Nunn) 
(June 10, 1980). 
While proposals to register women were being rejected in 
the course of transferring funds to register males, committees 
in both Houses which had conducted hearings on the issue 
were also rejecting the registration of women. The House 
Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed 
Services Committee tabled a bill which would have amended 
the MSSA to authorize registration of women, H. R. 6569, on 
March 6, 1980. Legislative CaleJ1dar, House Committee on 
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. , 54 (Sept. 30, 1980). 
The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected a proposal 
to register women, S. 2440, as it had one year before. see S. 
Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 8- 9, and adopted specific findings 
. supporting its action. See S~ Rep. No. 96- 826, supra. at 
156-161. These findings were stressed in debate in the Sen-
ate on Joint Resolution 521, see 126 Cong. Rec. S6544- S6545 
(Sen. Nvnn) (June 10, 1980); S6531- S6532 (Sen . Warner) 
(June 10, 1980). They were later specifically endorsed by 
House and Senate conferees considering the Fiscal Year 1981 
Defense Authorization Bill. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 96- 895, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1980).10 Later both Houses 
adopted the findings by passin~ the Report. 126 Cong. Rec. 
H7800, S11646 (Aug. 26, 1980) . The Senate Report, there-
fore, is considerably more significant than a typical report 
10 The findings were before the conferees because the Senrtte Armed 
Services Committee had added a provision to the 1981 Defense Authoriza. 
tion Bill authorizing the transfer of funds to register young men as a 
stop-gap measure should .Joint Resolution 521 fail. See S. Rep. No, 
96-895, supra, at 100. 
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of a single House, and its findings are in effect findings of the 
en tire Congress. 
ThE' foregoing clearly <>stablishes that the decision to ex-
empt women from registration was not the "accidental by-
product of a traditional way of thinking about women." 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 320 (1977) (quoting Cali-
fano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 233 (1977) (STEVENS, J., 
concurring)). In Michael M., supra, at-, n. 6, we rejected 
a similar argument because of action by th~ California Legis-
lature considering and rejecting proposals to make a statute 
challenged on discrimination grounds gender-neutral. The 
use for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here. / 
Whateve1 one's views on the merits, it is clear that Congress' l......--o 
decision to exempt women from registration was not r<.'fiex-~ 
ive, or simply the incidental baggage of out-moded views. 
The issue wa considered at great length, and Congress 
clearly expressed its purpose and intent. Contrast Califano 
v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 87 (1979) ("The gender qualifica-
tion ... escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and floor 
debate" ).11 
For the same reasons we reject appellees' argument that we 
must consider the constitutionality of the MSSA solely on 
the ba~is of thE' views <'Xpressed by Congress in 1948, when 
the M~SA was first enacted in its modern form. Contrary 
to the suggestions of app<'Jlees and various amici, reliance on 
the legislative history of Joint Resolution 521 and the ac-
tivity of the various committees of the 96th Congress con-
sidering the registration of women does not violate sound 
principles that appropriations legislation should not be con-
11 Nor can we ngrer with the characterization of the !\ISSA in the 
Brief for Amirus Curiae National Organization of Women as a law which 
"coerce[s l or prerludef s] women as a class from performing tasks or jobs 
of which they nre rapable," or the suggestion that this cnse involves " rtJhe 
Pxclusion of womPn from the military." Id., at 19-20. Nothing in the-· 
MSSA restricts in any way the OI?portuni.tiet fQl: women to volunteer for · 
military service. 
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sidered as modifying substantive legislation. Congress did 
not change the MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly recon-
sider the question of exempting women from its provisions, 
and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative history is, 
therefore, highly relevant in assessing the constitutional va-
lidity of the exemption. 
The MSSA established a plan for maintaining "adequate 
armed strength ... to ensure the security of rthe] nation." 
50 U. S. C. App. § 451 (b). Registration is the first step 
"in a united and continuous process designed to raise an 
Rrmy speedily and efficiently," Falbo v. United States, 320 
U. S. 549. 553 (1944) , see United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 
1. 9 (1953). and Congress provided for the reactivation of 
registration in order to "provide the means for the early 
delivery of inductees in an emergency." S. Rep. No. 96-826, 
mpra, at 156. Although the three-judge District Court often 
tried to sever its consideration of registration from the par" 
ticulars of induction, see, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 42a-
43a, Congress rather clearly linked the need for renewed reg-
istration with its views on the character of a subsequent draft. 
The Senate Report specifically found that 11 An ability to 
mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our na-
tional security. A functioning registration system is a vital 
part of any mobilization plan." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 
160. As Senator Warner put it, "I equate registration with 
the draft." Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1197. See also 
id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen) , 1671 (Sen. Exon). Such an ap-
proach is certainly logical, since under the MSSA induction 
is interlocked wi th registration : only those registered may be 
drafted, and registration serves no purpose beyond providing 
a pool for the draft. Any assessment of the congressional 
purpose and its chosen means must therefore consider the 
registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of na-
tional emergency. Any other approach would not be testing 
the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought to achieve .. 
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Congress determined that any future draft, which would 
be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be charac-
teriz.ed by a need for combat troops. The Senate Report 
explained, in a specific finding later adopted by both Houses, 
that "if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime sce-
nario, the primary ma.npower need would be for combat re-
placements." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160; see id., at 
158. This conclusion echoed one made a year before by the 
same Senate Committee, see S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 
2-3, 6. As Senator Jepsen put it, "The shortage would be in 
the combat arms. That is why you have drafts." Hearings 
on S. 2294, supra, at 1688. See also id., at 1195 (Sen. Jep-
sen); 126 Cong. Rec. H2750 (Rep. Nelson) (April 22, 1980). 
Congress' determination that the need would be for combat 
troops if a draft took place was sufficiently supported by tes-
timony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free 
to make their own judgment on the question. See Hearings 
on S. 2294, supra, at 1528-1529 (Marine Corps Lt. Gen. 
Bronars); 1395 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Army Clark); 1391 (Gen. Yerks); 748 (Gen. Meyer); House 
Hearings, supra, J. A., at 224 (Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Manpower Pirie). See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, 
supra, at 24, 54 (Gen. Rogers). The purpose of registration, 
therefore, was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. 
Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are 
not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation 
of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are statu-
tory. Under 10 U. S. C. § 6015 "women may not be as-
signed to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in 
combat missions," and under 10 U. S. C. § 8549 female mem-
bers of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in air-
craft engaged in combat missions." The Army and Marine 
Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of 
established policy. See J. A. 86, 34, 58. Congress specifi-
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pally recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from 
pombat in exempting women from registration, In the 
words of the Senate Report: 
"The principle that women should not intentionally and 
routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys 
wide support among our people. It is universally sup-
ported by military leaders who have testified before the 
Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women 
from being assigned to combat in our military forces, 
and the Committee reaffirms this policy." S. Rep. No. 
96--826, supra, at 157. 
The Senate Report specifically found that "Women should 
not be intentionally or routinely placed in combat positions 
in our military services." /d., at 160. See S. Rep. No. 96-
226, supra, at 9.12 The President expressed his intent to 
continue the current military policy p1ecluding women from 
combat, see Presidential Recommendations for Selective 
Service Reform, supra, J. A. 34, and appellees present their 
argument concerning registration against the background of 
such restrictions on the use of women in combat. 13 Consist-
ent with the approach of this Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
S'U.pra, we must examine appellees' constitutional claim con-
cerning registration with these combat restrictions firmly in 
mind. 
The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates 
the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from reg-
istration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a 
draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from 
combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed 
12 No major country h11s women in combat joqs in their standing army. 
See J . A. 143. 
1 ~ S<'e AppeliC'ef'' BriPf, nt 1- 2, n. 2 (denying any concession of the 
validity of combat restrietions, but . ubmitting restrictions are irreievant 
to the present rase) . See also J . A. 256. 
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in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register 
them. Again turning to the Senate Report: 
"In the Committee's view, the starting point for any 
discussion of the appropriateness of registering women 
for the draft is the question of the proper role of women 
in combat. . . . The policy precluding the use of women 
in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most impor-
tant reason for not including women in a registration 
syRtem." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 157. 
The District. Court stressed that the military need for 
women was irrelevant to the issue of their registration. As 
that court put it: "Congress could not constitutionally re-
quire registration under MSSA of only black citizens or only 
~bite citizens, or single out any political or religious group 
simply because those groups contained sufficient persons to 
till the needs of the selective service system." App. to .Juris. 
Statement 21a. This reasoning is beside the point. Women 
are not exempt from registration because military needs can 
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbi-
trarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situatrd 
groups, such as would be the case with an all-blark or all-
white, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Repub-
lican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, be-
cause of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not 
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for 
a draft. 
Congress' decision to authorize the registration of only 
men, therefore. is not violative of the Due Process Clause. 
The exemption of women from registration is not only suffi-
ciently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authoriz-
in~ reg;stration. See Michael M., swnra, at -; Craig v. 
Boren, suvra; Reed v. Reed, suvra. The fact that Congress 
and the Executive have decided that women should not serve· 
in combat fully justifies Congress in not authorizing their 
registration, since the purpose of registration is to develop 
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a pool of potential combat troops. As was the case in Schles-
inger v. Ballard, supra, "the gender classification is not in-
vidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact tha.t the sexes 
are not similarly situated" in this case. Michael M., supra, 
at -. The Constitution requires that Congress treat simi-
larly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures 
of superficial equality. 
In holding the MSSA constitutinally invalid the District 
Court relied heavily on the President's decision to seek au-
thority to register women and the testimony of members of 
tllf~ Executive Branch and the military in support of that de-
cision. See, e. (J., App. to Juris. Statement 37a. 39a. and n. 
30. As stated by the Administration's witnesses before Con-
gress, however, the President's "decision to ask for authority 
to register women is based on equity." House Hearings. 
J. A. 217 (stakment of Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie 
and Director of Selective Service System Rostker) ; see also 
Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform, 
supra, J. A. 35. 59, 60; Hearings on S. 2294, swvra, at 1657 
(statement of Executive Associate Director of Office of Man-
agement and Budget Wellford, Director of Selective Service 
System Rostker, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Dofense Danzig). This was also the basis for the testimony 
by military officials. Hearinjl;s on S. 2294, at 710 (Gen. 
Meyer), 1002 (Gen. Allen). The Senate Report. evaluating 
the tPstimony before the Committee, recognized that "the 
argument for registration and induction of women ... is not 
based on military necessity, but on considerations of equity." 
S. Rep. No. 96-826. supra, at 158. Congress was certainly 
entitled. in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise 
and regulate armies and navies. to focus on the q11estion of 
military ne<'d rather than "equity." 14 As Senator Nunn of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee put it: 
"Our Committee went into very great detail. We 
14 The grant of constitutional authority is, after all, to Congres and 
not to the Executive or military officials. 
22 
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foun~ that there was no military necessity cited by any 
witnesses for the registration of females. · 
"The main point that those who favored the registra-
tration of females made was that they were in favor o~ 
this because of the equality issue which is, of course, a 
legitimate view. But as far as military necessity, and 
that is what we are primarily, I hope, considering in the 
overall registration bill, there is no military necessity 
for this." 126 Cong. Rec. 86544. 
See also House Hearings, supra, J. A. 230 (Rep. Holt) ("You 
jl.re talking about equity. I am talking about military.").15 
. Although the military experts who testified in favor of 
registering women uniformly opposed the actual drafting of 
women. see, e. g., Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra, at 11 
(Gen. Rogers). there was testimony that in the event of a 
draft of 650,000 the military could absorb some 80.000 female 
inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1661, 1828. The 
80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men 
to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking 
down the MSSA. the District Court palpably exceeded its 
authority when it ignored Congress' considered response to 
this line of reasoning. 
H• Thr District Court also focused on what it termed Congress' 
~ 'inconsistent positions" in encouraging women to volunteer for military 
service and expanding their opportunities in the sen ·ice, on the one hand, 
.and exempting them from rcgistrat ion and the draft on the other. App. 
to Juris. Statrmcnt 37a-41a. This reasoning fnils to appreciate the 
differrnt purposes served by encomaging womrn volunteers and registra-
tion for the draft. Women volunteers do not occupy combat positions, 
so encouraging womrn to volunteer is not related to concerns about the 
availability of combat troops. In the event of a draft , however, the need 
would be for combat trcops or troops which could be rotated into combat. 
Ree 15-16, supra. Congress' positions are clearl~r not inronsi:;;trnt and in 
treating thrm as such the District Court. failrd to understa nd Congress' 
purpose behind registration as· distinguished from its purpose in encour· 
'ing women volunteers. 
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Tn the first place, assuming that a small number of women 
could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did 
not consider it worth the added burdens of including women 
in draft and registration plans. "It has been suggested that 
all women be registered, but only a handful actually be in-
ducted in an emergency. The Comimttee finds this a con-
fused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution." S. Rep. No. 
96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senate Committee recognized 
a year before, "training \vol'ld be needlessly burdened by 
women recruits who could not be used in combat." S. Rep. 
No. 96-226, supra, at 9. See also S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, 
at 159 ("Other administrative problems such as housing and 
different treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and 
physical standards would also exist."). It is not for this 
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the con-
text of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future 
mobilization. 
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women 
for noncombat roles during mobilization. whether 80,000 or 
less, it could be met by volunteers. See S. Rep. No. 96- 826, 
supra, at 160; id., at 158 ("Because of the combat restric-
tions, the need would be primarily for men, and women 
volunteers would fill the requirements for women."); House 
Hearings, sunra, J . A. 227-22~ (Rep. Holt). See also Hear-
ings on S. 2294. supra, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers). 
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing non-
combat positions with women during a mobiliza.tion wovld 
be positively detrimental to the important goal of military 
fiexibili ty. 
"There are other military reasons that preclude very 
large numbers of women from serving. Military flexi-
bility requires that a commander be able to move 1111its 
or ships quickly. Units or ships not located at the front 
or not previously scheduled for the front nevertheless 
must be able to move into action if necessary. In peace 
. i 
,;. 4 
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and war, significant rotation of personnel is necessary. 
We should not divide the military into two groups-one 
in permanent combat and one in permanent support: 
Large numbers of non-combat positions must be avail-
able to which combat troops can return for duty befor~ 
being redeployed." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158. 
The point was repeated in specific findings. id., at 160; seE: 
also S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 9. In sum, Congress 
carefully evaluated the testimony that 80,000 women con-
scripts could be usefully employed in the event of a draft and 
rejected it in the permissible exercise of its comtitutional re-
sponsibility. See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, sup1 a, 
at 16 (Gen. Rogers); 10 Hearings on S. 2294. supra, at 1682. 
The District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an inde-
pendent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an 
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evalua-
tion of that evidence. 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress acted 
well within its constitutional authority when it authorized 
the registration of men, and not women, under the Military 
16 General Rogers' tE>stimony merits quotation: 
"General ROGERS. One thing which i~ often lost sight of, SPnator, is 
that in an emergency during war, the Army has often had to reach back 
Into the support basE', into thE' supporting elE'ment~ in the operating basr, 
and pull forward soldier~; to fill the rank~ in An E>mergency; that i~, to 
hand them a rifle or give thrm a l!mker suit and put them in thr front 
ra11ks. 
"Senator WARNER. General Patton did that At one time, I believe at 
the Battle of the Bulge. 
"Genernl ROGERS. Absolntrl~' · 
"Now, if that support basE' and that operating base to the rear consists 
in large measure of womE'u, tlwn W<' dou't have thnt opportunit~r to reach 
back and pull them forwnrd. bC'rnui'r wom('n should not bP placed in a 
forward fighting position or in a tank, in my opinion. So thnt, too, E>nters 
the equation whE>n onr eonsidcrs the subject of the utility of women tmcler-
contingency conditions." 
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Selective Service Act. The decision of the District Court 
holding otherwise is accordingly 
Reversed. 
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May 13, 1981 ~~~ 
Re: No. 80-215 Rostker v. Goldberg 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for your letter of May 12. Subject to any 
objection from those who have already joined, I am prepared 
to make some of the chan9es you suggest. Your suggested 
change No. 4 is, of course, both factual and accurate and 
will be made. ~m -a..lso willing to go along with your 
suggested chang No. 2~~ the sentence you have marked for . 
elimination is b~bly repetitive and adds little if ' 
anything to the opinion. 
For the reason that I cheerfully accede your suggestion 
No. 4, I would prefer not to make your suggested change 
No. 3. The sentence is an historical statement of the 
plurality's position in Michael M. There the plurality 
mentioned the California legislature's action and stated 
"that is enough" to reject the accidental byproduct 
argument. The rejection of the argument at least insofar as 
the plurality opinion is written was not simply "in part" 
because of the California legislature's action. 
As to your first suggested change, although I am not 
wedded to the particular language I do think some sentence 
is needed to introduce the discussion which follows. Is 
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sidered in that, despite appellees' 
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and not for any considered reason." 
Appellees 35. 
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De ar Bill, 
I should have said so before, but I 
am awaiting the dissent in this case . 
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Justice Rehnquist 
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Dear Bill: 
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Regards, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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June 12, 1981 
Re: No. 80-251, Rostker v. Goldberg 
Dear Bill, 
I would have no objection to the new 
footnote you contemplate. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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Re: No. 80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg 
You have been chosen from the field of nine to receive 
this communication because each of you has had the foresight 
and prescience to join my proposed opinion for the Court in 
this case. The only point in Thurgood's dissent that I am 
considering responding to ~his contention on £age 13 that 
if a peacetime draft were held the Court could "be forced to 
declare the male-only registration program unconstitutional" 
because the present opinion focuses on Congress' 
determination that registration was linked to a possible 
future draft characterized by a need for combat troops. I 
believe there are two significant errors in this reasoning. 
First, the constitutional validity of male-only 
registration would not be affected by a peacetime draft. 
Inductees could challenge the peacetime draft itself, but 
male-only registration would be valid for the reasons stated 
in our opinion. 
More importantly, a draft of combat troops of the sort 
anticipated by Congress need not at all be limited to actual 
wartime, and Congress, although focusing on mobilization, 
recognized this. If a peacetime draft were held the need 
would also be for combat or combat-eligible troops. See S. 
Rep. No. 96-826, at 160 ("Present manpower deficiencies 
under the All- Volunteer Force are concentrated in the 
combat arms--infantry, armor, combat engineers, field 
- 2 -
artillery and air defense."). Congress recognized that its 
considerations concerning registration of women, based on 
the perceived need in the event of a draft for combat 
troops, applied both to wartime and peacetime conscription. 
See, ~' id., at 157 ("registering women for assignment to 
combat or assigning women to combat positions in 
peacetime ..• would leave the actual performance of sexually 
mixed units as an experiment to be conducted in war with 
unknown risk") (emphasis supplied) . Some of Congress' 
reasons for exempting women from registration explicitly 
applied both to peacetime and wartime conscription. See, 
e.g., id., at 158 ("In peace and war, significant rotation 
of personnel is necessary."). Certainly Congress and the 
Executive do not have to await the actual outbreak of 
hostilities if they decide there exists a need for a draft 
of combat or combat-eligible troops. 
Although I am not convinced that it is necessary to say 
anything, do any of you have objections to a footnote along 
the following lines, perhaps added at the end of the block 
quotation on page 20 of the May 14 draft?: 
The dissent's suggestion that since Congress 
focused on the need for combat troops in 
authorizing male-only registration the Court 
"could be forced to declare the male-only 
registration program unconstitutional" in the 
event of a peacetime draft misreads our opinion. 
The perceived need for combat or combat-eligible 
troops in the event of a draft was not limited to 
- a wartime draft. See, ~' S. Rep. No. 96-826, 
supra, at 157 (considering problems associated 
with "[r]egistering women for assignment to combat 
or assigning women to combat positions in 
peacetime"); id., at 157 (need for rotation 
between comba~and non - combat positions "[i]n 
peace and war") • 
Sincerely, 
-.lune 12, 1981 
80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg 
Dear Bill: 
I think your proposed footnote will be helpful. 
It has my approval. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
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The new footnote is acceptable to me. 
Justice Rehnquist 
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